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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1 Background  
 
Small scale agriculture in developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA), is confronted with a number of challenges—such as low productivity—
compounded by the adverse effect of climate change. The low productivity in 
smallholder agriculture in SSA is, in part, due to degradation of soil using poor and 
unsustainable farming systems, low human capital and climatic conditions. These factors 
are also largely responsible for the low level of agricultural investment and financing 
(Zepeda, 2001; Thorp et al., 2005; Tenywa et al., 2011).  
Sustainable agriculture and rural development (SARD), as defined by the food 
and agriculture organization, FAO (1989) is “the management and conservation of the 
natural resource base, and the orientation of technological and institutional change in 
such a manner as to ensure the attainment and continued satisfaction of human needs 
for present and future generations. Such sustainable development conserves land, water, 
plant and animal genetic resources, is environmentally non-degrading, technically 
appropriate, economically viable and socially acceptable.” It is argued that sustainable 
agricultural growth amongst smallholders to overcome inefficiencies and natural 
resource degradation can be achieved by an innovation systems approach (Tenywa et al., 
2011). Upscaling of sustainable productivity in agriculture is suggested to involve 
substantial investment and innovative institutional arrangements (Jama and Pizarro, 
2008; Conning and Morduch, 2011). Structured institutions are required to facilitate 
access to and use of inputs such as physical capital and fertilizer necessary to attain food 
security and adequate levels of financing for agriculture, particularly in SSA (Wiebe et 
al., 2001). Organizations which act as intermediaries in the coordination of different 
sectors necessary to the attainment of social and environmental sustainability facilitate 
access to information and markets (Hall et al., 2006). As such, existing local structures 
and national pro-poor schemes could be vital to the promotion of rural agriculture and 
institutional innovation. Innovation by smallholder farmers that results in community 
empowerment is also suggested to increase market access via strong interactions and 
flow of knowledge within institutional networks (Kaaria et al., 2009; Biggs, 2007). 
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When farmers are linked to new (international) markets attaining higher bargaining 
power may improve their livelihoods (Sanginga et al., 2006). This is in line with a study 
by Dorward et al. (2003), who argue that the absence of markets, institutions and 
technology may be detrimental to the development of sustainable livelihoods and 
poverty reduction. 
Carbon emission markets such as the clean development mechanism (CDM) and 
voluntary carbon standards (VCS) are examples of the emergence of new markets driven 
by institutional innovation. These markets have the potential to achieve the millennium 
and sustainable development goals (M/SDG) of climate resilience agriculture and 
poverty reduction if properly designed and implemented. The afforestation and 
reforestation (A/R) or agroforestry emission trading scheme under the CDM and VCS 
which offer payments for ecosystem services (PES) are becoming successful in SSA 
especially amongst the least developed countries (LDC) (Kreibich et al., 2013). 
Agroforestry with PES projects accounts for 30 percent and 19 percent, respectively, of 
total A/R registered projects represents largest share of SSA registered project (Kreibich 
et al., 2013). PES are designed to provide socio- economic benefit to various groups by 
reward those providing ecosystem services accordingly (Ghazoul et al., 2011). PES, an 
indicator for sustainable agriculture, may also impact rural agricultural credits 
accessibility beyond current levels as a result of the increase in business investment as 
well as participation of various institutions in sustainable rural development. Efforts to 
promote agroforestry in rural SSA in recent years has had moderate success due to low 
rate of adoption estimated to be less than one percent of the continents land mass 
(Thiombiano and  Meshack, 2009). Another hurdle to agroforestry with PES is 
transaction costs, e.g., input maintenance, monitor reporting and validation (MRV), and 
low output prices (Ghazoul et al., 2011; Tschakert, 2007; Locatelli and Pedroni, 2006). 
It is argued that weak infrastructure in education, business and information hinders the 
adoption of innovation in developing countries (Aubert, 2005). Adoption of innovation 
such as agroforestry with PES in rural areas may not require well-developed 
infrastructure. It is suggested that strong partnerships between public and private parties 
involved in sustainable agriculture activities, especially in LDCs, may result in strong 
bargaining power in future climate policy agreements with respect to market regulations 
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and PES prices (Tubiello, 2011). For instance, agriculture and climate policy on 
agroforestry in Northeast Thailand led to the establishment of Inpang Carbon Bank and 
the reduction of transaction costs through the application of a new methodology (Samek 
et al., 2011). The PES from small-scale agroforestry has the ability to engage institutions 
which were previously not adequately linked to rural agriculture production, eventually 
increase financing (Ottaviani, 2011).  
PES prices are usually negotiated between buyers and sellers and take into 
consideration a number of factors, such as market prices and also the contribution of a 
project to the overall livelihood of smallholders. The historical prices of each unit of 
carbon, i.e., certified emissions reductions – CER and European Union allowances - 
EUA sold on the CDM and the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS), 
respectively, are depicted in figure 1 below. Both guaranteed and non-guaranteed forms 
of credit corresponding to secondary and primary CER assumes certain co-integration to 
the EUA which is a source of concern. This co-integrated has been argued not to exist as 
such, so that both EUA and CER are more independent (Mizrach, 2010). Nevertheless 
high volatility and low carbon price due to exogenous shocks may have certain negative 
impact on climate mitigation efforts as well as investment in low carbon technologies in 
developing countries (Ares, 2013). Celebi and Graves (2009) suggest that CO2 price 
volatility could delay investment in mitigation technologies by more than 10 years; 
therefore, they propose a floor and ceiling price on CO2 to safeguard low-carbon 
investments. Internationally traded emission credits can be assumed to be a main driver 
of sustainable investment and low-carbon innovation in developing countries. However, 
the restriction of trading of agroforestry related certain carbon on the EU ETS due to 
fear of non-permanent risk could impair efforts to promote rural sustainable because of 
market entry barrier (Dutschke et al., 2005; Shames and Scherr, 2010).  
Depending on a number of socio-economic factors, agroforestry with PES 
schemes in rural areas could promote inclusiveness, i.e., participation of the poorest of 
the poor. Certain schools of thought have, however, argued that there may be cases 
where PES schemes lead to the exclusion of the poorest of the poor (Tschakert, 2007). It 
is suggested that for pro-poor environmental service provisions to be successful, demand 
and supply have to be linked to adequate levels of payment and supported by equity 
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mechanisms (Tschakert, 2007). The equity mechanism stipulated above is expected to 
ease the low level of investment prevalent in rural areas (Tschakert, 2007). Financial 
institutions can bridge the gap left by low investments. These institutions can participate 
in the value chain of agroforestry through direct investments in projects or providing 
lending and saving facilities targeting smallholder farmers participating in agroforestry 
with PES schemes. The latter may improve the credit environment in rural agriculture 
areas which has been described by substantial number of studies as incredibly poor. The 
ability of small scale agriculture practitioners to signal of business quality to financial 
institutions has being problematic due to lack of adequate instruments. The self-
financing of a portion of agroforestry costs within a PES scheme, e.g., purchase input by 
smallholders and contractual agreements, could serve as an adequate signaling 
mechanism. This could be a novel approach to changing the perception widely held by 
financial institutions that small-scale agriculture activities are “risky”. The development 
of rural agriculture can be attained not just by increased access to credit but also more 
favorable credit terms for rural agricultural clients. PES schemes could improve the 
probability of financial institutions (microfinance) lending to small-scale agroforestry 
projects at favorable interest rates. This could potentially lessen one of the major hurdles 
to sustainable agriculture development in rural SSA. 
The potential benefits of small-scale agroforestry with PES schemes in rural SSA 
appear to include more than the conventional direct benefits, such as climate mitigation, 
nutritional supplementation, soil improvement and higher productivity. This thesis 
establishes a framework for institutional innovation in the agroforestry emission 
certification process and explores the possible poverty alleviation effect of this 
innovation through improved agriculture financing and also evaluates the socio-
economic condition of participating smallholders. Furthermore, the study seeks to shed 
light on the emergence of a low-risk sustainable agriculture system in parts of rural SSA. 
This study contributes to existing literature on sustainable agriculture and institutional 
innovation by adopting a pragmatic approach.  
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Source: Author´s modification (Greenresources, 2014; World Bank, 2012) 
Figure 1: Carbon emission reduction price trend 2007 – 2013 
 
1.2 Objective and research question 
   
A conceptual framework on how to integrate local institutions into the 
smallholder agroforestry PES value chain is proposed in this study. A comprehensive 
overview of the agroforestry carbon certification procedure and carbon accounting is 
introduced in later sections of this chapter. The impact of international emission trading 
mechanisms related to agriculture emission reduction (similar to that of the Kyoto 
protocol) on agricultural financing is evaluated. The inclusion of projects aimed at 
sequestering carbon via Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) in 
international agreements is a way of promoting and rewarding ‘climate friendly’ land 
use, particularly in developing countries (Thomas et al., 2009). Climate change 
mitigation through agroforestry (carbon capture and storage) and soil carbon offset 
emissions may potentially offset approximately 84 percent of current emissions due to 
agricultural activities (Smith et al., 2008). The total annual a global carbon (CO2) 
emission from agriculture is estimated between 5.1 Giga tons of carbon equivalent - Gt 
CO2-eq and 6.1 Gt CO2-eq (Smith et al., 2007). Over the last decade there has been a 
growing interest in agroforestry, particularly its provision of environmental services, 
impact on household welfare, and promotion of biological diversity conservation 
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(McNeely and Scherr, 2006). Agroforestry with PES also offers financial and non-
financial incentives such as carbon revenues and improved yield due to soil fertility, 
both of which can help promote the adoption of sustainable agriculture in rural SSA 
(Wollenberg et al., 2012; Streck et al., 2012). In order to effectively tap into the 
aforementioned benefits, certain constraints such as credit, investment and knowledge 
that confront smallholder farmers in rural SSA need to be addressed. This is in line with 
studies which argue that the success of small-scale agroforestry in developing countries 
depends on financing, including access to credit, available to project participants (Udo 
de Haes et al., 2008; Valdivia et al., 2009; Streck et al., 2012). Therefore a financing 
mechanism capable of dealing with smallholder farmers’ diverse risks can encourage 
sustainable practices on a large scale (Foster et al., 2013; Morton, 2007).  Sustainable or 
conservation farming in the form of agroforestry can potentially increase rural 
agriculture investment by harnessing the opportunity provided by climate change, e.g., 
international climate agreements and sustainable poverty alleviation programs. 
Furthermore the capital accumulation of participating smallholders can lead to other 
benefits such as access to formal credit.  Bumpus and Liverman (2008) argue that, 
although carbon offset is a capital-accumulation strategy for reducing atmospheric 
carbon, its policy design primarily benefits industrial countries and may be 
disadvantageous to agroforestry due to relative low prices for agroforestry carbon offset. 
A number of international and local institutions as well as Non-profit and for-profit 
organizations are involved in agroforestry with PES leading to a comprehensive value 
chain. This value chain interaction is suggested to have led to a positive and significant 
relationship between agricultural carbon finance, institutional structure, and 
smallholders (Shames and Scherr, 2010). Researchers in agricultural and developmental 
economics have been urged to conduct studies on how to strengthen this value chain 
linkage in order to improve technical efficiency and the welfare of smallholder farmers 
in SSA (Oduol et al., 2011). The value chain of agroforestry with PES can be utilized by 
financial institutions as a risk management strategy that has lower transaction costs and 
information asymmetries than strategies solely based on a borrower’s creditworthiness. 
This thesis analyzes smallholder sustainable agriculture (agroforestry with PES) in 
connection to credit financing. The opportunities provided by international climate 
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agreements and emission trading schemes as well as corresponding value chains are 
evaluated. More specifically the following questions are addressed in this thesis:  
1. Who are the sustainable smallholder farmers practicing agroforestry with PES, and 
what has influenced their decision to do so?   
2. What possible value chain framework can promote business partnerships between 
sustainable smallholders and financial institutions in rural SSA?    
3. Can the self-financing aspect of agroforestry with PES signal the quality of a farm 
business to financial institutions? 
4. How does payment for ecosystem services (PES) influence a borrower’s credit risk 
indictor? 
5. Are sustainable smallholders credit constrained  and/or have favorable interest rate 
compared to conventional smallholders     
 
1.3 Climate, productivity and sub-Saharan Africa agriculture 
 
  Agriculture is the main source of livelihood for a large share of the rural 
population in SSA. The smallholder farming system, i.e., farm size less than three 
hectares (ha), is one of the largest employers within the informal sector, employing over 
60 percent of the continent’s labor force (Prakash and Stigler, 2012). Smallholder 
farmers are responsible for approximately 90 percent of food and cash crop production 
in developing countries, while the sector accounts for between 18  and 35 percent of 
SSA gross domestic product (GDP) (Morton, 2007; Prakash and Stigler, 2012; 
Mucavele, 2009). Despite the sector´s substantial contribution to economic growth in 
SSA, it continues to experience a moderate level of productivity. For instance, SSA 
agriculture productivity remains relatively low, estimated at 1.1 to1.5 metric tons per 
hectare compared to the world average of 3.2 metric tons per hectare (Oluoch- Kosura, 
and Sikei, 2013). Amongst the factors that have contributed to the low productivity 
observed in SSA are climate and environmental effects and financial constraints 
(Challinor et al., 2007; Dercon, 2008; Dercon, 2000; Morton, 2007). This section 
reviews the effects of the former on agriculture while the latter is addressed in the 
subsequent section. Climate change, either natural or human-induced, influences the 
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productivity of agriculture systems due to the release of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
which changes rainfall patterns and temperatures (Challinor et al., 2007). A substantial 
number (89 percent) of cereal production farming systems in rural SSA agriculture as 
well as other developing countries are dependent on rainfall (Challinor et al., 2007). The 
effect of climate change across various ecological zones within SSA varies. Decline in 
annual rainfall for parts of Western African over the last 60 years is estimated to be 
between 20 and 40 percent while certain parts of the region, e.g., the Guinean coast, 
have witnessed a 10 percent increase in annual rainfall (Boko et al., 2007). It has also 
been argued that while East Africa observed increased rainfall in the north and reduced 
rainfall in the south, Southern African has been experiencing extreme climatic 
conditions (Boko et al., 2007). Simulation models suggest that the agriculture system in 
western Africa may see an increase in crop yield in the early part of the 21st century due 
to increases in temperature and precipitation; however, a decline in crop yield is 
projected for the latter part of the century (Adewojun, 2006). Grain crop yields in lower 
latitudes, i.e., most of SSA, may decrease compared to yields in higher latitude regions if 
average temperature increases by one to three degrees Celsius (Schneider et al., 2007). 
The low productivity of smallholder farming in SSA is also attributed to poor and 
unsustainable farming practices which have led to erosive cultivation and declining soil 
fertility (Mazvimavi and Twomlow, 2009; Hartemink, 2006). Approximately 10 to 12 
percent of total global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in 2005 were due to 
unsustainable agricultural activities (Smith, 2007). Over the last 40 years, 500 million 
hectares of land globally have been converted to agricultural land, this corresponds to an 
average six million hectares of forest land and seven million hectares of other land 
annually (Smith, 2007). The reasons for this massive trend in land use change, which is 
expected to continue, are growing populations and an increased demand for food and 
energy (Smith, 2007; Benjamin, 2012). Certain agriculture activities such as clearing of 
land and fertilizer application serve as a source of CO2 emissions. SSA estimates that 
emissions from the aforementioned agricultural activities from 1990 – 2020 will be 
approximately 1000 Mt CO2eq (Smith, 2007). The CO2 emission due to land clearing 
and expansion of agricultural land accounts for 43 percent of Africa’s total CO2 
emissions (Shames and Scherr, 2010). The area of land in SSA that will have been 
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deforested for agriculture expansion purposes over the last decade (2005 – 2015) is 
estimated at five million hectares which will emit 13 percent (two billion tons of CO2eq) 
of annual global CO2 (Shames and Scherr, 2010). Certain agriculture practices have 
been shown to be major contributors to the production of/release of GHGs; however, 
other practices mitigate atmospheric GHGs, offsetting adverse effects. The mitigation 
potential of agriculture practices such as crop and organic soil management is 
approximately 5500–6000 Mt CO2-eq yr-1 which is 20 percent of total annual emissions 
of 29 Gt CO2-eq in the 1990s (Smith, 2008). Smallholder agroforestry intercropping 
systems may help reduce the effect of GHGs by mitigating between40 and 147 CO2eq 
yr-1 (Shames and Scherr, 2010; Benjamin, 2012). Perennial crops, apart from improving 
soil conditions and increasing soil carbon content, may also protect against soil erosion 
(Benjamin, 2012). Therefore adoption of conservation agriculture is seen as a means of 
increasing crop productivity despite the presence of climate change and environmental 
degradation. An estimated 65.7 percent of Zambian smallholder farmers have adopted 
conservation farming practices such as minimum tillage and nitrogen-fixing crop 
rotation (Kabamba and Muimba-Kankolongo, 2009; Manzeke et al., 2012; Jama and 
Pizarro, 2008). This form of agricultural practices has led to an average maize yield of 
approximately 2 tons/ha, which is three times the yield from conventional farming 
observed in Zambia and across parts of SSA (Kabamba and Muimba-Kankolongo 2009; 
Manzeke et al., 2012; Jama and Pizarro, 2008). Adoption of conservation farming moves 
smallholder farmers away from production inefficiency and closer to their production 
frontier and technical efficiency (Musara et al., 2012; Feder et al., 1982). This may also 
increase human capital through access to extension services. However, the adoption rate 
of sustainable farming practices in SSA is low and suggested to be restricted to South 
Africa, Ghana and Zambia (Giller et al., 2009). The adoption of sustainable agriculture 
practices to mitigate GHGs in the future will depend on the price of carbon dioxide 
equivalents. The incentives that come with the adoption of sustainable agriculture 
practices must be higher than the opportunity cost; in other words, the net benefit of 
agroforestry with PES must be substantially greater than zero. This is in line with a 
study by Smith et al. (2008) where it was argued that the potential of agriculture to 
mitigate GHGs can be effectively tapped into if future prices of carbon are between 
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US$20 and US$100 t CO2-eq-1. The low carbon prices currently observed on the market 
may therefore be a barrier to the adoption of sustainable practices as the opportunity 
costs of these practices may be higher. However, if the other benefits that come with 
agroforestry with PES are considered, the opportunity cost may be lower. 
 
1.4 Agricultural credit and investment in sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Lending by formal institutions to the agricultural sector in rural areas in 
developing countries, especially SSA, is low. It is difficult to estimate if the unbanked 
are omitted because they own profitable businesses, are not creditworthy, or are 
creditworthy but not interested in credit (Johnston and Morduch, 2007; Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2008; Sahan and Mikhail, 2012). In Africa, lack of access to credit (see 
figure 2) generally affects agriculture inputs in particular (Jama and Pizarro, 2008). 
Smallholders in SSA are argued to be in need of seasonal credit to buy inputs for 
reviving cash crop production; this credit may be achieved by involving intermediary 
such as traders in formal lending process of banks to ensure low default rates (Poulton et 
al., 1998). The mechanism as proposed by Poulton et al. (1998) may be controversial as 
smallholders are locked-out of the financial system, with the intermediary taking 
advantage of the system design. Although smallholder farmers in parts of rural SSA 
have devised means of accessing credit by forming informal savings groups such as 
Chama and tontines, this has not lessened the constraints on credit due to low lending 
volume (Kiptot and Franzel, 2012). Risk management strategy as well as lack of 
agriculture sector evaluation by a number of financial institutions may have shifted 
lending to low-risk borrowers (Hughes and Mester, 1998; Skees and Barnett, 2006).  
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Source:  Demirguc-Kunt, A., and L. Klapper. 2012 
Figure 2: Lending around the World (2012) 
 
Rural smallholder farmers are often regarded by financial institutions as high-
risk borrowers due to lack of collateral and inadequate instrumentation for signaling 
business quality (Johnston and Morduch, 2007; Armendariz and Morduch, 2005; 
Dercon, 2004; Jama and Pizarro, 2008; Lubwama, 1999). The vulnerability of 
smallholders to climate change as well as lack of business knowledge, land tenure and 
information asymmetry may further limit loan availability to the rural agriculture sector 
(Rodrigues de Aquino, 2011). Besley (1994) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) have argued 
that credit rationing always occurs when lenders lack information on borrowers and 
incur high costs due to contract enforcement which leads to institutional inefficiency. 
This is in line with the results of the survey conducted by this study on commercial and 
microfinance bank lending to agriculture small and medium enterprise (SME) in the 
rural Mount Kenyan region (see figures 3 and 4). This may be one of the reasons for the 
observed decline in investment in rural agriculture in SSA. Another reason for the 
decline in agriculture investment is the fall in bilateral aid from the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) from 13.2 percent in 1987 to 7.3 
percent in 1998, along with a decrease in national government funding (Tschirley and 
Benfica, 2001). For instance, total investment in agriculture for SSA in 2007 stood at 
one percent, compared to the 2001 level of between 1.5 and 7.9 percent (Prakash and 
Stigler, 2012; Zepeda, 2001). In the last 40 years, agricultural economists have argued 
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that investment in the agricultural sector is vital to both poverty alleviation and 
economic transformation (Tschirley and Benfica, 2001). 
 
 
Source: Author  
Figure 3: Reasons for low level commercial bank lending in Meru, Embu and 
Nanyuki Kenya (2013)  
 
Source: Author  
Figure 4: Reasons for low level microfinance bank lending in Meru, Embu and 
Nanyuki Kenya (2013)  
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In contrast to developed countries, where private funding is a common option available 
to agriculture, developing countries have limited accessibility to private funding 
combined with uncertain returns and low private-led research institutions (Prakash and 
Stigler, 2012). Funding in the form of credit or loans is suggested to be connected to 
social capital and common pool resources and more recently has been linked to 
environmental resource management (Anderson et al., 2002).  This may imply that 
smallholder farmers’ limited access to formal credit might correspond to a high rate of 
environmental resource depletion or degradation. This is in line with the study by 
Tamazian et al. (2008) in which it is argued that development of the financial (banking) 
sector and financial openness are important for the reduction of CO2 in developing 
countries. It may not be appropriate to assume a strict positive and significant correlation 
between environmental degradation and credit. Degradation of the environment may 
also correlate with other traditional and socio-economic factors as well as nature which 
should not be excluded from consideration. Farm-level measures to control 
environmental degradation usually provide diverse long-term benefits. But these 
practices involve upfront costs and credit market imperfections and failures in rural 
areas of developing economies impair long-term lending to conservation endeavors 
(Winters et al., 2004). The low level of lending to smallholder farms may continue to 
encourage unsustainable farming systems, leading to continued soil degradation. 
Lending by sector amongst commercial banks around the Mount Kenya region indicates 
that SME agriculture may be underserved. The total lending of commercial banks to 
small and medium agriculture was 5.65 percent of total portfolio (see figure 5). Prakash 
and Stigler (2012) argue that commercial bank lending to agriculture in developing 
countries is less than 10 percent. The percentage of total credit portfolio allocated to 
agriculture by microfinance and co-operative banks in the Mount Kenya region was high 
at 49 percent (see figure 6). Commercial banks and an increasing number of 
microfinance institutions are focusing on individual lending in agricultural financing. 
Commercial banks prefer the conventional form of collateralization, namely land and 
physical capital i.e. savings deposit (see figure 7). The same is observed amongst 
microfinance and co-operative banks (see figure 8) due to a risk management strategy 
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that involves a collateral requirement. This in line with a study by Kodongo and Kendi 
(2013) that suggests that microfinance institutions in Kenya are shifting from group to 
individual lending.  
 
 
Source: Author  
Figure 5: Average commercial bank lending by sector in Meru, Embu and 
Nanyuki. Kenya (2013)  
 
 
Source: Author  
Figure 6: Average microfinance lending by sector in Meru, Embu and Nanyuki. 
Kenya (2013)  
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When credit is available to smallholder farmers in certain parts of SSA, high interest 
rates, usually between 22 and 27 percent, make it unaffordable for potential borrowers 
(Lubwama, 1999). The interest rate charged on agricultural credit by commercial banks 
in the sampled area is between 18.5 and 19 percent.  This is similar to that charged by 
microfinance institutions which range between 10 and 24 percent. The high interest rates 
charged by financial institutions may be due to the aforementioned lack of adequate 
collateral by smallholders in the agricultural sector. Certain risk-management strategies 
and national banking legislations may limit agricultural financing of SME agriculture 
thus favoring large-scale farms which can put up conventional collateral (Jessop et al., 
2012; Kloeppinger-Todd and Sharma 2010). Risk management strategies for individual 
lending that solely focus on conventional collateral in agriculture may not be able to 
evaluate other eligible forms of collateral. This may be a reason why all the 
microfinance and commercial institutions sampled in the eastern province of the Mount 
Kenya region were not aware of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs 
taking place within the various local communities. 
 
 
Source: Author  
Figure 7: Preferred collateral of commercial banks in Meru, Embu and Nanyuki 
Kenya (2013) 
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Source: Author  
gure 8: Preferred collateral of microfinance banks in Meru, Embu and Nanyuki 
Kenya (2013) 
 
Smallholders “conventional collateral” due to exposure to exogenous and endogenous 
shocks may negative influence borrowers credit evaluation by financial institutions. The 
financial institutions interviewed stated that farmland evaluation is a challenge due to 
size and ownership structure. Moreover, the high transaction cost accruable to the 
financial institution in case of default and inability to sell the acquired land is also an 
issue. Physical capital such as savings deposits—which were not available to rural 
populations in the past but can now be accessed via Information and communication 
technology-ICT such as mobile money–is perceived to present an opportunity to 
financial institutions. However, in Kenya, of the 68 percent of adults using mobile 
phones on an annual basis for sending or receiving money, only 43 percent had an 
account with a financial institution (Demirguc-Kunt and Klapper, 2012). The total 
percentage of adults in rural SSA with accounts with a financial institution was 
estimated at 21 percent compared to 88percent in high-income countries (Demirguc-
Kunt and Klapper, 2012). This massive difference in the percentage of savings account 
holders has been attributed to low national income and high gender inequality in SSA. 
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The issue surrounding consideration of conventional collateral in smallholder credit 
evaluation may lead to a pooling system for agriculture loans. Charging a uniform 
interest rate (pooling) is another measure by financial institutions to reduce the risk of 
default by borrowers, at the same time this strategy limits lending to a specific thus, 
exposure to correlated shocks (Skees and Barnett, 2006). This may explain the reason 
microfinance banks are shifting from group to individual lending, which is a more 
collateralized form of banking (Goldberg and Palladini, 2010; Lehner, 2009). There is 
need to provide some form of support to sustainable farmers in developing countries to 
enable them to access formal financial credit (Winters et al., 2004). Credit with 
favorable interest rates helps smallholder farmers to invest in fertilizers, improved seeds, 
and conservation which impacts livelihood despite the poor marketing conditions 
present in most rural areas (Jama and Pizarro, 2008; Solís et al., 2007).   
 
1.5 Methodology  
 
To address the research questions in section 1.2, theoretical and empirical 
analysis was conducted based on game theory, random utility model, logistic regression 
and ordinary least squares (OLS). Models were proposed for the integration of financial 
institutions into agroforestry with PES value chain. The game theory model used to 
address some of the research questions reverts to mathematical methodology in 
analyzing the strategy of agents (farmers and financial institutions). The strategy chosen 
by an agent is expected to maximize payoffs in the presence of competitors with other 
strategies. In such situations the game theory and random utility models are appropriate 
analytical tools. Question 1 is closely related to the adoption of innovation in a rural 
context. Question 2 prompts analysis of the mode of interaction between a principal and 
an agent and information asymmetry. Question 3 revolves around signaling as a 
mechanism. Question 4 is based on the impact of sustainability on credit risk 
management. Question 5 is related to the assessment of sustainability on credit 
accessibility and terms.  
Chapter 2 aims to address the first research question. The adoption of an 
innovation, agroforestry with PES, is treated as a utility problem. A random utility 
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discrete choice model for the adoption of agriculture conservation practices with PES in 
Costa Rica is applied to agroforestry in Kenya. The model is based on utility 
maximization of the adopters as well as investigating factors that are likely to influence 
the adoption of agroforestry with PES in the rural Mount Kenyan region. Apart from the 
utility derived from agroforestry, aforementioned factors may turn participation in a PES 
scheme into a sort of “club” which may lead to exclusion of poorer smallholders. Factors 
that generally characterize smallholder farmers such as farm size, age, and education are 
analyzed against the backdrop of participation in agroforestry with PES.  
Research question 2 is the center of focus of chapter 3. This chapter investigates 
rural agricultural financing and investment given opportunities provided by international 
agreement on sustainable development and climate change mitigation. A model based on 
the current linkage of sustainable smallholder farmers to international emission markets 
as a value chain process is designed to integrate formal financial institution. This model 
sheds new insight on diversification of agricultural risk and sustainable investments 
opportunities for formal financial institutions and international investors.  
Chapter 4 seeks to address research question 3. In this chapter, game theory 
signaling, given incomplete information, is used to assess the first-mover advantage of 
certain types of borrowers, i.e., smallholder farmers. From the perspective of the 
financial institution, borrowers are divided into two groups: sustainable and non-
sustainable. The former are assumed to have self-financed part of their agroforestry 
project. This study therefore investigates if partial self-financing can signal to potential 
lenders a form of business quality, eventually leading to a separation rather than pooling 
equilibrium amongst agriculture borrowers.  
Chapter 5 deals with the fourth research question. Evaluation of credit 
performance based on sustainable and conventional agricultural practices are simulated 
using credit risk instruments. The effects of PES from agroforestry on variables 
including probability of default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and profitability of 
credit portfolio are quantified. The current low price for carbon per ton and falling prices 
of conventional collateral was simulated to determine what impact, if any, PES has on 
risk variables.   
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Chapter 6 provides answers to the fifth research question. This chapter 
investigates the credit terms and constraints amongst sustainable (agroforestry with 
PES) and conventional smallholder farmers in Kenya. The impact of PES as an eligible 
collateral substitute on the interest rate charged by financial institutions is also 
investigated.  
 
1.6 Institutional setting and scale  
 
Environmental degradation, poverty and climate change have called on 
international and national policy-makers and institutions to establish a framework for 
sustainable development, including improved smallholder productivity (Winter et al., 
2004). Lybbert and Sumner (2010) argue that institutions are important links between 
agriculture and ecosystem services; through the accounting of GHGs, PES or emission 
credits are introduced within the sector. The rights to carbon credits are also linked to 
land rights and therefore the lack of land tenure may present challenges (Shames and 
Scherr, 2010). Successful PES programs in developing countries require collaboration 
between organizations (predominantly NGOs) working as intermediaries and local 
trustworthy networks (Bekessy and Cooke, 2011). Involvement of governmental 
organizations may delay the adoption of agriculture innovation, since lack of knowledge 
and proper program design inhibit opportunities to access new markets (Salami et al., 
2010). The lack of local institutions to enforce agroforestry regulations may lead to a 
collapse of the PES project (Rodrigues de Aquino et al., 2011; Perez et al., 2007). Multi-
layered institutional structure can address the hurdles in the provision of ecosystem 
services in areas with high levels of poverty and can also promote pro-poor adoption of 
agroforestry (Tschakert, 2007). For instance, the value chain of smallholder agroforestry 
with PES usually involves non-government extension services (project management), 
carbon developers, third party verifiers and buyers (see Figure 9) (Bayon et al., 2009; 
Shames et al., 2012; Shames and Scherr, 2010; Peskett et al., 2010). This structure is 
observed across almost all emission trading markets. The two markets for agroforestry 
emission trading comprise the compliance and voluntary markets which shall be 
discussed in detail in the next section. The United Nations’ Clean Development 
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Mechanism (CDM) which is the compliance market, between 2001 and 2003, accepted 
(A/R) activities as a CO2 emission reduction strategy (Dutschke et al., 2005; Smith, 
2002). The voluntary carbon market recognized agroforestry as a mitigation strategy in 
1989 and has continuously upgraded its quality of agroforestry emission with standards 
(Bayon et al., 2009). Lower prices coupled with the limited recognition of forestry’s 
additional social and environmental benefits are two reasons for the low level of 
transactions on the CDM (Peskett et al., 2010; Kreibich et al., 2013). This study does not 
differentiate between PES traded on the VCS or CDM market, as the procedures are 
similar. It is important to analyze the value chain of smallholders’ agroforestry with PES 
from an organizational perspective. Project management entities with the PES project 
provide extension services and technical assistance (Shames et al., 2012). The extension 
services provided by the project management differs from the conventional extension 
services as the focus is on sustainable practices targeted at overcoming climate and 
environmental challenges. This core competence “climate smart agriculture” may 
therefore lead to resilient and profitable rural agriculture. Project managers are pro-
active in the day-to-day operations and outreach of the project, including tree monitoring 
and PES sharing supervision. The International Small Group Tree Planting Programme 
(TIST) provides project management of the agroforestry with PES analyzed in this 
study. TIST is located in the city of Meru in the Eastern province of Kenya.  
 
Source: Author´s modification (Bayon et al., 2009) 
Figure 9: Supply chain of the voluntary carbon markets 
Carbon project developers are vital for the establishment of carbon projects given their 
know-how and expertise in emission registration. Carbon project developers range from 
for- and non-profit organizations to public institutions, each with different motives 
connected in one way or another to climate change mitigation/adaptation and sustainable 
development (Hamilton et al., 2008). The carbon developer for the smallholder 
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agroforestry with PES project in the Mount Kenya region is the Clean Air Action 
Corporation (CAAC). Project developers have to perform a number of tasks which 
include the monitoring of the cost of project implementation (Shames et al., 2012). 
Carbon developers have the capability and resources to conduct proper carbon 
accounting and project design; they usually make decisions regarding project 
implementation and benefit-sharing (Atela, 2012). Furthermore, it is the responsibility of 
the carbon developer to provide evidence of a positive socio-economic effect of the 
project’s activities on smallholders, as well as choose appropriate emission methodology 
(Shames et al., 2012). The overall objective of a carbon developer is to authenticate 
carbon mitigation, certifying smallholders’ farming activities as sustainable. Apart from 
appointing verifiers, carbon developers—depending on level of involvement in the 
project—also link smallholders to markets by either acting as carbon credit buyers or 
finding potential buyers (Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010). The verifiers or auditors of 
emissions within a project are known as the designated operation entity (DOE). The 
auditing costs of the DOE makes up a substantial portion of the project cost, as DOEs 
are typically international corporations. This cost is perceived as a hurdle to the 
registration of projects on the VCS in South Africa, where the focus has shifted to 
capacity building of local verifiers and auditors (Peters-Stanley and Hamilton, 2012). 
Retailers and wholesalers supply emission offsets to the market in different volumes 
using different transaction channels. Retailers provide small amounts of emission credits 
to individuals and organizations, mostly using online transaction tools (Hamilton et al., 
2008; Bellassen and Leguet, 2007). Wholesalers sell emission credits in large quantities 
to specialized organizations using over-the-counter (OTC) transactions (Hamilton et al., 
2008; Bellassen and Leguet, 2007). Organizations buy into the carbon market to offset 
their emissions for various reasons. Some organizations offset emissions because they 
are consumer-based, perceive investment opportunities or see it as a form of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) (Peters-Stanley and Hamilton, 2012; Gössling et al., 2007; 
Rondinelli and Berry, 2000; Butzengeiger, 2005). Individuals participate directly or 
indirectly in carbon trading by paying additional fees on services or products to 
compensate for emissions generated during production (Bellassen and Leguet, 2007).  
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The share of organizations and individuals purchasing emission offsets depends on their 
individual visions and objectives (Butzengeiger, 2005). 
 
1.6.1 Climate mitigation mechanism  
 
The carbon emission reduction and corresponding PES of the project analyzed in 
this section, although traded on the voluntary carbon market, uses the framework of the 
compliance market. The voluntary and compliance carbon markets are quite similar in 
the registration and certification issuance processes. The standards of the compliance 
market are applicable and generally acceptable under the voluntary carbon standards. 
CDM methodology approved by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) is one of the options available to voluntary carbon for emission calculation from 
Agriculture, Forestry and Other Land Use (AFOLU) (Kollmuss et al., 2008). There has 
been a considerable surge in sub-Saharan African forest emission reduction transactions 
on the compliance and voluntary markets compared to 2010 levels (Shames and Scher, 
2010; Kreibich et al., 2013). Carbon credits generated from land-based or terrestrial 
projects are relevant in voluntary carbon market accounting for 45 and 23 percent of the 
total credit transactions in 2010 and 2011, respectively (Seeberg‐Elverfeldt and Gordes, 
2013). The compliance market transacted a total of 10.2 billion tons of CO2 in 2011 
compared to 8.7 billion tons of CO2 in 2010 (Peters-Stanley and Hamilton, 2012). On the 
contrary, the voluntary carbon market transaction decreased from 128 million tons of 
CO2 in 2010 to 95 million tons of CO2 in 2011 (Peters-Stanley and Hamilton, 2012). The 
transacted volumes and values of the compliance and voluntary market are depicted in 
table 1. 
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Table 1: Transaction Volumes and Values, Global Carbon Market, 2010 and 2011 
  Volume (MtCO2e) Value (US$ million) 
Markets 2010 2011 2010 2011 
Voluntary OTC-traded 128 93 422 572 
CCX (exchange -traded) 2 - 0.2 - 
Other Exchanges 2 2 11 4 
Total Voluntary Markets 132 95 433.2 576 
EU ETS [EUA] 6789 7853 133598 147848 
Primary CDM1 265 291 3206 3320 
Secondary CDM1 1275 1822 20637 23250 
Kyoto 62 47 626 318 
RGGI (Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative) 210 120 458 249 
RMU (Removal unit - Land Use, Land-Use 
Change and Forestry (LULUCF))2 
- 4 - 12 
NZU (New Zealand Units) 7 27 101 351 
CCA (California Carbon Allowance) - 4 - 63 
Other Allowances 94 26 151 40 
Total Regulated or compliance Markets 8702 10194 158777 175451 
Total Global Markets 8834 10289 159210.2 176027 
Source: Peters-Stanley and Hamilton, 2012 
 
The seventh session of the United Nations convention on climate change in 2001 in 
Marrakesh restricted the maximum amount of forestry mitigation investment by 
developed countries to developing countries under the Kyoto protocol. The maximum 
permissible investment from a developed country in generating carbon credits through 
forestry in developing countries is one percent of its 1990 emission level multiplied by 
five (Smith, 2002). The articles 6, 12, and 17 of the Kyoto protocol stipulate three 
transaction or trading channels of emission reduction by developed or annex 1 country 
(see figure 10). The article 12 is an important transaction avenue for forestry i.e. A/R 
emission project from developing countries under the compliance market. A/R has a 
rather broad definition which comprises the conversion of non-forest land to forest 
through conversation farming system or protection of forest and should support 
sustainable development (Smith, 2002).  
 
                                                          
1 Clean Development Mechanism 
2 Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry 
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Source: Author  
Figure 10: Framework of climate mitigation mechanism of the Kyoto protocol 
 
An important step at the beginning of any carbon project is the formulation of a 
project idea note (PIN), which helps developers structure their project objectives. The 
PIN lays the foundation for the project design document (PDD) which is the formal 
documentation that determines the approval of the projects. The PDD communicates the 
main reason for engaging in an emission mitigation project, e.g., for financial or 
environmental purposes, to the registration authority.  The document also stipulates the 
baseline, appropriate methodology for carbon accounting and leakage as well as 
monitoring and verification. The compilation of forestry PDD involves a large number 
of stakeholders which include individual farmers, local authorities and host 
communities. This broad consultation with different stakeholders and the corresponding 
protocols are Important for meeting the additionality criteria of the CDM as well as 
baseline calculation. Countries that rectified the Kyoto protocol, apart from pledging to 
implement mitigation action plans, also established designated national authorities 
(DNAs) to monitor self-determined threshold levels. The DNAs undertake the 
evaluation of the PDD on behalf of the host country and also approve the host country’s 
submission to the CDM executive board after it is reviewed by the DOE. After 
validation of emissions reduced by the project, it is then registered with the CDM 
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executive board. The registration procedure of emissions as described above is termed 
the project preparatory phase for all emission mitigation projects including agroforestry 
with PES (see figure 11). The next phase of the project is implementation which 
includes active participation of all stakeholders along the agroforestry with PES value 
chain. At the start of the agroforestry with PES project, stakeholders work vigorously to 
predefine timelines for monitoring emission reductions and extension service offerings. 
Extension services include farm and financial management training, demonstrations, and 
regular meetings to promote sustainable farming through forest cover. The project 
verification by the DOE is done on a continuous basis, i.e., throughout the life span of 
the project, typically every five years for a small-scale agroforestry with PES project. 
Only after additional validation by a third DOE of the claimed emissions reduction from 
the project is certification possible. The CDM executive board will then issue the credit 
for the subsequent commitment period.  
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Source: Author  
Figure 11: Registration processes under the Kyoto protocol´s Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) afforestation / reforestation (A/R) 
The methodology for accounting for carbon sequestrated, discussed in the next 
section, is an important component of all emission projects, particularly in the 
preparation phase. However, the PDD for carbon credits designated for the voluntary 
market project can be formulated before, during or after the project implementation 
phase. This is one area where the VCS requirement is flexible compared to the CDM. 
While project developers choose the appropriate methodology, DOE ensures that 
methodologies and baselines chosen are suitable and comply with VCS or other 
approved standards (VCS, 2007). Only after the conditions of the VCS are met, and 
validation and verification reports as well as certification of statements are issued by at 
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least two DOEs, can carbon credits be expected (VCS, 2007). The multi-evaluation of 
voluntary market traded carbon credit is required to allow for transparency and reduce 
conflict of interest which has made external, rather than in-house, verifiers or auditors 
increasingly important (Kollmuss et al., 2008). The registration of the project with the 
registry after thorough examination of submitted documents and VCS screening leads to 
issuance and depositing of emission certification to a custodial service. 
 
Source: Author  
Figure 12: Registration processes under the voluntary carbon standard (VCS)  
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1.6.2 Carbon measurement in agroforestry  
 
This section reviews forestry carbon accounting and important conditions for 
forest carbon registration under the CDM, which is also applicable to all other carbon 
markets. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
(2005) defines forest as “a minimum area of land of 0.05-1.0 hectares with tree crown 
cover (or equivalent stocking level) of more than 10-30 per cent with trees with the 
potential to reach a minimum height of 2-5 meters at maturity in situ. A forest may 
consist either of closed forest formations where trees of various storeys and 
undergrowth cover a high proportion of the ground or open forest. Young natural stands 
and all plantations which have yet to reach a crown density of 10-30 per cent or tree 
height of 2-5 meters are included under forest, as are areas normally forming part of the 
forest area which are temporarily unstocked as a result of human intervention such as 
harvesting or natural causes but which are expected to revert to forest”. The 
applicability condition states that crop and settlement land can be converted into forest 
cover, irrespective of size, and earn PES. If a number of plots belong to one project, it is 
possible to bundle these plots of farmland into a single entity as long as the total amount 
of carbon sequestrated does not exceed to 8000 tons or eight kilotons of CO2 per year 
(UNFCC, 2003). Non-bundled small-scale agroforestry sequestrates a maximum of 
16,000 tons of CO2 equivalent (tCO2e) annually (Thomas et al., 2009). To keep 
opportunity costs low, a maximum of 20 percent of total land may be allocated to tree 
crown covered for cropland, while tree cover on the project site prior to the project 
should be less than 20 percent (UNFCC, 2003). It is suggested by a number of studies 
that more flexibility and simplification of the methodology and documentation 
procedures will lead to increased forestry participation on the carbon market (Thomas et 
al., 2009; Locatelli and Pedroni, 2006). Although the challenges of implementing 
agroforestry with PES may be daunting due to applicable methodology, approved 
methodology seeks to simplify this procedure. Other important variables such as 
additionality, greenhouse gas removal by sinks (based on baseline calculation), leakage, 
non-permanence and environmental and socioeconomic impacts have to be estimated.  
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The additionality condition stipulates that actual carbon removal by sink due to a 
project should increase beyond the baseline scenario, i.e., a case where the project was 
non-existent. This condition also states certain barriers which would make the 
implementation of the project less likely in developing countries, thus, qualifying for 
investment from annex 1 countries. Some examples of these barriers are lack of funds, 
credit constraints, inconsistent forestry legislation and lack of know-how (UNFCC, 
2003).  Other barriers are the ecological condition of the region as well as social factors 
such as conflict of interest and illegal tree harvesting.  
To calculate the AFOLU greenhouse gas removals by sinks, the baseline 
condition needs to be determined. The baseline, also termed a “reference scenario”, is 
defined as the projection of the changes to carbon stock at the project site in the absence 
of the project. Existing stock of carbon such as tree biomass, litter and deadwood, shrubs 
and vegetation, soil organic carbon (SOC) are called carbon pools in baseline. In 
selecting a baseline, it is important to know if the carbon pool is significant. If there are 
no significant carbon pools in a baseline, then a simplified baseline, which is constant 
throughout the credit period, can be used otherwise revert to a baseline method proposed 
by executive board of the CDM. The simplified baseline standard as stated in the 
UNFCCC (2014) guidelines may therefore apply to the on-going project in rural Kenya 
since portions of cropland are converted to forest. This Simplified baseline of land-use 
prior to a project in a given year t is denoted as: 
tBSLC ,∆  = 0           (1) 
This means changes in the carbon baseline without the project, annually measured as
1
2
−eYrCOt , shall be equal to zero.  
The actual net carbon removal by sink per year )( 12
−eYrCOt  is equivalent to the 
project’s carbon removed by sink given stratification by tree species, tree age classes, 
soil, and agroforestry practices calculated as: 
tPJtActual CC ,, ∆=∆          (2) 
  
Stratification by tree species, tree age classes, soil, and agroforestry practices is 
estimated as:       
12
44.
1
,,Pr, ∑
=
∆=∆
I
i
tiojecttPJ CC         (3) 
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The equation (3) above can be simplified to consist of the difference in carbon stock (ton 
of Carbon -tC) in living trees for a given stratum, i, at a given time t,  the number of 
years between carbon stock evaluation, T , and average yearly carbon change in the soil 
for a given stratum, i, at a given time t, denoted as: 
tsoil
titreetitree
tioject CT
CC
C ,
,,,,
,,Pr
12 ∆+
−
=∆       (4)
   
The estimation of carbon stock, titreeC ,, , can be done using the biomass expansion factor 
(BEF) or the allometric equation method.  
The BEF method to calculate carbon stock titreeC ,,  above and below ground, AB/BB, for 
individual tress, l, by species, j, plot, sp, stratum, i, and year, t, ( tljspiABC ,,,,, and 
tljspiBBC ,,,,, ) involves certain steps. The first step is an ex ante estimate at 1.3 meters 
above ground level of the diameter at breast height (DBH) and height using a data table, 
or an ex post estimation by actual measurement. The next step is to estimate the volume 
of the commercial component, tljspiABV ,,,,, , of the trees using the available equation, 
default value or yield table. A relascope or tele-relascope measurement may provide a 
combined value for step one and two. The third step is to choose a value for BEF and a 
carbon fraction,CF , of dry matter for specific species (IPCC default value for CF is 0.5 
t C). The fourth step would be to calculate the basic wood density D, which is:  
 
V
MD =           (5) 
Where M is equal to mass and V is the volume of the tree.  
The conversion of the commercial component of the tree, tljspiABV ,,,,, , to above-ground 
carbon stock is as follows: 
jjjtljspitljspiAB CFBEFDVC *** ,2,,,,,,,,, =       (6) 
The above-ground tljspiABC ,,,,,  carbon stock can be converted to below-ground biomass 
tljspiBBC ,,,,,  by multiplying by a root-shoot ratio, R, (default value for all trees = 0.3kg 
d.m t C): 
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jtljspiABtljspiBB RCC *,,,,,,,,,, =         (7)
     
Total above and below ground carbon stock of all trees, l, in sample plot sp, stratum i, at 
given time, t, can be estimated by summing all trees, l, by species,  j, in the plot, sp, and 
time t: 
( )∑ ∑
= =
+=
PS tspjiS
j
N
l
tljspiBBtljspiABtspitree CCC
1 1
,,,,,,,,,,,,,
,,,,,
      (8) 
To estimate the mean carbon stock, titreeC ,, , in trees biomass for each stratum, i , divide 
the area of stratum of corresponding plots, iA , by the total area of sample plots in 
stratum (ha), iAsp , and multiply by carbon stock of all trees, l, in sample plot sp, 
stratum i, at given time, t : 
∑
=
=
Pi
sp
tspitree
i
i
titree CAsp
AC
1
,,,,,         (9) 
The allometric equation method to estimate the carbon stock, titreeC ,,  is similar to the BEF 
method. The DBH and Height calculation are identical to that of the BEF. The total 
above-ground biomass (TAGB) for respective tree species, j, at time, t , for any given 
DBH and H  referred to as  fj (DBH, H) can be solved using different estimation models 
(Basuki et al., 2009). The TAGB for (tropical) trees with a diameter of between 5cm to 
156cm can be estimated as (Basuki et al., 2009): 
(DBH))ln53.2134.2exp( +−=TABG       
 (10) 
)(DBH)(ln0281.0 -(DBH)(ln207.0(DBH)ln148.2499.1exp( 32++−= pTABG  (11) 
Where P is species-specific wood density (g/cm3) 
c2(DBH)( += avgprTABG         (12)  
Where r is a parameter constant over a wide range of geographical areas, pavg is the 
average wood density for the study areas, and c is a parameter estimated from the 
relationship between tree height and DBH.  
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The above-ground carbon stock tjspiABC ,,,, for each individual tree, l, and species, j, on 
sample plot, sp, for stratum, i, can be evaluated as: 
∑
=
=
spNl
l
jjtjspiAB HDBHfCFC
,
1
,,,, ),(*        (13) 
The conversion of above-ground carbon stock tljspiABC ,,,,,  to below-ground biomass 
tljspiBBC ,,,,,  follows earlier calculation: 
 jtjspiABtjspiBB RCC .,,,,,,,, =         (14) 
The resulting carbon stock in living tress, by species, plot, stratum and year, is 
calculated as:  
( )∑
=
+=
PSS
j
tjspiBBtjspiABtspitree CCC
1
,,,,,,,,,,,        (15) 
The mean carbon stock in trees biomass for each stratum ( titreeC ,, ) also follows earlier 
estimations: 
∑
=
=
Pi
sp
tspitree
i
i
titree CAsp
AC
1
,,,,,         (16) 
The ex-ante and ex-post estimations of the difference in annual soil organic carbon 
(SOC), tisoiíC ,,∆ , for strata, i, in year, t, without organic soil is calculated as: 
iryagroforestitisoií CAC ,,, *∆=∆    imequilibriuttfor ,≤     (17) 
0,, =∆ tisoiíC     imequilibriuttfor ,>     (18) 
Where Ai is the area earlier defined, iryagroforestC ,∆ is the average increase in carbon stock 
for SOC pool in agroforestry in stratum i, and imequilibriut ,  is the time a new equilibrium is 
attained in carbon stock for SOC pool for agroforestry in stratum i, from the project 
commencement period. The default value of iryagroforestC ,∆ and  imequilibriut ,  are given as 0.5 t 
C ha-1 yr-1 and 20 years respectively (UNFCC, 2014).  
Leakage is the occurrence of unintended and unwanted activities due to 
implementation of an emission reduction project. An example of leakage is the increase 
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in GHG emissions due to the deforestation of a different location as a result of 
implementing a forestry emission mitigation project (Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010). For the 
simplified methodology, leakage, LKt, will not occur at any given time, and therefore for 
the carbon developer and project participant this value is equal to zero: 
LKt = 0          (19) 
The net anthropogenic gas removal by sinks for each year )( ,tCDMARC − is therefore 
estimated as:  
t,,, LK−∆−∆=− tBSLtActualtCDMAR CCC        (20) 
The units of temporary certified emission reduction, 
tvtCER , at year of verification, tv, 
in tCO2e is estimated as: 
∑
=
− ∆=
tv
t
tCDMARTV tCtCER
0
, *         (21) 
Where ∆t is a time increment of typically 1 year. 
The units of long-term certified emission reduction, 
tvlCER , at year of verification, tv, in 
tCO2e is calculated as: 
 KTV
tv
t
tCDMARTV lCERtClCER −
=
− −∆=∑
0
, *       (22) 
Where KTVlCER − are the units of lCER issued in the current verification deducted from 
those issued in the previous verification period. The lCER and tCER from small scale 
forestry expires at the end of the crediting period, i.e., a period where emission reduction 
from the baseline is verified and certified by DOE. The crediting period for small scale 
forestry commences at the implementation, rather than registration, phase. The typical 
crediting period for small scale forestry project is between 30 to 40 years (CDM 
rulebook, 2014).  
The non-permanence (loss in carbon stock due to fire, drought) risk of AFOLU 
emission reduction requires setting aside carbon credit from the project as insurance 
(VCS, 2012b). The tCER calculation of forestry carbon is used to account for the risk of 
non-permanence, i.e., duration of storage and probability of loss of a project (Seeberg-
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Elverfeldt, 2010). The lCER may also address the risk of non-permanence of credit from 
forestry.  
Environmental and socio-economic analyses include the direct and indirect 
impacts of the project. The analyses also consider the impact of the project on 
biodiversity and natural ecosystems beyond the project site (CDM rulebook, 2014). The 
socio-economic analysis of the impact of agroforestry with PES on a smallholder’s 
livelihood, apart from suggesting a positive and significant direct effect, also indicates a 
similar effect on credit accessibility and interest rates (Benjamin 2014; Benjamin et al., 
2014). 
The variables discussed above, to a large extent, constitute the PDD for the 
program of activities (PoA) and may explain the high transaction costs associated with 
forestry carbon programs. The cost of developing a small-scale agroforestry with PES 
project sequestrating < 5000 ton CO2yr-1 is estimated to range between US$25,000 and 
US$65,000 (Benjamin, 2012). This is in line with estimates by Thomas et al. (2009), 
where application costs of CDM forestry projects were between US$50,000 and 
US$200,000. The total cost of a forestry carbon project registration under VCS in 
Thailand was US$75,000 (Samek et al., 2011). The estimated cost of verifying and 
certifying the project which sequestrated 45,125 Mg CO2 over the next 15 years, was 
US$45,000 (Samek et al., 2011). This is somewhat in line with estimates given by 
Bayon et al. (2009) for the cost of carbon verification under VCS, which ranged between 
US$5,000 and US$23,100. The transaction costs due to measurement, reporting and 
verification are argued to exceed the PES per hectare per year which is estimated to be 
far less than US$30 ha-1 yr-1 (Luedeling et al., 2011). 
 
1.7 Reading Guide 
 
The subsequent chapters of this thesis address the research questions formulated 
in section 1.2, while the last chapter draws some overall conclusions. The research 
questions analyzed in this thesis are a result of the multiple challenges confronting rural 
agriculture financing in parts of sub-Saharan Africa as described by the status quo in 
sections 1.4 and 1.5. Moreover the research questions are related to the 
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institutionalization of international climate and sustainable development agreements as 
well as certification value chain in section 1.6. 
Chapter 2 analyzes the participation of smallholders in the TIST program in rural 
Kenya. This small-scale agroforestry project is linked to the international emission 
market and generates PES.  The analysis is carried out to explore the determinants of 
adoption and the inclusiveness (i.e., non-formation of privileged participation or club) of 
small-scale agroforestry with PES projects in rural areas.  
Chapter 3 assesses the potential linkage of PES value chain to the credit 
evaluation of financial institutions. A model which savors business relationships 
between sustainable smallholder farmers and financial institutions is developed. Two 
scenarios of the proposed model are explored.   
Chapter 4 explores partial self-financing of business as a strategic business 
decision and its influence on financial institution credit allocation. The signaling theory 
is used to show if and how such a strategy may lead to a separation rather than pooling 
equilibrium in agricultural lending. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the impact of PES on the credit default potential of farmers 
with conventional collateral (farmland) given an exogenous shock. Financial 
mathematical methodology for risk assessment is used to compute the credit default 
probability of South African farmers with and without PES. 
Chapter 6 reviews the impact of PES on credit accessibility and the interest rate 
of sustainable smallholder farmers. A theoretical assumption based on sorting and 
screening is used to model collateral and interest rate interaction. The data collected in 
rural Kenya is used in the empirical analysis. 
Chapter 7 concludes with important policy recommendations for stakeholders. 
These stakeholders include national and international agencies and organizations as well 
as farmers.  
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Chapter 2∗: Participation of smallholders in carbon-certified small-scale 
agroforestry: A lesson from the rural Mount Kenyan region 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Agriculture is central to ensuring food security; it provides jobs and livelihoods 
for large shares of the populations in developing and emerging economies, and it offers a 
channel for smallholder farmers to escape poverty and increases incomes above 
subsistence-levels. In the future, agriculture will be crucial in the move towards 
achieving sustainable economic production by providing food and feed as well as 
eventually producing the crops for bioenergy that can replace fossil fuels. Agriculture 
also plays a major role in mitigating the effect of climate change (Garnett et al., 2013; 
Smith et al., 2007); using diverse technologies and adopting them to local circumstances 
is an effective way to achieve these goals. Medium- and high income farmers have 
means to adopt new technologies since their farm infrastructures often include modern 
communications, education, a skilled labor force, and access to financial markets. For 
example, it has been observed that in Costa Rica and Senegal, forestry programs that 
enable farmers to obtain payments for ecosystem services (PES) may be adopted 
predominantly by larger farms with highly-skilled staff and off-farm income (Zbinden 
and Lee, 2005; Tschakert, 2007). Smallholders often face little asset endowment due to 
small farm size and insecure property rights, thus they have limited opportunities to 
enter credit markets and adopt sustainable or modern technologies. Research has shown 
that networks of smallholders may help foster information flows and induce spillover 
effects among them, helping to achieve the aforementioned goals, despite substantial 
disadvantages (Benjamin et al. 2014). 
This paper contributes to our understanding of how networks, farm 
characteristics and farmers’ individual characteristics function with respect to the 
adoption of innovative production methods. We focus on smallholders’ participation in 
                                                          
∗ The definitive, peer-reviewed and edited version of this article is published in [World Bank Land and 
poverty conference 2015 proceedings, March 23 – 27, Washington D.C, U.S], or 
[https://www.conftool.com/landandpoverty2015/index.php/Benjamin-108-
108.pdf?page=downloadPaper&filename=Benjamin-108-108.pdf&form_id=108.]. 
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agroforestry with PES, a means to generate additional revenue through the acquisition of 
pollution rights (carbon storage through agroforestry) and the sale of these pollution 
rights on the compliance market (clean development mechanism (CDM)) or voluntary 
carbon market (voluntary carbon standards (VCS)).  
PES from land use programs benefits poor smallholder farmers in developing 
countries, depending on the distribution of land quality, through productivity 
compensation and increases in output prices and labor demand (Zilberman et al., 2008). 
Empirical evidence suggests that participation in emissions trading and corresponding 
PES may ease smallholder farmers’ financial credit constraints and lower interest rates 
of borrowers over the long term (Benjamin et al., 2014). Easier access to credit markets 
in turn is associated with more investment in agriculture, health and education, and 
subsequently, higher incomes. Agroforestry projects with PES may promote poverty 
alleviation amongst poor smallholders by increasing incomes, contributing to soil 
fertility, and reducing soil erosion, all of which can lead to increased food security. It is 
argued that participation by the poorest smallholders in agroforestry with PES may help 
in the attainment of international poverty alleviation objectives such as the Millennium 
Development Goals (Pagiola et al., 2005; Saliu et al., 2010; Shames, 2012; Garrity, 
2004; Miyazawa, 2012). 
The rationale behind this study is to understand motives and determinants of 
smallholders’ participation (or non-participation) in PES. We use data from The 
International Small Group Tree Planting Programme (TIST) around the Mount Kenya 
region in Kenya. Participation in TIST is voluntary and unrestricted. TIST contributes to 
the local agricultural sector through the provision of credit and savings infrastructure, 
farm management training, as well as training in agricultural techniques and 
technologies. TIST encourages participation in the carbon markets and ensures 
collaboration with carbon developers who serve as intermediaries, helping to link 
Kenyan smallholders and carbon markets. This empirical study uses information about 
smallholders to assess their reasons and incentives to participate in TIST, as well as the 
barriers for doing so.  This paper may serve as a manual to the investigation of country-
specific effects, leading to a more comprehensive picture. In the Kenyan case, we find 
evidence that the spread of information, existing networks and peer involvement in the 
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TIST program are forces that drive participation in TIST. Conversely, smallholders’ 
participation in TIST does not seem to be influenced by education levels, land 
ownership or asset endowment. Contrary to some sources, we found weak evidence that 
the adoption of agroforestry with PES in the Mount Kenyan region increases with a 
smallholder’s age. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2.2 we discuss 
materials and methods used in this study. In section 2.3 we provide a selective review of 
the literature and discuss potential determinants for participation in agroforestry with 
PES. In sections 2.4 and 2.5 we present our data and discuss empirical results, 
respectively, and Section 2.6 outlines our conclusion. 
 
2.2 Material and methods 
 
Conservation farming, depending on level of investment, has greater benefits, 
e.g. higher productivity, when compared to conventional farming (Byiringiro and 
Reardon, 1996). It is therefore assumed that there are two types (conservation and 
conventional) of farming practices, YF, available to farmers, i, in sub-Saharan Africa. 
These farmers choose the practice that gives the highest utility given resource 
constraints. Smallholder farmers maximize not only profit but also welfare, with 
multiple objectives ranging from food and social security to reduction in diverse 
consumption risks (Scherr, 1995). Wunscher et al. (2011) analyzed the effect of non-
monetary variables of the opportunity cost of agroforestry with PES on adoption using a 
utility function. The utility function of agroforestry with PES, , was defined as 
.  is a function of expected net payment (Pexp) 
which is a function of offered payment Cpayment, transaction and protection cost Ct + p, 
perceived risk and risk behavior R, information attributes I, as well as non-monetary 
costs and benefits of forest conservation through PES enrollment which are unknown 
parameters Nc. The utility of alternative agricultural land use, , is defined as 
.  is a function of expected net payment (Bexp) which is 
a function of the opportunity cost,  as well as  I, N (as defined above).  
cU
)),,,(( ,exp cptpaymentcc NIRCCPUU += cU
aU
)),,,(( .exp.. aoppaa NIRCBUU = aU
,oppC ,R
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The random utility model similar to that of Wunscher et al. (2011) is also used in 
this analysis by concentrating on the effects of non-monetary variables of agroforestry 
with PES on its adoption. The PES from agroforestry is an economic incentive which 
may influence the adoption decisions of smallholders (Pattanayak et al., 2003). 
However, low carbon market prices and revenues accruable to smallholder farmers may 
be a setback to agroforestry projects. The PES from agroforestry to smallholders around 
the Mount Kenyan region is approximately US$10 per hectare per year or US$0.02 per 
tree per year (Shames et al., 2012). This is similar to payments observed in Bolivia, 
where forest conservation generates US$7 per hectare per year, whereby in some 
instances PES are lower than the opportunity cost (Wunder, 2007; Landell-Mills and 
Porras, 2002). Despite current low PES, smallholder farmers in developing countries 
continue to voluntarily participate in agroforestry programs, in part due to long contract 
phases or awareness of non-PES-related benefits. The effect of soil and natural resource 
conservation, an important part of sustainable agroforestry, on the livelihood of 
smallholders cannot be overemphasized (Nicoll et al., 2005; Sanchez et al., 1997; 
Benjamin, 2012). Franzel (1999) argues that factors that influence the adoption of 
agroforestry practice as a conservation method in Africa may be classified into 
feasibility, profitability, and acceptability. If the utility of agroforestry with PES, 
, is greater than alternative use of land   then smallholders will opt 
for Afforestation or reforestation-A/R participation (Ogada, 2012; Wunscher et al., 
2011).  
Our model focuses on the utility of agroforestry with PES as it is modified to 
give the spread of information through social interaction a more central role. The 
importance of social capital on the adoption of sustainable agricultural conservation in 
communities has been illustrated by diffusion in innovation theory (Wejnert, 2002; 
Knowler and Bradshaw, 2007). The flow of information is essential to the adoption of 
agricultural innovation; the more complex the innovation, the more information that will 
be sought. The innovation-decision process has been described as an information-
seeking and information-processing activity which in the long run reduces uncertainty 
amongst adapters through proper communication channels (Rogers 2003). Social capital 
and consultative norms were observed to positively influence the adoption of agriculture 
)( / RAU
)( .AlterU ./ AlterRA UU >
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technology in Tanzania (Isham, 2000). The model by Foster and Rozenweig (1995) on 
the effect of knowledge on innovation adoption by rural households in India suggests 
that low levels of knowledge are a major barrier. The model also gives evidence of 
learning spillover from experienced neighbors. It is argued that social information 
channels and farmer-to-framer communication amongst smallholder can increase the 
adoption of conservation practices with PES (Garbach et al., 2012).  
Households producing ecosystem services at or below the fixed set of PES will 
accept current market prices, while those producing above the fixed set may decide not 
to enroll in PES schemes (Jack et al., 2008). However, non-monetary benefits from 
agroforestry with PES may motivate households in the latter category to stay in the 
program3. In other words, households may be quite aware of the future earnings of PES 
as well as the non-monetary benefits via information received from extension services 
and informal meetings (Zbinden and Lee, 2005).  
The information disparity level amongst family members is argued to be minimal 
(Pollak, 1985).  This may lead to a high monitoring of projects whereas household 
members themselves serve as a kind of insurance mechanism that can impact levels of 
transaction and protection costs (Pollak, 1985) 
The spread of information through interpersonal exchange (I), word of mouth 
(WOM) and media (M) also reduces perceived risk and risk behavior of individuals 
(Mitra et al., 1999). Thus, membership in community agroforestry organizations, to 
which more than one member of a family often belongs, not only provides 
infrastructural support but also an adequate channel for communication of relevant 
information, reducing uncertainty and improving payoffs (Mercer and Pattanayak, 2003; 
Caveness and Kurtz, 1993; Kabwe et al., 2009). It can therefore be argued that all 
variables are a function of some form of information flow, i.e.:  
.  
 denotes the information flow on monetary benefits of PES,  information sharing 
amongst households on transaction and protection cost,  is the interactive 
information and communications link within formal or informal programs. The 
conditional utility function of agroforestry with PES therefore can be re-written as:  
                                                          
3 However, this aspect was largely ignored in this analysis as it is beyond the scope of this article. 
));();();( /,,,, RAMWOMIHHptptMpaymentpayment NIRRICCICC === ++
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       (1) 
The utility function of not participation in agroforestry with PES is denoted as  
      (2) 
Where  is the error term for adopting and non-adopting smallholders.  
The reduced form of the choice probability of participating in agroforestry with PES, YFi 
, is therefore denoted as:  
 (3) 
Equation 3 defines the general condition under which decision to adopt conservation 
may occur.  
Smallholders also generate additional utility, yi*, which are unobservable, if they 
choose either conservation or conventional farming. This additional utility is however 
conditional on certain features of these farmers. Additional utility, yi*, is denoted as; 
       (4) 
 
The unobservable additional utility if greater than zero will increase the likely of 
adoption of agroforestry with PES  
        (5) 
 
2.3 Potential determinants for participation in agroforestry with PES 
 
a) Farm size  
Smallholder farmers may decide against certain types of conservation agriculture 
especially if confronted with land constraints and if adopting a new agricultural 
technology requires substantial land allocation. This trend was observed in certain parts 
of sub-Saharan Africa and other developing countries (Thangata et al., 2008; Current et 
al., 1995). Marenya and Barrett (2007) and Scherr (1995b) argued that for smallholders 
in western Kenya, farm size had a significant positive effect on agroforestry adoption. 
While farm size is an appropriate indicator for wealth in a rural economy context is 
highly contested (Pattanayak et al., 2003; Scherr, 1995b), farmers with larger farms 
typically are not the poorest of the poor, and often the poorest of the poor lease or rent 
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land under different tenure systems. This implies that only farmers with a certain level of 
asset endowments participate in agroforestry projects, leading to a selection issue 
amongst adopters of agroforestry with PES and possible exclusion of the poorest of the 
poor smallholders from PES schemes. The adoption of agroforestry in Kenya was found 
to be affected by the security of land ownership/rental agreement rather than the size of 
farm land cultivated (Mercer and Pattanayak, 2003). Therefore, the tenure system of the 
rented or leased land may be vital to inclusion in PES schemes. Because of the length of 
time involved in the agroforestry adoption process compared to other agricultural 
practices, property rights are an important consideration (Place et al., 2012). Not only 
are clear definition of asset rights and consent of the parties involved key issues 
surrounding property rights but also the right to a level of expected income and 
compensation (Coase, 1960). Coase (1960) also suggested that property rights at the 
initial stage should be allocated to parties with the lowest externality costs. The lack of 
security of tenure was one of the major constraints of agroforestry adoption and 
conservation farming, confronting the most vulnerable groups of smallholder farmers 
(especially women), in the Katete district of Zambia and provinces in Kenya (Kabwe et 
al., 2009; Nyangena, 2008). It is also argued that conservation farming and 
Corresponding PES may allow for securing property rights in the absence of secured 
frameworks (FAO, 2007; Nyangena, 2008;, 2004). Even in developed countries, Land 
tenure is suggested to be important factors which influence the decision to adopt 
medium-term conservation practices (Soule et al., 2000; Fraser, 2004; Zbinden and Lee, 
2005). In the case of developing countries there is no definite result for the correlation 
between the area-based farm size and conservation adoption amongst farmers (FAO, 
2011a). This is in line with the study of Pattanayak et al. (2003) which argued that the 
sign of the correlation between farm size and agroforestry adoption in 68 per cent of the 
existing literature was inconsistent, with approximately 50 per cent positive and 28 per 
cent negative. The adoption of agroforestry with PES by smallholders in rural Kenya, 
who on average have one hectare, may not be influenced by farm size but rather land 
tenure security.  
b) Farm elevation 
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Cultivating sloping land is generally cumbersome given the risk of soil erosion and 
degradation. In the case of the sloping farmland, lack of conservation practices such as 
agroforestry may lead to soil erosion and land degradation (Young, 1989). The 
difference in elevation of farmland, i.e. the grade of the slope, is suggested to be a 
significant determinant in the adoption of conservation practices, and therefore more 
adoption should take place in areas of steeply sloping land (Nyangena, 2008; Mercer and 
Pattanayak, 2003). Keeping erosion to a minimum and replenishing soil nutrients 
through agroforestry can improve the livelihoods of smallholders. In as much, practicing 
conservation agriculture such as agroforestry, can convert formerly marginal agricultural 
land into healthier, more productive land and ease the susceptibility of rural areas to 
deforestation. The clearing of forests for the purpose of agriculture may be reduced if 
cultivation of sloping land is viable. Agroforestry in sloping areas is also identified as a 
measure to alleviate poverty. The continuous expansion of trees on diverse landscapes 
cultivated by smallholders has been identified as the driving force behind the 
reforestation observed in the tropics (Sanchez et al., 1997). There is a higher probability 
that farmers with gently sloping land will adopt agroforestry to control run-offs and 
erosion as compared to farms on steeply sloping land which makes the practice 
challenging. In Ethiopia the degree of slope influences the adoption of conservation 
farming, however, a very steep slope may also lead to non-adoption (Gebremedhin and 
Swinton, 2003). The adoption level of agroforestry on hillside landscape in southern 
Malawi was suggested to be due to secondary benefits, e.g., food security, rather than 
soil improvement (Sirrine and Shennan, 2010). Mugagga and Buyinza (2013) argue that 
adoption of soil conservation on the slopes of Mount Elgon National Park in eastern 
Uganda is not widespread. The effect of a farm’s physical characteristics on adoption of 
conservation is not easily estimated due to the availability of a range of inexpensive 
conservation activities for sloping plains aside agroforestry. The adoption of 
agroforestry around the Mount Kenya region, despite the fact that 45 per cent of 
cultivated land was observed to be located on a slope, may therefore be moderate.  
c) Distance to market 
Distance and access to market may promote adoption of agricultural conservation 
technologies as well as reduce transaction costs in accessing funds and workforce. 
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Markets are usually located in areas with modest infrastructure, e.g., semi-urban, and 
institutions are also more likely to cluster in these areas rather than rural settlement thus 
opportunities may abound in agriculture financing. The excess supply of labor which 
may prevail on the labor market in urban and semi-urban areas in developing countries 
may also present employment opportunities for the unemployed. Smallholder farmers 
adopting agroforestry, which is labor-intensive especially during the early stages, may 
profit from this surplus of manpower as well as investments from nearby urban and 
semi-urban areas were markets are situated (Akinnifesi et al., 2008). On the contrary, the 
proximity to market may also increases opportunity cost of labor and lead to low levels 
of adoption of agriculture conservation technologies such as agroforestry. The demand 
for food due to proximity to market may be high such that the opportunity cost of 
alternative land use, in this case agroforestry, could be quite large. Gebremedhin and 
Swinton (2003) argued that for conservation adoption in Ethiopia, the further farms were 
from local markets, the more likely that (adoption would take place due in part to the 
lower opportunity cost of labor. Winter et al. (2004) argue that for Ecuador, the further 
away the urban centers, i.e., the greater the lack of market access, the more likely it is 
that smallholders will embrace agricultural innovations and participate in conservation 
programs. The effect of proximity to markets on conservation agriculture adoption by 
smallholders in sub-Saharan Africa is suggested to be obscure (Yesuf and Kohlin, 2006). 
In the case of Kenya, where there appears to be a structured labor market around urban 
and semi-urban areas and proximity to large urban markets is great (more the 250 
kilometers on average, the opportunity cost of agricultural labor may be low. This may 
lead to high levels of adoption of agroforestry with PES. 
d) Labor supply 
The magnitude of the effect of labor on the adoption of conservation practices such 
as agroforestry depends on the relative labor intensity of the particular agricultural 
innovation (Mercer, 2004). Adoption of agroforestry by smallholders in sub-Saharan 
Africa is argued to be positively correlated with household labor supply (Marenya and 
Barrett, 2007; Franzel, 1999; Mugwe et al., 2009). Apart from the household endowment 
of labor, the level of development of the labor market plays a crucial role (Gebremedhin 
and Swinton 2003; Barrios et al., 2006; Silici, 2010). The higher level of economic 
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growth in urban areas as compared to rural areas implies that rural-urban migration in 
developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa, may be quiet high. The growth rate 
of urbanization for sub-Saharan Africa is notoriously high and ranked amongst the 
highest in the world, this increase in urbanization observed has been linked to climate 
change effect i.e. shortage in rainfall (Barrios et al., 2006). The dependence of rural 
agriculture production areas on rainfall compounds the livelihood challenges of those at 
margin of subsistence (Barrios et al., 2006). This shortage of rain does not only affect 
the agricultural sector, which is a major employer in rural areas, but also contributes to 
rural–urban migration patterns (Barrios et al., 2006). Employment opportunities in urban 
areas may not be plentiful enough to support the volume of labor supply, resulting in 
high levels of unemployment. Even though unemployment is persistent in urban areas, 
the high productivity of other sectors outside agriculture and their level of compensation 
do not create room for urban-rural migration (Barrios et al., 2006). One of the reasons 
why the adoption of certain types of agroforestry in Malawi and other parts of sub-
Saharan Africa was constrained was the amount of labor required (Current et al., 1995; 
Adesina and Chianu, 2002). The constraints of an insufficient labor supply in rural sub-
Saharan Africa are driving the adoption of agroforestry practices that are less labor-
intensive. The effect of household labor supply on the adoption of agroforestry with PES 
in Kenya may be positive despite the presence of a structured labor market.  
e) Access to credit  
Access to credit may be significantly and positively correlated to the adoption of 
agroforestry (Pattanayak et al., 2003). Kiptot and Franzel (2011) and Gladwin et al. 
(2002) argue that the lack of access to resources such as credit resulted in limited 
agricultural input and led to low adoption of agroforestry especially amongst women in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Credit constraint plays a crucial role in early-stage decisions 
regarding innovation adoption in developing countries (Feder et al., 1985; Mercer, 
2004). In Kenya, the adoption of improved tree fallow by smallholders was positively 
correlated with the availability of credit as well as other economic benefits (Kiptot et al., 
2007). In Senegal, certain constraints to agroforestry adoption may be eased with 
policies effectively designed to promote credit accessibility (Caveness and Kurtz, 1993). 
This is in line with the study of Place et al. (2012) which points out that the exclusion of 
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agroforestry as a means to access credit and favorable credit terms in parts of sub-
Saharan Africa has led to low adoption of the practice. The impact of credit accessibility 
on agroforestry adoption in Latin America has been observed to be insignificant 
(Current et al., 1995). The regeneration project which implemented agroforestry with 
PES in Ethiopia and The International Small Group Tree Planting Programme (TIST) in 
Kenya provide credit and savings facilities to participating smallholder farmers (Shames 
et al., 2012). Therefore smallholder farmers facing credit constraints are more likely to 
participate in agroforestry with PES, due in part to the certain financial incentives 
involved. 
f) Interest rate 
If a high interest rate is imposed on agroforestry credit, this may lead to low 
adoption levels amongst smallholder farmers. Loans provided at market rates in parts of 
Imo state, Nigeria, are argued to be vital for the adoption of agroforestry by regional 
farmers with limited financial possibilities (Lambert and Ozioma, 2011). In India, cases 
where credit for agroforestry comes with a higher interest rate than that for other 
agricultural activities have been observed (Place et al., 2012). For agroforestry adopters 
in rural Kenya, the opposite has been observed, and the lower interest rates can be 
attributed in part to the diverse benefits derived from carbon certification (Benjamin et 
al., 2014; Roshetko et al., 2005). Certain agroforestry schemes with PES provide 
financial support through a low-interest-rate loan scheme intended to ease credit 
constraints and facilitate the purchase of inputs such as tree seedlings, fertilizer and pest 
control. Smallholder farmers charged low interest rate are more likely to adopt in 
agroforestry with PES and vice versa. 
g) Age of famer 
Age is one of the socioeconomic factors perceived to significantly influence the 
adoption of agroforestry in rural sub-Saharan Africa. The age of  smallholder farmer i.e. 
older farmers, which may serve as a proxy for experience, is argued to positively 
influence the management decision to use tress on farmland (Adesina and Chianu, 2002; 
Asafu-Adjaye, 2008). Aging smallholders may benefit from and adopt non-labor-
intensive types of agroforestry and the associated technologies In the Mount Kenyan 
region, where the average age of smallholder farmers is approximately 48 years, and a 
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certain level of rural-urban migration has restricted household labor supply, adoption of 
certain types of agroforestry technologies may be unlikely. Mercer and Pattanayak 
(2003) and Ndayambaje et al. (2013) emphasize the positive correlation between age and 
the probability of agroforestry adoption. Mercer (2004) argued that 64 percent of all 
agroforestry adoption studies include age as a determinant and of those 64 percent, 29 
percent conclude age is not significant, however, when significant it was mostly 
positively correlated. The effect of farmers’ age on the likelihood of agroforestry 
adoption is not consistent, as probability of adoption may either increase or decrease 
with age (Mugwe et al., 2009). The lack of adoption by older farmers may be due to 
shorter planning horizons. Younger farmers are more likely to adopt innovative farming 
practices as they tend to be better informed and are typically less risk-averse than older 
famers (Asafu-Adjaye, 2008). A number of studies have also indicated that adoption of 
conservation practices amongst older farmers was less likely as these farmers reduce 
investment required to improve farm productivity (Mugwe et al., 2009; Marenya and 
Barrett, 2007). The influence of age on the adoption of conservation practices may 
depend on the type of these practices and the asset endowment (including labor) of 
individual farmers. 
h) Education  
Education is used as an approximation for human capital. Education can lead to a 
decrease in the knowledge gap, promoting higher labor productivity and incomes by 
increasing the likelihood of adopting innovative and lucrative farming practices. The 
growth rate of total factor productivity in agriculture is considered to be positively 
correlated to human capital stock which determines the speed of technology adoption 
and level of home-grown technological innovation (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995). The 
ability to process information relating to agricultural innovation may therefore depend 
on years of early schooling or informal training. Low-income countries investments in 
primary school have a high rate of return on most sectors, while the low rate of return to 
agriculture may be due to climatic and environmental conditions (Huffman, 2001). 
Human capital has been argued to significantly influence decisions to adapt and modify 
technology in agriculture (Adesina and Chianu, 2002). Human capital and technological 
adoption is arguably of high significance when access to other resources is limited (Solís 
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et al., 2007; Silici, 2010). The resulting improvement due to adoption of a specific 
technology may be sustained if a certain level of human capital is available. Rahm and 
Huffman (1984) argue that human capital was one of the variables which led to the 
effectiveness of reduced tillage practices Feder and Umali (1993) suggest no defined 
effect of education on the adoption of conservation agriculture. Education was not found 
to significantly influence the conservation adoption decisions of smallholder farmers in 
countries such as Kenya, Zambia and Fiji Island (Mugwe et al., 2009; Kabwe et al., 
2009; Asafu-Adjaye, 2008; Mercer and Pattanayak, 2003). Pilot demonstration and 
extension services and learning-by-doing could make level of education insignificant in 
the case of agroforestry. 
i) Information and communication technology (ICT) 
The use of ICT in sub-Saharan Africa agriculture to spread information to 
smallholder has being receiving considerable attention in the last 13 years. The use of 
television, radio and most especially mobile phones in rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa 
is one of the success stories of the rapid adoption of ICT (Aker and Mbiti 2010). Radio 
and television in developing countries, is argued to positively and negatively influence 
social capital and conduct, in some instance leading to adoption of new type of life style 
and values  (Jensen and Oster, 2009). Television in rural Kenya is not as widely spread 
as radio which is present in almost all household. The adoption rate of mobile phone in 
Kenya as of 2009 was estimated at 47%, while one-third of the population shared mobile 
phones relatives and friends (Aker and Mbiti 2010). Mobile phone option has being 
introduced to agriculture extension services in Kenya for farmers to dial in or send text 
messages for agricultural support and information (Aker and Mbiti 2010). However, the 
use of mobile phones on the in rural areas to access information is rather moderate. 
Approximately 33% of total smallholders farmers interviewed in this study stated that 
they have at point in time in the last 2 years use mobile phone to access market 
information while most smallholder have not used mobile phone to request for 
agriculture extension service information . Some of the reasons for the limited use of 
ICT in agricultural extension service may range from lack information on agricultural 
practices and data exchange to cost (Aker, 2010). Aker (2010) argued that ICT-based 
agricultural extension may become redundant and limit adoption of agriculture 
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innovation and spread of knowledge amongst smallholders if current programs are not 
adequately evaluated.  
Table 2: The effect of non-monetary variables on the adoption of agroforestry in 
Kenya 
Variable Measurement  Expected effect on 
adoption decision 
TIST membership Discrete  + 
Neighbor is TIST member  Discrete + 
Co-operative member  Discrete + 
Farm size In hectares +/- 
Farm elevation Dummies +/- 
Distance to market  In km  +/- 
Labor supply Discrete + 
Access to credit (yes/ no) Discrete + 
Interest rate (in %) In % - 
Age In years +/- 
Education In years +/- 
Information and communication 
technology  
Discrete +/- 
 
2.4 Data 
 
We collected original micro data on Kenyan smallholders who participate in 
TIST, a non-government-run agroforestry mitigation program with PES in the Mount 
Kenya region. Descriptive statistics presented in table 3 indicate that 58 percent of all 
farmers are members of the TIST program, while 82 percent of interviewees reported to 
have at least one neighbor who cooperates with TIST. Sixty-seven percent of 
interviewees state to be a member of a co-operative. We observe considerable variation 
in market integration: average distance to the nearest market is on average 2.1 
kilometers with a standard deviation of 2.8 kilometers. We also obtained information on 
farm and the farmer’s household: on average two to three household members 
participate in farm activities; average years of schooling completed by the farmers is 
8.78; exactly 50 per cent of the farmers report that they possess land located on hillsides; 
and average age of the interviewee is approximately 48 years. We know that 16 per cent 
of smallholders are unable to access credit markets and that for the 59 individuals who 
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do have credit; the average interest rate is 14.92 per cent. Variations in the interest rate 
for loans are quite substantial with a minimum of four per cent and a maximum of 50 per 
cent, and a standard deviation of approximately eight per cent. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (refer to model 1 in table 4) 
Variable N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
TIST membership (yes/ no) 142 0.55 0.5 0 1 
Neighbor is TIST member (yes/ no) 142 0.8 0.4 0 1 
Co-operative member (yes/ no) 142 0.7 0.46 0 1 
Distance to market (in km) 142 2.03 2.45 0 15 
Age 142 47.6 13.53 25 80 
Size of farm 142 0.54 0.42 0.1 2.4 
Land on slope (yes/ no) 142 0.51 0.5 0 1 
Number of workers in household 142 2.62 1.51 1 10 
Years of education 142 8.63 3.56 0 16 
Own a TV 142 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Interest rate (in %) 55 15.1 8.26 4 50 
Credit constraint (yes/ no) 116 0.16 0.37 0 1 
  
2.5 Empirical results 
 
Results of a set of logistic regressions are presented in table 4. Based on these 
results we can identify two potential explanations for the variation in TIST membership: 
neighbors’ participation in the TIST program and the farmer’s membership in a 
cooperative. To a lesser extent, age and labor abundance, measured by the number of 
household members active on the farm, are positively correlated but with low levels of 
statistical significance. We find that having a neighbor who is a TIST member increases 
the probability that the interviewee is also a participant by the factor three to four. 
Unfortunately, we do not know if the neighbor or the interviewee joined the TIST 
program first. Therefore, we cannot precisely identify who convinced whom to join the 
program, but we can clearly observe information spillovers between neighbors. Our 
results are similar to those of Scholz (2009) who argued social capital is an important 
variable in the adoption of small-scale agroforestry in Tanzania. Therefore, we are not 
able to identify whether our interviewee was motivated by or the motivator for the 
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neighbor to join TIST. The correlation, however, indicates an information flow between 
neighbors, suggesting that word of mouth is an important channel for the exchange of 
experiences and opportunities. Conversely, we do not find possession of television or 
mobile phones (the latter is not shown in regression tables) to be correlated with TIST 
participation, indicating that spillover effects occur mainly through word-of-mouth.  
Table 4: Determinants of small-scale forestry adoption among smallholder farmers 
(farmland < 3 hectares) in the Mount Kenyan region  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Neighbor is TIST participant  3.11*** 3.66*** 3.11*** 2.36*** 3.06*** 
(yes/no) (3.81) (4.67) (3.85) (2.77) (3.66) 
Cooperative member (yes/no) 1.39** 1.40*** 1.41** 1.69 2.58*** 
 (2.39) (3.11) (2.44) (1.25) (3.40) 
Distance to market (km) 0.07  0.08 0.24 0.14 
 (0.77)  (0.82) (0.60) (0.99) 
Size of farm (hectares) 0.69 0.71 0.71 0.84 0.92 
 (1.41) (1.62) (1.42) (0.63) (1.26) 
Age of farmer 0.02 0.03** 0.02 0.05 0.04 
 (1.09) (2.40) (1.08) (1.22) (1.60) 
Slope on farm (yes/no) -0.10 -0.06 -0.09 0.07 0.22 
 (-0.25) (-0.15) (-0.21) (0.08) (0.44) 
Workers from own household 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.94** 0.00 
 (0.66) (0.68) (0.70) (2.21) (0.00) 
Years of education -0.11*  -0.10 0.08 -0.07 
 (-1.76)  (-1.50) (0.50) (-0.97) 
Own a TV  -0.33 -0.32 -0.99 -0.32 
  (-0.82) (-0.73) (-1.30) (-0.59) 
Credit interest rate (in %)    -0.05  
    (-0.87)  
Credit constraint (yes/no)     1.25* 
     (1.69) 
Constant -4.18*** -5.84*** -4.14*** -8.30** -6.24*** 
 (-3.39) (-5.30) (-3.33) (-2.08) (-3.50) 
Observations 142 165 142 55 116 
Note: Robust z-statistics in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Cooperative membership is associated with an increased likelihood of joining TIST. 
This coefficient is statistically significant in four out of five models; only in model four, 
where the number of observations drops substantially due to the inclusion of a new 
variable, statistical significance cannot be observed. We also cannot identify an 
unambiguous causal direction going from co-operative membership and TIST 
participation, but we know that co-operatives have existed in Kenya for many decades 
while TIST activities started only in 2005, suggesting that preexisting co-operative 
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structures fostered information flow about TIST. Our control variable ‘age of farmer’ 
suggests a higher likelihood of participation among elderly smallholders, even though 
this coefficient is not consistently statistically significant. Similarly, coefficients 
reflecting the effects of farm size and distance to market indicate a positive relationship 
between these variables and TIST participation. As for farm size, we may hypothesize 
that this coefficient possibly indicates a benefit from economies of scale. Remote farms 
may face high transaction costs with conventional farming; in these cases, agroforestry 
is an attractive alternative since revenues may be generated without the necessity of 
bringing crops to local markets. Also, remoteness to markets seems to reduce the 
opportunity cost of potential laborers and reduce the necessity to use land primarily for 
food exports to urban markets. Interestingly, school education seems to have a negative 
effect on TIST participation; we abstain from interpreting this coefficient in the light of 
inconsistent expectations suggested by aforementioned literature, but use this variable as 
a control to avoid omitted variable bias. We also tested whether an individual’s 
experience with formal credit markets is an incentive for participation. In model 4, we 
investigated determinants of TIST membership among clients of a formal credit 
institution and found no correlation between paid interest rates and TIST membership. 
Model 5 extends the analysis performed in model 4 and investigates all potential clients 
of a credit institution. We use the information on credit constraints as another proxy for 
the incentive to participate in TIST. The corresponding coefficient indicates that credit 
constraints serve as an incentive to participate in TIST. This confirms the considerations 
discussed above: smallholders with limited credit market access may join TIST in order 
to benefit from credit and savings infrastructure. This seems to be an important finding 
since participation in TIST and the accompanying income from ecosystem services have 
been found to be a successful business strategy for smallholders, granting them 
favorable credit contract terms and providing a collateral substitute (Benjamin et al., 
2014). 
 
 
 
 53 
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
We investigate a strategy which may help poor smallholder farmers overcoming 
impaired possibilities of adopting agricultural technologies and credit constraints. A 
deeper understanding of the forces withholding smallholders’ productivity may help 
addressing challenges related to ensuring food security, provision of jobs and livelihoods 
in developing and emerging economies, and rural poverty. There are concerns that 
adoption of agricultural technologies may be restricted to a specific set of smallholder 
farmers that are characterized by above-average socio-economic status, thus, excluding 
poorer social strata from access to innovations and credit markets. We do so by 
investigating Kenyan smallholders’ participation in The International Small Group Tree 
Planting Program (TIST) around the Mount Kenya region. Participation in TIST is 
voluntary and open to anyone interested, including poor smallholders. TIST contributes 
to the local agricultural sector through provision of credit and savings infrastructure, 
farm and forestry management training, as well as training in agricultural techniques and 
technologies. TIST encourages participation of farmers in emission trading by linking 
agroforestry stored carbon to the carbon markets and ensures collaboration with carbon 
developers who serve as intermediates. This also increases smallholders’ incomes 
through payments for ecosystem services (PES). 
We use a random utility model and a logistic regression approach to investigate 
factors that influence agroforestry adoption. We collected original data from non-
government-run agroforestry mitigation programs with PES that have been implemented 
in the Mount Kenya region, allowing us to investigate non-monetary factors, such as 
information spillover, that influence the decision to adopt such conservation strategies. 
Smallholders’ socio-economic variables examined are farm characteristics e.g. farm size 
and topography, farm organization, labor supply and access to credit as well as personal 
characteristics e.g. age and education. Our findings indicate that the spread of 
information, existing networks and peer involvement in such programs drive 
participation. Conversely, participation by smallholders does not seem to be influenced 
by education, land or asset endowment. Contrary to some existing literature, we found 
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weak evidence for a positive correlation between the adoption of agroforestry with PES 
and age of smallholder, e.g., one increases with the other, in the Mount Kenyan region. 
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Chapter 3∗: Financial Lending and Investment in Sustainable Small-Scale 
Agribusiness in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Carbon Sequestration and 
welfare Benefits 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Agricultural growth plays a critical role in eradicating poverty, especially in low-
income countries. In developing countries, especially sub-Saharan Africa, apart from 
generating a substantial level of revenue, the sector contributes ca. 32 per cent to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) (Christiaensen and Demery, 2007). 75 per cent of the work-
force in low income countries in sub-Saharan Africa is engaged in agriculture with 
largely small-scale farming of between 0.5 and 2 hectares of land (The World Bank, 
2007b). In promoting agricultural growth, it is essential to increase factors of production 
and productivity (labor – L, capital – K and total factor productivity – A) in a sustainable 
manner as this ensures food and energy security. The ability to alleviate poverty 
depends, to a large extent, on the availability of finance to both urban and rural business 
activities. These entrepreneurs must have access to regular and adequate capital as well 
as resource management knowledge to function (Balkenhol, 1991). Finance and capital 
to rural small-scale agribusiness requires well-defined and stable financial institutions as 
the investment and individual wealth or asset of rural smallholders are quite digress and 
the absence of these institutions may lead to a plunge in capital stock during economic 
downturn (Gonzalez-Vega & Graham, 1995).  
The composition of rural financial institutions has evolved from microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), money lenders and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to 
include commercial banks due to the gap in the access to wide range of credit 
(Randhawa & Gallardo, 2003; Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2008). The prime 
objective of micro finance remains the ability to providing financial services to low-
income households, micro, small and medium size firms at an affordable rate to support 
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economic growth while utilizing appropriate methodology that guarantees financial 
soundness and enhance consumer livelihood. Sub-Saharan pre-regulatory eras of micro 
finance in the 1980s were characterized by structural disorganization, high default rate 
and lack of financial discipline. In order to foster a stable financial environment, 
international and national prudential organs have stipulated guidelines or regulations 
which financial institutions specifically deposit-taking organizations have to abide by 
(Amha, 2001). As financial and non-financial institutions in the sub-Saharan Africa 
regions are increasing regional operations, it is important that these institutions also 
adhere to international standards such as the Basel accord. Stakeholders and depositors 
protection as well as monitoring and measuring of risk is a vital component these 
guidelines (Lafourcade et al., 2005). Loans to off-farm enterprise have shown 
remarkable success due to reduced vulnerability, stable income and group guarantee. 
However, micro financing of agriculture is not as profitable as conventional lending with 
collateral or collateral substitute (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2008). 
An array of literatures identifies credit constraints as one of the major problems 
confronting development of agriculture not only in developing countries but on a global 
scale. Factors ranging from information asymmetry, moral hazard, contract enforcement, 
high rate of interest and farm debt, under-developed financial institution to high 
transaction cost may be responsible for limited credit allocation. In the 1970s, 15 per 
cent of farmers had access to institutional credit in Latin America and 5 per cent Africa 
(Gonzalez-Vega, 1993; Gonzalez-Vega & Graham, 1995). The issue of land tenure 
system has compounded to the woes of agricultural financing because lack of proper 
definition of right to land deprives usage as collateral while the absence of stable income 
arising from risk associate with agriculture (weather, price volatility, poor infrastructure) 
means no physical collateral. The direct effect of climate change on the banking 
operations can be due to severe weather threat or indirectly due to regulatory compliance 
or change in societal preference. Financial institutions in rural areas can, however, seize 
business opportunities to provide services and develop financial techniques that foster 
climate mitigation and adaptation through emission trading and advisory services (Furrer 
et al., 2009). 
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Africa will be one of the most vulnerable regions to climate change, due to 
projected decrease in precipitation and increase in temperature and population as well as 
decline in GDP (Schneider at el., 2007).  Therefore there is a need to shift attention to 
what can be done not only to adapt but also to mitigate its negative in order to ensure 
food security for the growing population. Investment in adaptation and mitigation of 
harmful climate change (including agriculture – carbon sink) requires an estimated 
investment of over US$1 trillion per annum with 86 per cent anticipated to come from 
the private sector, such as financial institutions, directed to developing countries.  
Although the private sector seems discouraged by carbon market situation, there are 
certain investments that are starting to emerge (Jones & Hiller, 2010). Climate smart 
agriculture can be propelled by smallholders and may provide sustainable investment 
potential of ca. US$1 trillion over the next 4 decades which has been projected for sub-
Saharan Africa (Branca, 2011). There are signs of strong interest in investing in 
sustainability amongst financial investors on a global scale. A study by the Rockefeller 
foundation found that 69 per cent of financial advisory perceived sustainable investment 
as an avenue for growth. However, only 38 per cent actively participated in international 
micro-finance engaged in sustainable development while over 80 per cent were not 
engaged and 43 per cent were either doubtful or uninterested (Conway & Stevens, 
2012). 
This paper seeks to establish how financial institutions engaged in microfinance 
can benefit directly from agricultural sustainability through climate investment or 
indirectly through a targeted lending with climate-backed- security, which may lead to 
rural development and solid financial environment. There are indications that there is 
need to emerge with new innovative approaches to be countered the old problems 
relating to credit constraint experienced by the poor at the hands of financial institutions.  
Specifically, this study aims to establish a benchmark that can be used for further 
research into climate financing. 
This paper proceeds by investigating the financial sector servicing the rural low-
income farmers and changes in operations and compliance in order to facilitate a stable 
financial environment. Section 3.3 reviews the lending by financial and non-financial 
organisations towards smallholders and their participation in investments relating to 
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environmental protection and development. Section 3.4 outlines possible benefits of 
sustainability to credit institutions and how this can be an integral part of their operation 
in line with international standards. The formulation of policies which may help prompt 
sustainable lending and investment are the focus of section 3.5. The paper then draws a 
conclusion from the relevant research materials and information gathered on the topic. 
    
3.2 Trends in sub-Saharan rural credit institutions  
 
Some authors have questioned if the existence of banks in the conventional 
definition, in this modern times, are relevant as banks continue to engage in off-balance 
sheet rather than deposit taking and loan disbursement. Banks have become less 
dependent on core business thus exploring other form of business activities. It is also 
argued on one hand that the involvement of other non-banking organization in banking 
activities is undermining the traditional banks which are causing banks to shrink 
(Llewellyn, 1999).  On the other hand financial service provided to rural smallholders in 
sub-Saharan African by institutions is not wide-spread as the market it is both limited 
and under-served thus the financial sector has continued to see growth in size and 
operations. A substantial number of microfinance institutions in Africa have been able to 
post impressive growth without compromising portfolio quality, even as competition 
intensifies (Fernando, 2008). There are several changes that have taken place in the 
financing of rural poor.  However, this paper would rather focus on 4 of these namely: 
(a) Institutional expansion and profitability  
(b) Deposit 
(c) Regulation (Risk Management)  
(d) Technology 
 
3.2.1 Institutional expansion and profitability 
 
The low entry requirement for the establishment of financial institution in Sub-
Saharan Africa in the 1970s and 1980s propelled the growth of local banks and non-
bank financial institutions (NBFI). This period also witnessed the setting-up of 
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government backed developmental banks, intended for the urban and rural 
entrepreneurs. Although this government incentive to increase financing to local 
business increased the number of financial institutions, they were mostly inefficient. 
There was a decline in the number of financial institutions in the 1990s due to bank 
failures; however, commercial as well as other financial and non- financial institutions 
witnessed a revival in a more stable financial environment (Brownbridge, 1998; Steel & 
Andah, 2003). There has been an increase in the number of sub-Saharan financial 
institutions in Africa operating beyond national borders in accordance to international 
standards (Verhoef, 2005). However, the profit efficiency of banks in Africa is argued to 
be in smaller size banks than in big financial institution, therefore, casting doubt over the 
development of the continent´s financial sector through the establishment of mega banks 
(Kiyota, 2009). This may be in line with studies which show that more unconventional 
financial institutions, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs), are shifting 
away from non-profit towards for-profit while increasing in the number of financial 
institutions represented by small entity in remote areas (Campion & White, 2001; Mix 
2010). The fear that a for-profit approach by micro finance will result in high market 
profit as well as the neglect of the poor has not materialized, instead there may be an 
increase in diversification in the operations by microfinance institutions in different 
directs (Charitonenko & Campion, 2003). This may not have a negative effect as it 
enables these institutions to explore new innovative ideas in financing the efficient 
amongst the poor. The influx of a number of commercial bank into microfinance may, to 
a large extent, reshape the financial landscape. The economy of scale and scope from 
non-microfinance activities of these institutions may be used to further develop the 
microfinance sector.  
 
3.2.2 Deposit  
 
Asia microfinance is a prime example of how saving (deposit) can help 
strengthen the productivity and increased investment, the microfinance in sub-Saharan 
Africa has also helped increase the number of bank account and saving holders in 
addition to those provided by other institutions (WSBI, 2008). On the contrary, 
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commercial banking in Africa has rather witnessed a steady movement of asset by the 
wealthy to off-shore location rather than deposit to local financial institutions, which 
may explain the low rate of saving (The World Bank, 2006). Microfinance comprising 
non-bank financial institution, credit unions and financial cooperatives and a small 
number of NGOs reached an estimated 9 million depositors with a total volume of 
US$2.1 billion. The number of depositors in 2010 increased to 10.2 million clients 
(MIX, 2008).  This trend in depositors growth is in line with a general consensus that the 
poor will deposit part of savings in the presence of an adequately and stable financial 
environment (Wisniwski, 1998). In order to protect the depositors, institutions engaged 
in deposit-taking are required to adhere to international standards such as Basel accord´s 
Principles 2 – permissible activities, 3 – licensing Criteria, 6 – capital adequacy, 7 – risk 
management procedure, 8 – credit risk (BIS, 2010). 
 
3.2.3 Regulation (Risk Management)  
 
The number of regulated sub-Saharan microfinance institutions including those 
operated by commercial banks in 2003 was 71, while 92 institutions were unregulated 
(Lafourcade et al, 2005).  The laissez-faire approach to enacting financial regulation 
may not necessarily be an appropriate generalization (Arun & Murinde 2005). In Ghana, 
legislation and regulation for rural and micro financial institutions are creating 
appropriate level of new entries and providing opportunities while improving 
performance. The regulator of microfinance  in Ghana complies  with international 
standards (BASEL), which focus on reserve requirements which are then changed 
according to a classification system based on loan recovery performance (Steel & 
Andah, 2003).  Microfinance providers in most African countries do not only have to 
register but are expected to adhere to the procedures for compliance with capital 
adequacy and solvency requirements for deposit-taking and other institutions, these 
prudential rules described above as well as risk concentration limits (on single 
borrowers), liquidity limits, have been found to exist in other countries such as 
Tanzania, Benin and Guinea (Basu et al., 2004).  Stringent regulatory and supervision 
has also helped improve the microfinance in Uganda with a capital adequacy level well 
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above the minimum requirement (UCB, 2010). Although the banking and non-banking 
sector in Sub-Saharan Africa has made progress in generating profit over the years, the 
environment in which they operate is risky due to weak legal institution and low 
enforcement. This high risk is argued as the driver behind high returns (Flamini, 
McDonald & Schumacher, 2009).   
 
3.2.4 Technology 
 
Technological advancement has been instrumental in advancing and increasing 
financial services to rural dweller. For instance, mobile phones have been fully 
integrated into the financial operation through retail payment and checking price updates 
in the last decades (Porteous, 2006), The use of technology in microfinance in rural 
areas ranging from Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) or Point of Sales (POS), 
Interactive voice response (IVR) technology, Phone -Internet banking, Personal digital 
assistant (PDA), Management information system (MIS) to Credit scoring have proven 
to reduce not only operating cost but also aid risk assessment (Hishigsuren, 2006).  
Mobile phones are gaining popularity and are used by households to remit money to 
family and friends in remote Sub-Saharan, leading to synergy between banks and mobile 
operators in countries like Kenya. It was argued that mobile banking may be more 
favored in the rural areas in a number of countries if it connects to financial institutions 
(Comninos et al., 2008).  On the operational front, the need to report to supervisors as 
well as keep track of business dates, develop methodology for calculating interest and 
lending/saving has increased the use of information and communication technology 
(ICT). To this end certain software over the years has been developed to specifically 
cater for microfinance taking their unique features into consideration (Augsburg & 
Schmidt, 2011).  
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3.3 Credit institution´s agricultural lending and sustainable investment in sub-
Saharan Africa  
 
Credit constraint is a major problem confronting the development of sustainable 
agriculture (Feder and Umali, 1993; Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride, 2002; Ahmad, 
2005). Studies have shown that by providing credit to smallholders, adoption of new 
technology (e.g. hybrid maize) is encouraged and the ability of smallholders to bear risk 
increases (Diagne et al, 2009). All studies found that a credit constraint had a negative 
impact on the adoption of agricultural innovation, which ultimately might lead to limited 
agricultural growth and development and increased poverty. A number of rural 
smallholders source their savings for funds (when and if available) or from family and 
friends or other sources such as rich people or money lenders in the community who 
usually charge above market interest rates. There is doubt that such a situation will help 
promote sustainable agricultural development. Smallholders in Kenya have expressed 
their dismay at the credit situation they are facing, insisting that it was the main cause of 
low agriculture productivity. There is limited data available on lending from 
microfinance to small scale agriculture for in sub-Saharan Africa. It is, however, 
estimated that less than 10 per cent of total lending by commercial financial institutions 
in sub-Saharan Africa goes to agriculture with large scale farmers as core benefactors 
(Mhlanga, 2010). Figure 13 provides an overview of the lending pattern of commercial 
banks to agriculture in a number of selected sub-Saharan African countries between 
1995 and 2008. The graph shows that lending in a number of selected sub-Saharan 
countries has experienced modest growth with some cases of slight decline.  
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Source: Author´s modification (Mhlanga, 2010) 
Figure 13: Value of commercial Bank lending to the agricultural sector of selected 
countries in Africa 1995 -2008 (USD million) 
Although microfinance institutions (MFIs) have helped facilitate credit to the 
rural smallholders by adopting a different approach based on business’s cash flow 
evaluation or income as eligible collateral substitute, its impact has not been widespread 
(Salami et al., 2010). Co-operatives in rural areas have also helped spread agricultural 
credit.  This is because information complied on respective members by the organization 
is useful not only in the loan assessment process but also repayment due to peer 
pressure. Furthermore, financial institutions do not have to engage in high infrastructure 
costs like in the case of institutional set-up (Admasu and Paul, 2010). Financial 
institutions can thus reduce transaction costs by aligning operations to those of the co-
operatives. 
   83 per cent of enterprises and firms in sub-Saharan Africa were obliged to 
provide a form of security or deposit before they were granted loans by financial 
institutions (The World Bank, 2006). One major reason deterring commercial and for-
profit financial institutions from disbursing credit to sub-Saharan Africa (smallholders) 
or small-scale agriculture is the lack of proper collateral and their documentation (Beck 
et al, 2009). Sub-Saharan African agricultural production is characterized by a 
disproportionately large fraction of agricultural output which is in the hands of 
smallholder farmers. The average land holding is about one to three hectares, thus 
agricultural asset (farmlands) is available in rural areas, a number of smallholders 
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however lease or rent farmlands for cultivation (Ogunlela and Mukhtar, 2009). 
Collateral plays a major role in credit risk and capital requirement of an agriculture 
portfolio (Katchova and Barry, 2005). Credit risk variables such the probability of 
default (PD) and capital adequacy´s value-at-risk (VaR) have collateral evaluation as an 
integral element (Katchova & Barry, 2005). PD estimates the probability that an 
individual farmer will not be able to meet his/her obligation, in other words, the 
likelihood that the farmer´s asset will fall below the farmer´s debt. Value-at-risk (VaR) 
estimate probability distribution of credit losses conditional on portfolio composition 
(Thonabauer & Nosslinger, 2004). If the asset valuation of the rural smallholders at the 
initial period is perceived to be zero, default already occurs as at the time that the 
smallholder applied for the loan.  This method of modeling credit risk does marginalize 
small-scale agribusiness and/or smallholders due to the high risk and even higher capital 
requirements that the commercial banks would face in the event of lack of collateral. 
However, the conventional method of modeling agriculture risk and lending may be 
discriminatory toward sustainable agriculture which offers stable income eligible as 
collateral apart from the conventional farmland.  
The difficulty project investors face, especially in developing countries, in 
balancing profitability with the needs of people, NGOs etc. can be tackled by increasing 
local participation, long-term interests of projects, fair and competitive long-term price 
and uniform conservative environmental standard as well as contributing to peace and 
stability (Wagner, 2004). Financing projects which are developed to be socially and 
environmentally sustainable is a way financial institutions can and are contributing to 
sustainable agriculture and development. The Environmental Social Governance (ESG) 
factor which remains an indicator for sustainable investments, amongst others 
investment decision-making, may however not be quantitative but rather qualitative in 
nature (Bassen & Kovacs, 2008). Financial institutions in Nigeria and South Africa are 
working to improve their ESG in terms of lending and investment under the Equator 
Principles (a comprehensive set of environmental and social guidelines for the financing 
of projects over US$50 million) although progress has been slow (UNEP, 2007a). The 
joint venture between Diamond bank (Nigeria), the international financial corporation 
(IFC) and shell petroleum, were only ecosystem friendly efficient businesses profit from 
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an investment fund of ca. US$1.5 million and Ned-bank´s Green Trust (South Africa) 
with US$770,000 in fund which focuses mainly on agribusiness are examples of how 
financial institutions are improving their ESG (UNEP, 2004). The total socially 
responsible investment fund for South Africa is estimated to be ca. US$1.4 billion. 
Although microfinance investment vehicles (MIVs) are promoting the use of ESG, 
enough is not being done across sub-Saharan Africa (CGAP, 2010a). With MIV 
concentrated in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (43 per cent), allocated investment to 
Africa  (6 per cent) is quite minimal presumably due to the risks involved (CGAP, 
2010b). 
 
3.4 Sustainable agriculture opportunities for sub-Saharan credit institutions  
 
Climate change due to the emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) primarily 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and other gases such as methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) 
are a global threat. Agricultural is a contributor to GHGs, fertilizer usage, burning and 
felling burning of trees, land use change and animal dung releases CO2 and N2O. 
Activities such as afforestation and reforestation, the management of forest, soil, 
livestock, manure and land, sustainable biofuel production, energy efficiencies and 
biodiversity mitigates GHGs emissions (Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010). Sustainable 
agriculture practices provide a solution to climate change since it has the ability to store 
and capture CO2. Certain rural smallholders and small-scale agribusinesses are therefore 
able to mitigate climate change by engaging in afforestation (reforestation). Carbon 
capture and storage is economically viable due to the ability to trade each ton of 
sequestrated carbon as an entity on the secondary market similar to those on the stock 
exchange. “Taungya” is an example of sustainable small-scale agroforestry practice; 
Taungya is the combined cultivation of timber trees and horticultural crops (Harrison, 
2009). Others nitrogen fixing trees with energy potential such as Calliandra, Sesbania 
sesban, Jatropha curcus and Pongamia pinnata can be used in small-scale agroforestry 
with diverse benefits (Rossi & Lambrou, 2009). A variety of small-scale sustainable 
agroforestry by smallholders can be beneficial not only in the adaptation and mitigation 
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of climate change, but could help improve food and energy security if well propagated 
(Seeberg-Elverfeldt, 2010).  
There is need to explore not only the direct benefits small-scale agroforestry may 
provide to smallholders such as yield improvement and increased productivity, but also 
the indirect benefit such as capital formation and increase welfare which may have 
positive impact on banks, loans or agroforestry projects decision-making.  This paper 
elaborates on Jatropha agroforestry, whereby an estimated 120,000 hectares is being 
cultivated in Africa by both corporate and small-scale farmers, Asia and Latin America 
have 760,000 and 20,000 hectares respectively (Brittaine and Lutaladio, 2010). The 
Jatropha tree has a high level of toxicity and is invasive in nature. Its oil production 
varies between 400 and 2,200 liters per hectares (Sielhorst et al, 2008). Although 
Jatropha seed has been in use in sub-Saharan Africa for ca. 50 years, predominantly in 
the making of soap and lighting, its socio-economic evaluation has being limited. 
Another aspect that has received less attention apart from the indigenous use is the 
carbon sequestrated through its cultivation in small-scale agroforestry (Hellings at el., 
2012). It is argued that promoting carbon sink either through the Kyoto protocol or 
voluntary market provides a promising avenue to address the north-south equity issues, 
while noting that the conservation practices is beneficial to smallholders depending on 
the practice and household endowment (Tschakert, 2004). It is important to point out 
that the study above also emphasizes the need to assist smallholders financially, 
technically etc. in their pursuit of sustainability. To illustrate capture and storage 
(environmental service), a 3 hectares small-scale agroforestry with Jatropha may range 
from between 1100 and 2500 trees depending on density (Benge, 2006). Small-scale 
cultivation of Jatropha on marginal land or wasteland compared to large scale 
cultivation, although characterized by non-optimal growth, may be socio-economically 
viable. The carbon sequestrated is a mitigation measure which is eligible for 
compensation in the form of carbon credit.  The sequestration potential of the small-
scale cultivation is estimated to be 5.5 t CO2 ha−1 year−1 (Abhilash et al., 2010). The 
possible annual revenue from emission trading of 5.5 t CO2 ha−1,using 2007 prices, on 
the clean development mechanism (CDM) and voluntary market is US$60 and 
US$68.75, respectively. The estimated cost of carbon market participation of a micro- to 
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small-scale project (< 5000 ton CO2/yr) is ca. US$65,000 for the CDM and ca. 
US$25,000 for the VCS which includes negotiation, project approval, project 
monitoring, verification, and insurance costs (Green Markets International, 2007; Lipper 
at el., 2011; De Pinto at el. 2010).  Jatropha medicated soap production due to the simple 
local production techniques is observed in sub-Saharan Africa to be highly profitable 
and provides additional revenue to low-income earners (Eijck, 2007). The amount of 
soap derived from 13 liters of Jatropha oil, given an estimated five working hours, is 
4.7k g (Henning, 2004).  Seed cake residue which is a by-product of soap production 
serves as an organic fertilizer, applying this type of fertilizer on farmland is a way to 
generate carbon credit because it does not contribute to the release of N2O (Brittaine  & 
Lutaladio, 2010).  
 
Source: Author 
Figure 14: Integrating financial institution into smallholder farmers into emission 
certification (Model A) 
Carbon trading presents a win-win situation for both carbon buyers and sellers 
especially for sustainable smallholders in developing countries (The World Bank, 
2011b). Some literatures out on how to create a broker between the demand and the 
supply of carbon certificates via emission trading championed by financial institutions 
are reviewed and models of climate-agricultural based investments and lending are 
introduce hereafter. 
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 “Carbon trading partners are to be linked by an investment vehicle with 
adequate financial capital willing to dedicate substantial capital to the project” (Perez et 
al., 2007).  
“Accumulating and storing carbon may also yield higher returns whereby these 
returns may come with a lag or delay, if this is the case farmers may require a positive 
financial incentive, such as a loan, to be encouraged to bear the fixed and variable costs 
of adopting and maintaining conservation practices” (Antle and Diagana, 2003). The 
argument of the authors is that the carbon market can act as the financier of 
sustainability if stable financial institutions are in place.     
Microfinance institutions may therefore reduce credit risk and promote 
sustainability by improving on their ESG factor and target rural climate certified 
smallholders and projects. The voluntary carbon certification process for smallholders, 
although still in its infancy, is starting to gain recognition as a conservation practices 
resulting in stable income through improved yield and carbon revenues (The World 
Bank, 2011c). The database of verified carbon standards estimates the number of 
agriculture, forestry and land use (AFOLU) related projects observed in countries such 
as Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Mali and Madagascar with active 
participation from NGOs at 11 (VCS, 2012). Since the support for the inclusion of social 
and environmental risk in credit risk analysis of African banks is on the increase, 
smallholder carbon credit inclusion in risk calculation may lead to more lending (UNEP, 
2007b). Carbon credit on one hand may to some extent improve smallholders asset base 
making them less risker as far as calculation of the probability of default is concern and 
on the other hand may help free up capital which would otherwise be tied to capital 
adequacy.  
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Source: Author 
Figure 15: Integrating financial institution into smallholder farmers into emission 
certification (Model B) 
 
3.5 Policy implication  
 
The policies on (small-scale) agriculture drafted by Africa governments and 
international organization and donors which seeks the development of agricultural 
research, technology dissemination and adoption to sustain long-term productivity 
growth and national poverty reduction have not adequately addressed the agriculture and 
rural development (UKFG, 2012). Theoretically, where there is efficiency in small scale 
agriculture, government intervention in agriculture should be minimal rather market 
forces should prevail, thus the focus of policy interventions should be to offer an 
enabling economic environment for market-led development (Daio, 2007). Daio (2007) 
argues that the existence of institutional and market failures, ultimately leading to 
poverty trap, would however not permit such hands–off approach. Diversifying the 
income of poor smallholders in developing countries are slim therefore effective policies 
which may help broaden this opportunity have to be formulated. This formulation should 
give rise to innovative institutional arrangements between the public and private sector 
which guarantees the growth of both sectors.   
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 The existence of a Equator principle for financial institution to foster development 
based on the framework of International Finance Corporation Performance Standards on 
social and environmental sustainability and on the World Bank Group environmental, 
Health, and Safety Guidelines should pave way for a sub-Saharan Africa version 
directed at microfinance institutions (EP, 2011). The limited number of financial 
institutions from sub-Saharan Africa, namely six, who are signatory to the Equator 
principle mainly from South Africa and Nigeria signals a need by government and 
national regulator to push for ESGs from a bottom-up. 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
The problems confronting sub-Saharan agriculture and a move towards a 
sustainable agriculture are complex and far reaching. As the demand for and the prices 
of food and fossil fuel continue to surge, with Africa being the most vulnerable, 
concerns about sustainability and climate change are genuine. In order to ensure 
sustainable food and energy security, agriculture development in a sustainable manner 
has to be the main focus. With the food versus fuel and poverty elevation debate heating 
up in sun-Saharan Africa, a possible solution amongst others is in sustainable small-
scale agroforestry with energy potential. The guidelines of international climate 
consensus such as the CDM and voluntary carbon markets are continuously amended to 
accommodate rural sustainable smallholders in developing countries. The eligibility for 
carbon credit certificate due to sustainable farming and resulting trading on carbon 
market means smallholders are recipient of stable long-term income. The active 
participation of financial and non-bank financial institutions on the carbon projects may 
provide climate financing capacity building and a base for the asset valuation of these 
local smallholders in credit risk management process. The opportunities that climate 
mitigation instruments presents can be used to reverse the trend of credit constraints due 
to lack of collateral (farm asset or stable income). A number of issues however need 
further investigation, such as the actual cost and revenue as well as risks of climate 
financing and sustainable lending through accurate case studies. 
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Chapter 4∗: Adverse Selections and Microfinance in Rural Africa: Signaling through 
Environmental Services   
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) remain risk-neutral and are highly competitive, 
consequently, they grant credits to borrowers whose expected business turnover is at or 
above the break-even point (Batabyal and Beladi, 2010). Urban business ventures have 
an advantage in that they are often able to signal the profitability of their business either 
through partial self-financing or collateral. In comparison, signaling in rural businesses – 
predominantly small-scale agriculture – is difficult to ascertain because many operate at 
subsistence levels. However, it is suggested that ‘Economic growth in agriculture, 
particularly in the subsectors that directly or indirectly involve smallholders, tenants, and 
wage earners, is an important precondition for economic growth and poverty reduction 
in rural areas’ (Pederson, 2003). The problem of adverse selection in formal lending may 
however be resolved if borrowers are given the means to accumulate assets and if loan 
applications are based on evaluation of the aforementioned assets (Armendariz and 
Morduch, 2005). The comparison of microfinance activities between different regions in 
developing countries (see Table 5) indicates that sub-Saharan African MFIs have to 
catch up with other regions in terms of loan volume and lending, which in turn can be 
attributed to adverse selection and signaling issues. This paper explores how 
environmental service certification, obtained through the use of sustainable agricultural 
practices, can serve as a signal to MFIs of an agricultural business’s self-financing 
capability. This certification also functions as an instrument to reduce adverse selection 
problems within a pooling system of small farmers. Additionally, this paper examines 
the role policy makers and MFIs can play in assisting smallholders with the process of 
obtaining environmental services certification – and in doing so, help them grow assets 
and build banking relationships.  
                                                          
∗ © Practical Action Publishing, [2013].  The definitive, peer-reviewed and edited version of this article 
(Version of Scholarly Record) is published in [Enterprise Development and Microfinance], [24], [1], [28 – 
39], [2013], [DOI: 10.3362/1755-1986.2013.004] or 
[http://practicalaction.metapress.com/content/q657224025k72q71/]. 
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MFIs in the context of this paper cover commercial and non-commercial banks, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and co-operatives, all of which have the 
primary objective of serving small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and poor 
households. 
This paper is structured as follows: the next section provides a literature review 
on credit advancement to urban and rural (agricultural) areas, adverse selection, and 
microfinance agricultural investment. The notion of sustainable agriculture investment 
and carbon credit payments are also introduced. Then the theoretical framework of 
adverse selection is described using the Batabyal and Beladi (2010) approach. This is 
followed by a section incorporating the concept of environmental services into the 
adverse selection model and aiming to justify lending to smallholders engaging in 
sustainable farming practices. The penultimate section discusses ways in which policy 
makers and MFI practitioners can improve agriculture financing and investment in a 
sustainable manner and some conclusions are presented in the final section. 
Table 5: Activities and performance of microfinance institutions by region (2001) 
Activities Africa  Latin America  Asia (incl. Indonesia) 
Percent of MFIs 45 18.6  36.4 
Percent of members 15.4 19.9  64.7 
Members/MFI (in 000) 19  62  95 
Percent of savings 5.6  45.2  49.2 
Savings/MFI (in $ million) 3  79 28 
Percent of loans 27  33.9  63.4 
Loan Vol./MFI (in $ million) 2  69  52 
Loan repayment rate (%) 88.7  93.1  95.6 
Female members (%) 69.9  73.3  87.8 
Average loan size ($) 261  418  153 
Average loan size (% of per 
capita GDP) 
82 33  35 
Average deposit size ($) 75  590  62 
Average deposit size (% of per capita 
GDP) 
24  20 7 
Source: Pederson, 2003 
4.2 Literature review 
MFIs in a number of sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have adequate 
liquidity although not quite comparable to other developing regions. The sufficient level 
of liquidity of these MFIs can be attributed to increased deposit-taking, as well as the 
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participation of commercial banks. In order to monitor the capital base of MFIs in SSA 
while protecting depositors, most sub-Saharan countries have licensing, supervision, and 
regulatory frameworks. Sub-Saharan microfinance institutions are undergoing financial 
transformation experienced by developed countries in the past, which saw them evolve 
into full-scale banks focused on SME lending. For example, in Tanzania, the National 
Microfinance Bank (NMB) shows promising signs of transitioning into a full-scale bank 
with an estimated 750,000 depositors and 20,000 micro-borrowers with an average loan 
amount of US$400 (Sacerdoti, 2005). These numbers are similar to those recorded in 
2001 for all Ghanaian Rural and Community banks (RCBs) which have 1.2 million 
depositors and 150,000 borrowers, while an additional eight saving and loans companies 
have 160,000 depositors and 10,000 borrowers (Basu et al., 2004). These figures support 
the argument that emphasizes the importance of deposit services in the transformation 
process. The number of formal borrowers (small entrepreneurs or households) is modest, 
suggesting to some that this segment of the population may not be interested in lending 
services. However, the fact that these borrowers continue to patronize moneylenders 
with less rigorous requirements and interest rates as high as 300 per cent per annum 
undermines this assumption (Pandey, 2007). The cost-covering interest rate charged by 
MFIs – although in no way comparable to the moneylender rate noted above – remains 
high because of transaction costs and clients’ risk profiles. However, evaluation methods 
such as cash flow-based lending, scoring techniques, and banking relationships may 
result in MFI interest rates lower than those offered by conventional banks. 
MFIs’ geographical business operations can be divided into urban and rural 
microfinance, which have different issues but all aim to provide services to the poor and 
SMEs. The word ‘poor’ in the urban context is broad as it refers to migrants from rural 
areas, salary-earning residents, and entrepreneurs. Owing to the large number of these 
sub-classes of poor in urban areas, there is a high demand for credit in developing 
countries (Pandey, 2007).  Microfinance to the poor with loans of $100 and above is 
based on the principle that borrowers invest in micro-ventures that yield profits 
sufficient to repay their debt (Dixon et al., 2007). Using collateral substitutes such as 
group lending or peer pressure may not be adequate in urban microfinance; rather, 
individual lending (based on the self-selection principle) applies (Simtowe et al., 2007). 
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Some notable collateral substitute and repayment incentives in individual lending, such 
as mandatory saving and investment in MFI equity through purchase of shares, have 
helped to spread financial services to the poorest of the poor in urban areas. Individual 
lending relies on exogenous factors such as repayment and collateral (collateral 
substitute) which are client-quality attributes important to MFI sustainability and 
influence the interest rate charged. The assumption that all urban poor and SMEs benefit 
from MFIs’ financial services because their ventures are profitable may not be well 
grounded. Data from India, which is comparable to other developing countries, indicates 
that only 4.7 per cent of urban borrowers receive formal financing, which accounts for 
2.7 per cent of a borrower’s working capital requirement (Mohapatra, 2007). This 
underutilization of urban MFIs by the poor may be the result of the presence of 
alternative means of obtaining funding such as through family, friends, moneylenders, 
and informal savings and credit schemes, all of which are crowding out MFIs. It may 
also be argued that the high liquidity observed among certain financial institutions in 
sub-Saharan countries may indicate reluctance to expand credit to the private sector due 
to high risk (Sacerdoti, 2005).  
Rural microfinance, it is argued, has shown some improvement in a number of 
sub-Saharan countries such as Ghana, Benin, and Guinea. Reasons for improvement 
include management and interest rate (deposit and lending) autonomy, as well as the 
adoption of international best practice such as credit risk management (Basu et al., 
2004). However, the MFIs’ financial sustainability, as measured by the operational 
break-even point, remains a major concern in sub-Saharan Africa and may be a reason 
for the high interest rate spread among MFIs within the region. This heterogeneous 
interest spread among sub-Saharan MFIs is a result of bad debt, lack of collateral, and 
poor judicial loan recovery process (Sacerdoti, 2005). Strict refinancing conditions for 
African MFIs from commercial banks, international funding agencies and donors – 
especially during an economic downturn – is shifting MFIs from non-profit to for-profit 
entities (Dixon et al., 2007). The lack of adequate risk instruments to reduce the diverse 
risk (systemic, covariant) present in rural areas is also a major hindrance in 
strengthening the rural financial market. Thus, when lending to individuals in rural 
areas, MFIs are concerned with issues of moral hazard and adverse selection. Lack of 
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quantitative information regarding clients and risk is limiting the supply of funds by 
MFIs. This becomes evident when looking at agricultural loans as a percentage of total 
bank loans. In sub-Saharan Africa, this ranges between 2.5 and 13 per cent in 2003 
compared to c. 54.1 per cent estimated in India (Sacerdoti, 2005; Patel, 2010). Currently, 
the average loan size to agricultural smallholders by rural MFIs in Tanzania is US$200, 
while in Kenya and Ethiopia it is $180 and $100, respectively. 
Small conservation farmers engaged in environmentally friendly practices are 
often able to generate stable revenue through carbon credits. To illustrate the magnitude 
of an environmental service payment, the carbon project in Mozambique operated by the 
World Bank generated $40.50 per hectare per year (almost half the average credit loan 
amount) for each household in 2004 (Jindal et al., 2008). Another issue raised by 
Pederson (2003) is the lack of commitment from rural MFIs to finance smallholders’ 
term investments, which are typically more long-term projects. Term investments 
include conservation activities (which may provide environmental services) and can be a 
means for smallholders to attain food security, accumulate assets, and generate revenue. 
However, funds for environmental services registration (upfront costs) which generate 
carbon credits are mainly made available by NGOs funded by donors or international 
funding agencies. These NGOs fill the investment vacuum left by financial institutions, 
since data to date shows little to no involvement from these institutions. 
Carbon credit investment may be viewed as an asset which generates other assets 
by providing stable cash flow to smallholders, and as such, becomes a sustainable asset-
based development approach for the poor. An example of asset-based development in 
the financial sector is ‘banking the unbanked poor’, where the poor have access to a 
savings facility (Ssewamala et al., 2010). This example corresponds to the recent 
argument that on a global scale, alleviating poverty and reducing income inequality can 
be achieved through social, human, and economic capital capacity building. The 
estimated cost of registration for a long-term, micro-scale carbon project is $25,000–
65,000, depending on the type of carbon market. Aggregate revenue of a project 
approximately 40 years in duration is about $1.25 million (Benjamin, 2012a). While the 
decision of rural microfinance to engage in short-term lending is based on repayment 
capability, long-term investments of substantial amounts and with higher risk require 
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adequate future project appraisal and collateral, which MFIs are unlikely to undertake. 
The lack of data on financial institutions’ direct or indirect investment in carbon credit 
registration and verification may also indicate reluctance to engage in sustainable long-
term investment. If farmers are willing to switch to environmentally friendly farming 
systems and NGOs accredit the environmental services, then MFIs may provide upfront 
investment secured by the assets that will be generated (in this case, carbon credits). 
 
4.3 Adverse selection theoretical framework  
 
In the model proposed by Batabyal and Beladi (2010), the aim is to explore how 
adverse selection relating to risk information asymmetry in developing countries can be 
reduced with the help of signalling tools such as borrower self-financing. Carbon 
projects by certain type of farmers have being observed to be self-financed by these 
farmers (Shames and Scherr, 2010). A comparative analysis of the interactions between 
MFIs and borrowers with and without self-financing is examined. In analyzing the 
model, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of poor borrowers in rural areas. 
These borrowers need loans to complete or complement business projects they have 
established or intend to establish. The outlook for success of these businesses, either low 
or high, may only be known to the respective entrepreneur. Businesses of high quality 
have a high probability of posting positive profits and a low probability of zero profit. 
Low-quality businesses have a lower probability of realizing a positive profit but higher 
probability of seeing zero profit. Loans to facilitate these projects bring MFIs and rural 
entrepreneurs together; however, MFIs are cautious of risk and therefore tend to lend to 
all borrowers under the ‘optimistic’ assumption that they all make zero profit in the 
worst case scenario. In the absence of information about these probabilities, MFIs can 
either lend to all businesses or to none. The assumption holds that repayment will be 
made to MFIs by borrowers if, and only if, their businesses make a profit. Since MFIs 
aggregate all rural lending, and ultimately repayment, it is important to investigate the 
equilibrium repayment amount in such a pooling system. The fact that all businesses or 
projects (both high and low quality) of rural entrepreneurs are financed as long as they 
yield zero profit means MFIs could be regarded risk neutral entities. Therefore, for MFIs 
 77 
 
to break even, returns from the funds have to be equal to the opportunity costs. From a 
MFI’s perspective, to maintain sustainability (ensure break-even), borrowers’ profits 
must be greater than the ratio of the opportunity cost of the fund to the probability of 
loan repayment. To MFIs, all projects for which loans are applied are assumed to have a 
high probability of realizing high profits, irrespective of the quality of the project 
(pooling equilibrium; see Appendix). This means high-quality businesses with 
probabilities of low profits may be left out when the pooling system is used. These 
assumptions explain the vulnerability of MFIs, especially in the case where a large 
proportion of the projects are of low quality. 
The issue of adverse selection will continue to prevail as long as common 
repayment terms and conditions apply to all businesses receiving loans from MFIs, 
without regard to quality. It remains to be seen whether high-quality businesses can send 
a clear signal to MFIs regarding their profitability. Signaling may lead to preferential 
terms and conditions for said businesses. One example of project quality signaling is 
self-financing. According to Batabyal and Beladi (2010), signaling will lead to a 
separating system, rather than a pooling system, where quality borrowers are identified 
and given different terms and conditions. The self-financed section of the business can 
be used as a signal while it acknowledges that borrowers have opportunity costs for 
these funds. The borrower’s payoff is described as a function of the type of business 
project, loan repayment sum, and self-financed fraction of the business (Batabyal and 
Beladi, 2010). The slope of an indifference curve in a (R, f) space is negative if the 
repayment amount is quite small, which signifies a higher utility for self-financed 
businesses. From this utility function, it is clear that a borrower’s expected payoff 
decreases with an increase in the loan repayment amount and/or portion of the business 
that is self-financed. By identifying businesses which are partially self-financed, MFIs 
can categorize businesses as high or low quality. Such a separating system provides 
individualized loan contracts to low and high-quality business projects. This separating 
system ensures that only high-quality businesses receive preferential terms. For a 
separating equilibrium to exist, signal cost should not be too costly for the borrower to 
bear. A high-quality borrower should have a minimum amount of self-financing, 
signaling a positive expected payoff. For low-quality projects, this minimum amount is 
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zero, and as such, yields a negative payoff. Borrowers with low-quality businesses will 
not self-finance and will take loans as long as expected profits are higher than 
repayment, while high-quality business borrowers will self-finance and take loans as 
long as repayment is less than or equal to MFIs’ ideal borrower’s profit equation (see 
Appendix). This should eventually lead to differences in loan contract repayment 
amounts. 
 
4.4 Environmental services as a signaling tool 
 
Issues confronting agricultural finance are quite similar to those experienced in 
environmental services financing (referred to henceforth as carbon finance). According 
to Havemann (2011), smallholders’ carbon finance and investment, like agricultural 
finance, has a number of obstacles, including carbon mitigation standards, modest 
benefits, high upfront costs, information asymmetry, carbon price and demand volatility, 
and land management and tenure. However, financial risks associated with smallholders 
can be reduced if carbon-financed projects are established for sustainable farmers with 
affordable upfront costs. Smallholders with carbon credits can be viewed as diversifying 
the business of agriculture which, when combined with affordable climate insurance 
comparable to that of ENSO (El Niño Southern Oscillation) insurance programs in Peru, 
may prove a success (Havemann, 2011). A certified farmer may overcome many barriers 
to agricultural financing and may pose less of a risk. Since the risk of lending to these 
sustainable farmers is perceived to be low, what consequence might this have on MFIs’ 
adverse selection and farmers’ credit contract terms? Carbon revenue or credit can 
therefore be recognized not only as a source of collateral but also as a signaling 
mechanism.   
There is growing concern for climate mitigation and adaptation programs, 
particularly those targeting smallholders on the African continent, as Africa will be one 
of the most acutely affected landmasses. This provides ample opportunity for the 
development of carbon credit markets. One of the first smallholder carbon credit 
community projects in Africa started in 2010 and is located in Kenya. It is expected to 
generate carbon revenues totalling $350,000 with an initial payment made in 2011 of 
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$80,000 (World Bank, 2011b). This paper argues that a borrower (farmer) with carbon 
credits from a sustainable farming activity is likely to have a strong probability of a 
quality business and thus high-profit prospects compared with those without carbon 
credit. Since the upfront costs of environmental certification are primarily covered by 
donors and international agencies, acquiring this form of signaling is thus not too costly 
to smallholders. These high upfront costs are later recovered from the expected total 
revenues generated from smallholders’ environmental services (carbon credit) sales. 
This may explain the limited benefit which these farmers themselves derive from 
participation in environmental services. Thus, certified farmers can be said to be self-
financing part of their business, while non-certified farmers have no self-financing.  
In the pooling system, farmers or borrowers without carbon credit will enjoy 
access to credit as long as the probability of profit is high; on the other side, certified 
farmers with low-profit probability are shut out of the credit market entirely. In a 
separating system, these borrowers without carbon credit have zero profit and 
corresponding loan terms. Therefore, a separating system in agriculturally sustainable 
lending will be preferred by certified smallholders. PCarbon is the probability of a high 
quality business with carbon certification and carbon revenue. This business may have a 
positive profit due to increased yield from conservation denoted as ᴨ>0Carbon. The 
probability that high quality business may have positive profit due to diversification is 
high and denoted as Phq Carbon, while the probability of a high quality carbon business 
will have zero profit is low an equals 1-phq Carbon.  The Probability of loan repayment,
)(PP , Increases as portion of high quality business projects hqPP carbon increases this 
however lowers the repayment amount for carbon generating projects  
)(
1
PP
rRcarbon
+
= ,           (1) 
Ultimately
 )(
1
Carbon PP
r+
≥P
 
holds        (2) 
Therefore quality businesses will self-finance, for carbon certified borrowers implies:  
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(See appendix for proof) 
 
4.5 Policy implication  
 
The contribution of global financial institutions (i.e. commercial banks) to 
sustainability is indexed by the environmental social governance (ESG) indicator. The 
Equator Principles set guidelines for these financial institutions’ sustainable and social 
investments (Benjamin, 2012b). Similar investment mechanisms in microfinance – such 
as the microfinance investment vehicle (MIV) which also seeks to enhance ESG – are 
not adequately implemented in Africa (Benjamin, 2012b). Therefore, including MFI 
participation in the Equator Principles may be a way of improving MFIs’ overall long-
term sustainable investment, including the geographically wide spread of certified 
environmental services in sub-Saharan Africa. Instead of national financial regulators 
issuing advisory directives to financial institutions on the need to invest in sustainable 
agriculture – which has had little impact – a sustainable ESG threshold may be enacted 
for all financial institutions by these national institutions. National and international 
authorities (e.g. International Finance Corporation (IFC) – World Bank Group) should 
further provide a training and information platform to MFIs on the importance and 
profitability prospects of financing and/or lending to environmental projects. While 
aiming to lure MFIs into sustainable investment, the issue of property rights – one of the 
biggest obstacles to smallholder carbon and agriculture finance – has to be resolved. 
Participation of smallholders in certified environmental services, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, is expected to increase as a result of international efforts to promote 
climate mitigation and adaptation; however, if the issue of property rights is not 
addressed, this will be of little interest to financial institutions and project developers. 
National agencies should endeavor to establish and equip rural authorities with a proper 
registrar who records land titles and rights as well as local judiciaries to settle disputes in 
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a short period of time. Adopting a bottom-up approach for identifying new and pre-
existing conservation practices among smallholders, with verifiable environmental and 
economic benefits, will go a long way in promoting productivity and carbon market 
participation. NGOs should therefore tap into the vast wealth of local knowledge and 
also introduce new approaches which best fit each region’s unique characteristics. 
 
4.6 Conclusion  
 
Uninformed risk about borrowers (predominantly farmers), limited levels of 
signaling, and land tenure are some of the major problems confronting MFIs lending in 
sub-Saharan Africa. This may explain, to some extent, the limited participation of MFIs 
in agricultural investment. As a growing number of farmers engage in internationally 
certified sustainable practices to protect the environment and from which they derive 
significant economic benefit, these issues can be addressed. How would these farmers 
and/or businesses perform in the project evaluation scheme of MFIs, and what would 
that mean in terms of contract conditions? The results not only suggest that adverse 
selection, associated with unknown risk, is minimized through certification, but also that 
certification may lead to preferential treatment in loan contracts. Certification may also 
be a profitable new business venture for MFIs.  
 
Appendix 
 
Theoretical framework:  
P: High quality business probability  
1-P: Low quality business probability 
ᴨ>0: business with positive profit  
Phq: probability that high quality business will have positive profit (High) 
Plq: Probability that low quality business will have positive profit (Low) 
Plq< Phq 
ᴨ=0 business with zero profit  
1-phq: Probability that High quality business will have zero profit (low)  
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1-plq: Probability that low quality business will have zero profit (High) 
R: Repayment amount to MFIs (restriction: only if ᴨ>0) 
$1: is the assumed cost of project  
r: Opportunity cost of fund to MFIs (r>0) 
A. Equilibrium Repayment amount (Pooling equilibrium): 
[ ] [ ] rPRPPPRPP lqlqhqhq +=−+−+−+ 10)1(1(0)1(  : Condition for MFIs break even 
from financing all project        (4) 
)(
1
PP
rR += : Repayment amount in a pooling equilibrium     (5) 
lqhq PPPPPP )1()( −+= : Probability of loan repayment  
)(PP : Increases as portion of high quality business projects hqPP  increases    
i, i ={hq, lq} : high or low quality business 
00)1()( ≥−+−P ii PRP  or R≥P : MFI´s Project success estimate  
for all borrowers          (6) 
)(
1
PP
r+
≥P : Condition specification for project success (substitute in equation 3 by the 
results from 2)          (7) 
MFIs wants its borrowers to undertake project i as long as P is high enough: this occurs 
if from equation (4)          
0)1( ≥+−P rPhq  or 
hqP
r+
≥P
1 : Condition for high quality business project is satisfied  
  )1(0 rPPlq +−P≥ or 
lqP
r+
≤P
1 : Condition for low quality business project is satisfied  
(Elimination of R from the condition above implies that a low quality business will not 
necessarily have a negative return after loan is repaid) 
P = P*: solution of equation 
)(
1
PP
r+
=P
 
 P or P* < 1 
P>P*: all business will be undertaken as then 
)(
1
PP
r+
≥P holds 
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P<P*: No business (high or low) will be undertaken as then
)(
1
PP
r+
≤P holds 
If r is large compared to P  MFIs and P (P) is small (proportion of low quality business 
project is rather large)  MFI´s can break down  
B. Self-financing (signaling) of business projects:  
P>P* = 
)(
1
PP
r+
≥P   all business undertaken by borrowers (pooling equilibrium)  
Adverse selection in pooling equilibrium = common repayment terms for all borrowers  
f = self-financing fraction of business project 
𝛽= opportunity cost of fund to borrower  
[ ] [ ]RPfRPfPRfP iiii −+−−P=+−−+−−P )1()()1(0)1()1( ββ : Borrower’s Expected 
payoff function decrease as either R or f increases     (8) 
0
)1(
)1(
)1(
)1(
<
−
−
+
−=
−
−+
−=
f
R
P
Pf
RP
df
dR i
i
i
β
β
 
as longs as
iP
)1( β+ >R  : Marginal utility of 
indifference curve in (f, R) space for small repayment amount by borrowers of project  
type i            (9) 
C. Separating  Equilibrium: 
i
i P
rR += 1 : MFI´s condition for differentiate repayment amount  
)(
1
)(
1
PP
r
PP
r +
≤P≤
+
: MFI`s project success threshold assumption    (10) 
f = f*: | [ ] 0)1()( =−+−−P hqlqhqlq RPfRP β : Minimum amount of self-financing to 
effectively signal project type and expected  payoff : the case of low quality business 
            (11) 
[ ] 0)1()( >−+−−P hqhqhqhq RPfRP β  
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equilibrium repayment into (8)       (12) 
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0)( >− rβ : Marginal cost of signaling  
if 0)( >− rβ  Phq   f  similarly if 𝜋 Plq   f 
f = 0: Low quality businesses will not self-finance  they will accept MFI loan if R≤ 𝜋 
f = f*: High quality businesses will self-finance  they accept MFI loan if 
hq
i P
rR +≤ 1
 
MFI will offer loans repayment amount of 
lq
i P
rR += 1 if f =0 
MFI will offer loans repayment amount of 
hq
i P
rR += 1 if f = f* 
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Chapter 5∗: Credit risk modeling and sustainable agriculture: Asset evaluation and 
rural carbon revenue  
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Rural sub-Saharan Africa—consisting of remote and isolated communities with 
limited basic infrastructure—does not foster an optimal business environment. The main 
source of income for rural dwellers comes from small-scale agriculture of one- to-three 
hectare of farmland. However, financing this livelihood may be difficult, as smallholders 
have limited or no access to financial services. Rural borrowers plagued by lack of 
assets, small loans amounts and inadequate business information, result in high 
transaction and information-gathering costs for formal lenders (Randhawa and Gallardo, 
2003; Abukasawi et al., 2007). As such, formal financial institutions are extremely 
cautious about rural agricultural lending. These institutions, including microfinance, are 
more likely to invest in businesses located in urban and semi-urban areas where 
acquiring information is easier, assets are more readily available and transaction costs 
are lower. The success of microfinance predominantly in urban areas in sub-Saharan 
Africa has been argued by some authors (Carlton et al., 2001; Afrane, 2002). A global 
increase in rural financing by non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), commercial banks and credit unions has indeed 
been observed in the last couple years; however, this trend has not been the case in rural 
sub-Saharan Africa (Baydas et al., 1997; Delfiner and Peron, 2007; Benjamin 
Olatunbosun, 2012).  Microfinance actors in sub-Saharan Africa—especially commercial 
banks—are increasing their market share by reaching out to more depositors (Segrado 
Chiara 2005; Gupta Sarita, 2008). It is estimated that microfinance institutions in sub-
Saharan Africa mobilize 72 percent of their liability in the form of deposits, which are 
then used as a source of funds for loans (Lafourcade et al., 2005). Equity of these 
microfinance institutions only accounts for 25 percent of assets. Increased savings in 
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microfinance has yet to result in improved access to credit and higher loan amounts for 
rural agricultural entrepreneurs (Mahieux et al., 2011; Lapenu and Zeller, 2001). In 
order to protect depositors in cases where deposit insurance schemes do not exist, 
financial institutions need to be regulated by international banking standards and 
guidelines (BIS, 2012). As risk management fast becomes a regulatory prerequisite, it is 
less feasible for microfinance institutions to take on the same level of credit risk as 
before (Fernando, 2008). Collateral evaluation and business information are fundamental 
components of risk management which influence loan pricing (interest rate). In as much, 
what does risk management in microfinance mean for rural agricultural financing?  
Due to adverse selection, formal financial institutions in sub-Saharan Africa may 
have failed to segment rural agriculture by mode of operation. This failure makes it 
difficult to observe ongoing trends and their benefits. Community-based or individual-
based agriculture, including agroforestry, dairy production and small-scale farming, may 
choose conservation practices over conventional ones. Measurement of the direct 
benefits of conservation agriculture, such as improved yields, higher productivity and 
higher farm revenues; require proper data compilation which can aid MFIs in the 
assessment of the smallholder’s creditworthiness (McIntyre et al., 2008; FAO, 2011b; 
Nyanga, 2012). The indirect benefit—namely reduction in emissions of greenhouse 
gases (GHG)—should also be considered, since the resulting carbon certification  may 
provide an additional asset-base for smallholder farmers. Asset acquisition has been 
posited as one effective strategy in poverty reduction, given a certain minimal household 
endowment (Sadoulet et al., 1998). 
This paper explores the existing framework for credit-risk modeling while 
incorporating an innovative approach to agricultural lending. First, a comprehensive 
literature review examines the role of microfinance in rural agricultural as well as 
agriculture conservation and its monetary evaluation. Section 5.3 explores international 
asset evaluation and credit-risk modeling. Data on the unique characteristics of South 
Africa’s real farmland prices and real debt per hectare is presented in section 5.4. 
Section 5.5 applies the models discussed in section 5.3 to data described in section 5.4 
by evaluating assets with and without ecosystem revenues. Results and conclusion are 
presented in the last section.  
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5.2 Literature review 
  
5.2.1. Issues and challenges of agricultural micro-financing 
 
In rural agriculture lending, the concentration of credit extension to one 
particular sector, e.g., maize farming, exposes financial institutions to higher covariant 
risk (Christen and Pearce, 2005). Diversification in the business operations of 
smallholder farmers may reduce income vulnerability as well as covariant risk for 
financial institutions. In Kenya, business diversification through off-farm economic 
activities in rural areas stabilized farmers’ incomes (Jayne, et al., 2010).  
Other factors that decrease the ability of sub-Sahara African smallholder farmers 
to repay loans include lack of business knowledge, non-membership in co-operatives 
and irregular cash-flow (Oke et al., 2007). In the absence of borrower information, 
financial institutions depend upon banking relationships and collateral to deal with 
adverse selection (Jimenez and Saurina, 2004).  
Collateral to a financial institution is also an instrument to ascertain that the loans 
granted for a specific project are channeled into that project. Collateral type and 
acceptability are ultimately decided by the respective financial institutions. In 
agriculture, conventional collateral is often limited to farmland (Abukasawi et al., 2007). 
Other collateral types may include household appliances; social collateral, such as 
weekly mandatory savings (“cash collateral”); and use of the Group Guarantee Lending 
Model (GGLM) (The World Bank, 2007a). Through GGLM, loans are granted to groups 
rather than individuals, and all group members are liable in the event of default 
(Bunning, 2004). To a certain extent, GGLM could be considered  successful, although 
there is  little to no evidence that social collateral increases the likelihood of repayment 
and/or reduces chance of default (Paal and Wisemann, 2006; Simtowe et al., 2007). It 
may be difficult for microfinance institutions to quantify GGLM guarantee, making 
default estimation problematic. Credit granted to rural borrowers on the basis of GGLM 
could also lead to the collapse of MFIs in the event of simultaneous group default.  
The small credit amount allocated to rural farmers, apart from increasing 
transaction costs, may result in low operating efficiency ratio (total operating 
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expense/average loan portfolio), making microfinance less profitable (Young et al., 
2005). Increasing the amount of microcredit to credit-worthy customers is not only 
beneficial to the lender but can also support economic growth. As such, individual 
lending to clients with fixed earning assets is gaining ground amongst MFIs 
(Ledgerwood, 1999). The question is, if individual lending offers credit opportunities to 
a certain kind of small farmer, e.g., carbon-certified farmers in sub-Saharan Africa? To 
answer this question, the extent to which sustainable farming affects stability of income 
and/or asset acquisition must be examined. 
 
5.2.2. Impact of agricultural conservation and sustainability practices on 
smallholders 
 
Certain traditional agricultural methods employed in rural sub-Saharan Africa—
in conjunction with the effects of climate change, low-soil fertility and slow innovation 
adoption—are responsible for low productivity and biodiversity loss. Sustainable food 
security is a growing concern as population increases and available resources are 
exhausted. Attaining sustainable food security may require the adoption of conservation 
agriculture. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines conservation 
agriculture as “a concept for natural resource-saving, which strives to achieve acceptable 
profits with high and sustained production levels while concurrently conserving the 
environment” (Thiombiano and Meshack, 2009). According to this definition, benefits 
are twofold: improved profit and ecosystem/environmental services. These benefits 
indicate a new form of diversification in today’s agriculture. Increases in output (yield) 
and profits gained by rural smallholders due to conservation efforts have been 
documented by a number of research articles (Wagstaff and Malachy, 2010; Dumanski 
et al., 2006). A research project on conservation agriculture in Lesotho for likoti—a 
method of cultivation by digging holes in, rather than tilling, the soil—is another prime 
example (Laura, 2010). Smallholder production data (farm revenue) are compiled by 
research institutions, NGOs and smallholders for economic impact assessment purposes. 
For example, yields of 0.73 tons per hectare were recorded for small maize producers in 
Qacha’s Nek (Lesotho) when using likoti. This is a stunning 265 percent increase in 
yields given the 0.2 tones/hectare average yield for maize using conventional practices. 
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For likoti, the profit margin was 1,065 Maloti per hectare. In the absence of the 
conservation program, it is unlikely this information would have been measured and 
recorded so comprehensively. As a result, in a situation like this, MFIs could gain 
valuable information about the income status of small maize farmers in Qacha’s Nek 
using likoti. MFIs are therefore able to monitor farm business over time, improving 
calculation of risk evaluation and informed decision-making (Ashta, 2007; Stewart et al., 
2010).   
 However, the adoption of conservation agriculture is not without its challenges. 
Land tenure, farmers’ attitudes, low investment, knowledge gaps and high labor demand 
are predominant issues. Yet these issues are not insurmountable, as demonstrated in 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Kenya and Tanzania, all of which have seen a 
substantial increase in the successful adoption of conservation methods (Thiombiano 
and Meshack, 2009). Some threats to the success of conservation agriculture with 
respect to income stabilization are outside the control of farmers, such as climate 
changes and natural disasters. Issues and realization of conservation adoption are 
discussed in detail by Giller, et al. (2009) and remain beyond the scope of this paper. 
The primary focus of this paper is the indirect benefits—namely, certified environmental 
services—realized from rural conservation agriculture. 
  The indirect benefits of conservation method is particular important as 
increasing atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHG) and their mitigation are at the center of 
international debate. The United Nations (UN) and the World Bank group have 
established guidelines as well as climate funds (Global Environmental Fund - GEF) and 
emission schemes (e.g., Clean Development Mechanism) in developing and financing 
national mitigation and adaptation projects in diverse sectors, including agriculture 
(UNFCCC 2006; IEG World Bank 2011; Persson, 2011). One example is the 
compliance (or regulatory) market, where developed countries purchase certified 
emission reductions (CERs) from developing countries via the UN clearing house to 
meet their national emissions reduction target. Financing of mitigation and adaptation 
projects on a regional and local scale may also be achieved through voluntary carbon 
market participation, which is less rigorous compared to the compliance (or regulatory) 
market. The introduction of the trading of emission credits on these carbon markets is 
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argued to be a cost-efficient approach in combatting climate change by placing a price 
on pollution, ultimately leading to fewer emissions (Dudek et al., 1997; Ecosystem 
market place, 2008). In agriculture, combating climate change will be through carbon 
capture and storage. Conservation agriculturalists of likoti—again, a method which 
offsets GHGs via no tillage (carbon storage)—would not only qualify for carbon credit 
but also allow participation in a secondary carbon market (West and Post, 2002; 
Govaerts, 2009). Small-scale agroforestry, practiced in countries such as Kenya, 
Tanzania and Uganda, also provides environmental services through matured tree carbon 
sequestration (TIST, 2012). Other agricultural practices that sequestrate carbon are 
discussed in detail by Jarecki and Lal (2003). When carbon credits are traded to carbon 
emitters or polluters, the credits become an additional source of income for farmers 
(Baker, 2002). 
 There is need to further examine, on a global scale, community and individual 
carbon sequestrations in rural areas, which is important for placing a monetary value on 
potential and verified programs.   
 
5.2.3. Pricing Environmental Services 
  
This section explores the monetary value of carbon credits obtained through 
conservation agriculture and agroforestry. Around the globe, carbon projects are being 
carried out in rural areas on community and individual bases. In this section, 
agroforestry and agriculture are not distinguished.   
 Carbon sequestration payment for conservation and rehabilitation in the 
Philippines is expected to mitigate between 5230 tCO2e (tones of CO2 equivalent) and 
11759 tCO2e valued at approximately US$70,554 at a carbon price of $6 per ton CO2 
(Murdiyarso and Herawati, 2005). In Indonesian, local communities are expected to 
sequestrate 16.85 million tons of CO2 worth US$26 million over a span of 30 years 
(Crooks, 2009). In Mexico, around 400 smallholders generated carbon credits valued at 
approximately US$204,000, while in India, individual household annual income from 
carbon offset was US$280 (Smith and Scherr, 2002).  This is on par with small-scale 
agroforestry carbon revenues observed in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, where 
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households earned approximately US$280 for tree cultivation through intercropping 
(TIST, 2012). 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) project 
in Cameroon, comprising 830,000ha of rainforest, would generate carbon credit revenue 
of US$64 million even at carbon prices as low as USD$3/ton CO2 (Crooks, 2009). The 
Ibi Batéké Project in the Democratic Republic of Congo is expected to generated 
500,000 carbon certificates (CER) valued at US$2.5 million at current low prices of 
US$4.92 (The World Bank, 2011a). The small farmer community project in Kenya is 
estimated to generate carbon revenues of US$350,000 with an initial payment to the 
community of US$80,000 made in 2011 (The World Bank, 2011b). In Mozambique, the 
World Bank’s carbon project generated US$40.50 per hectare per year which was 
funneled into a community fund from which each household received US$34.70 per 
hectare per year (Jindal et al., 2008). Investment in community carbon projects by the 
World Bank in Africa is estimated at US$62 million which represents 10 percent of the 
World Bank’s total global carbon portfolio (Jindal et al., 2008). 
According to the Center for International Forestry Research, one of the many 
potential benefits of carbon sequestration is reduction of poverty through increases in 
income and capital accumulation amongst rural producers (Smith and Scherr, 2002). To 
a large extent, this corresponds with this paper’s hypothesis, particularly in terms of 
capital accumulation. 
 
5.3 Model 
 
The Bank of International Settlement seeks to globally improve the financial 
soundness of commercial and non-commercial financial institutions through unified 
standards and guidelines (BIS, 2012). These standards and guidelines act as operational 
blueprints for thresholds for these financial institutions (Bandyopadhyay, 2008). 
Agricultural loans under international standards are to be treated as retail loans, and the 
risk is to be weighted using the “5 Cs” approach (Bandyopadhyay, 2008).   The five Cs 
for risk evaluation are: 
a. character of borrower (reputation) 
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b. capital (leverage) 
c. capacity (volatility of earnings) 
d. collateral  
e. condition (macroeconomic cycle) 
 
Due to adverse selection and information asymmetry that are prevalent especially in 
rural areas, a number of the components of the 5Cs cannot be used. When information 
asymmetry is present, formal lenders rely on collateral as a marker of a borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan. Collateral (asset) evaluation is therefore at the center of 
financial institutions’ risk management modeling. With risk modeling, financial 
institutions can anticipate default and cost of default using Probability of Default (PD) 
and Loss Given Default (LGD), respectively (Hull, 2009). These measurements 
determine the percentage of a financial institution’s working capital that must be set 
aside as a buffer to protect depositors in the event of default. Katchova and Barry (2005) 
provide a detailed description of the relationship between PD, LGD, Expected Loss 
(EL), Unexpected Loss (UL) and bank capital adequacy requirement when using 
farmland as the only eligible asset. This paper argues that agricultural asset evaluation in 
the presence of conservation should not be limited to farmland; rather, it should include 
net cash flow from environmental services. This paper estimates the Distance-to-Default 
(DD) and the PD for farmland in southern Africa with and without certification under 
the assumption above. The PD is an indicator of client´s creditworthiness and directly 
influences the pricing of loans (interest rates). Measuring PD involves three steps:  
a. evaluation of the market value and volatility of assets  
b. estimation of the DD 
c. mapping DD to historical default and bankruptcy frequency 
 
5.3.1 Evaluation of the market value and volatility of assets  
 
Katchova and Barry’s (2005) model evaluating future farmland value was 
extended to include environmental services evaluation. A farmland price follows a 
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stochastic process, while environmental services involve a fixed or constant payment. 
Using Merton’s pricing model, we can therefore determine:   
 
 
 
 
 
Assetconserv 0 is today’s value of total farm asset (farmland) value taking fixed carbon 
revenue from environmental services into account. 
TA  equals the  value of farmland at any point in time in the future. 
µ  and 
2σ are the mean and variance of return on farmland.  
AssetconservT is the future value of farm asset plus constant carbon revenue.
 Zt is the Wiener process (stochastic continuous). 
The market value of farm asset (Assetconserv) flows into the DD. 
 
5.3.2 Distance-to-Default 
 
The DD calculates the number of standard deviations the asset value is away 
from the default point, or threshold (Pu Chen and Willi Semmler, 2013). 
Volatility ValueAsset 
debt sfirm'  theof book value-ValueMarket Asset   (DD)default -  to-Distance =  
Additional information required for the DD calculation is the book value of the firm’s 
debt and asset value volatility. 
 
5.3.3 Mapping DD to historical default and bankruptcy 
 
The solution to the DD equation can be mapped into a historical default and 
bankruptcy database in which a similar DD can be used as a comparison in identifying 
an overview of default occurrences.  
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5.3.4 Black–Scholes Option Pricing Model and PD Calculation 
 
Taking a closer look at the nominator of the DD it is clear that asset – debt = 
equity. The asset market value and market value of equity are interrelated, as illustrated 
by Merton in the pricing model. Given that equity holders have the right—but not the 
obligation—to pay back the debt of the firms (i.e., limited liability), and that they have 
residual claim on assets, indicates a linkage. In other words, equity is a call option (right 
to buy) on the farm’s assets with a strike price equal to the sum of all debt. The Black-
Scholes option pricing model as a unique case of Merton´s model provides a proxy for 
DD as well as the PD. 
The value of equity (including environmental services) is derived using Black and 
Scholes’s call option function, given as )()( 2100 dNDedNCrAE
rT−−= . 
D is the book value of debt at time t. 
N (d1) denotes the probability that asset exceed a certain level or price. 
N (d2) is the probability that call option will be exercised or that assets will fall below 
debt. 
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In the Black and Scholes model, N (d2) is a proxy for the number of standard 
deviations an asset is from default and therefore a good proxy for DD. The PD is the 
probability that the value of the asset will be less than the book value of farm liability by 
the time the debt is to be repaid. 
PD = Pr [AssetConserv T ≤ DT | AssetConserv 0 = rTCreA −+0 ]  
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After rearranging: 
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The Black and Scholes model considers the random content of the asset return to be 
normally distributed Zt~N(0, 1); it therefore follows that default probability can be 
defined in terms of Cumulative Normal Distribution (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003).   
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5.4 Data 
 
5.4.1 South African Real Farmland Prices 
 
The lack of data on smallholders’ farmland prices in sub-Saharan Africa 
ultimately lead to the use of available commercial farm data from South Africa’s farm 
prices using Obi (2006). However, this does not change the main hypothesis of this 
paper. Farm revenue, land rent and total value of farm production (productivity) 
generally determine an investor’s willingness to pay for a farmland and thus influence 
farm prices. The positive correlation between farm prices and farm income has being 
argued by certain authors (Hattingh and Herzberg, 1980). Farm producers are, however, 
negatively affected by falling farm prices which handicaps their borrowing capabilities. 
From the 1930s to early 1970s, the prices of farmland in South Africa enjoyed 
significant upward trends which may have also reflected investors’ perception of 
agriculture as being profitable. In 1973, South Africa’s farmland accounted for 78 
percent of total assets owned by commercial farmers; twenty years later it dwindled to 
67 percent due to the drop in farm prices, which was a result of political issues (Obi, 
2006).  
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5.4.2 South Africa’s Real Farm Debt 
 
Farmers’ debt significantly contributed to the variances in farmland prices as 
cheap available loans will enhance purchasing power. Moreover the debt of farms is also 
linked to the interest rate on debt and inflation which determines profitability and future 
farm revenue. Prior to the 1990s in South Africa real farm debt increased as farmland 
prices increased due to effective farmland demand depicting a positive correlation which 
is in line with economic theory (Obi, 2006). Higher demand for farmland thus loans 
slightly increases interest rate from their initial low levels (Obi, 2006). Therefore a 
positive correlation between real interest rates and farm prices in South Africa also 
existed. However, contrary to economic expectation a negative correlation between real 
interest rate and farm prices was observed from the mid-1990s mainly due to policy 
issues (Obi, 2006). In the long term, as farmland prices continued to decrease, there was 
an increase in the interest rate, this increase in interest rate may have in some cases 
could lead to higher farm indebtedness (were variable rates apply) and decrease in real 
farm debt.  
 
 
Source: Author´s modification (Obi, 2006) 
Figure 16: Real Farmland Prices and farm debt South Africa (1955 – 2000) 
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Table 6: Real farm asset (farmland) mean, return and volatility and Real farm debt 
mean in South African Rand (1980 – 2001) 
 Real farmland Prices per ha in S/Rand Real farm debt per ha in S/Rand 
Mean 1344 425 
Return on asset 𝝁 -40% - 
Historical Volatility 𝝈 7% - 
 
5.5 Result 
 
5.5.1 Distance to default without environmental services  
 
At the beginning of 2001 the value of one hectare of farm land in South Africa 
had to drop by  524.0
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(52.4 %) in order for the farmer to default 
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1.745 standard deviations above the default threshold.  
It is rather important to anticipate what the DD will be in a couple years. For 
instance, suppose T=2. It follows that in two years the
82.2
207.0
2
2
)07.0(4.0524.0
2
−=






−−+
=DD , meaning each hectare of farmland will be 
2.82 standard deviations below the default threshold. The probability of default per 
hectare of farmland at the end of 2003, judging from the normal distribution, would be 
99.99 percent. 
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5.5.2 Distance to default with environmental services  
 
The hypothetical inclusion of certified environmental services for each hectare of 
farmland using FAO stats of 3 tCO2e per ha-1year-1 of sequestration appears plausible 
(Louis, 2011). However in order to keep the situation rooted in the real world—where 
low prices prevail on the carbon market—this paper will not use the FAO’s optimistic 
price of US$10/tCO2e and instead use the more realistic price of US$5/tCO2e or 
69.2Rand/tCO2e. The carbon revenue generated by a certified South African farmer is 
valued at approximately 207.6R (R=Rand), bringing the total farm asset in 2001 to 808R 
(see appendix). Each hectare of farmland with environmental services would have to 
drop 113.9 percent for the farmer to default at the beginning of 2001 while the DD at the 
end of the period was approximately 650 percent. These are impressive figures 
compared to the results calculated without environmental services. Forecasting into 
2003, the value of each hectare of farmland with environmental services was 
approximately 0.176 standard deviation above the default threshold, while the 
probability of default was 43 percent. Despite decreasing farmland prices, the future 
probability that farm asset (including environmental services) will fall below debt was 
less that 50 percent. This could become a major argument for lending to certified 
farmers.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
   
In sub-Saharan Africa there are a number of sustainable agricultural practices 
used by smallholders which stabilizes income and capital accumulation as well as 
generates carbon revenues. Carbon credit generated in sub-Saharan Africa relative to 
carbon investment portfolio is way below average due to complexity of registration, low 
carbon prices, knowledge gap and cultural differences. Compared to other continents, 
there is a need to improve on carbon credit generation by replicating the success had by 
certain sub-Saharan rural areas. However, identification of existing sustainable small-
farmers with carbon revenue can go a long way toward improving risk management and 
easing lending constraints to rural agricultural. Financial institutions’ allocation of credit 
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to carbon revenue earners could promote climate mitigation and adaptation. Increasing 
credit volume to certified small farmers may foster the adoption and promotion of 
innovation, leading to an increase in agricultural output and productivity in rural areas. 
One of the advantages formal lenders have in lending to certified smallholders, apart 
from reduced risk, is that less capital adequacy is required. These funds could be 
invested in ongoing business operations to improve profitability. This is one of the first 
articles to explore synergies between formal credit and sustainability via carbon credit. 
There is still an enormous need for further research on this issue, particularly since 
additional research could shape future policy decision-making. 
 
Appendix 
Table 7: Real farm debt and Farmland Prices South Africa (1980 – 2000) 
Year Real Farm Debt in Rand /ha   Real Farmland Prices in Rand /ha   
1980 395 2500 
1981 410 2300 
1982 445 2010 
1983 460 2010 
1984 520 2000 
1985 610 1750 
1986 615 1625 
1987 600 1625 
1988 510 1585 
1989 480 1580 
1990 475 1500 
1991 440 1375 
1992 400 1187 
1993 360 1000 
1994 350 755 
1995 325 753 
1996 310 750 
1997 300 700 
1998 310 680 
1999 325 650 
2000 350 625 
2001 355 600 
Source: Author´s estimation of Obi (2006) data 
 100 
 
Chapter 6∗: Certified conservation farming: a strategy to overcome smallholder’s 
credit constraints? 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) are confronted with credit constraints. Several authors have found that over 50 
per cent of farm households in developing countries are formal credit constrained 
(Muayila and Tollens, 2012; Zahidul Islam et al. 2011; Simtowe et al. 2009; Khandker 
and Faruqee, 2003; Blackman 2001).This limited credit access slows agricultural 
development in these countries. In a situation where credit for agricultural investment is 
not available, agricultural development is hampered by the absence of modernization, 
proper marketing channels, and cash management (Barry and Robison, 2001). Limited 
lending by formal financial institutions to rural agricultural SMEs can therefore, in part, 
be attributed to information imperfection i.e. lenders are unable to observe which 
borrowers are involved (Sacerdoti 2005; IFAD 2003; IFC 2013; Benjamin 2013a; Su, 
2012) Information asymmetry, moral hazard and covariant risk associated with 
smallholder farmers compounded by lack of adequate collateral are considered 
incalculable risks for banks (Swinnen and Gow, 1999). However, there is a potential 
strong demand for agricultural credit in developing countries (Swinnen and Gow, 1999).   
In general, information asymmetry (adverse selection) and moral hazard 
together, is always an issue in credit demand, however, increasing the interest rate and 
collateral requirement results in financial institutions having a pool of bad clients and 
risky projects, ultimately yielding a reduction in bank return (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
Limited liability causes borrowers to invest in projects with relatively higher risk 
corresponding to higher payoff; increasing the interest rate would result in less risky 
projects being crowded out due to a low payoff, thus, credit rationing of high risk 
projects (Wette 1983). Increasing the liability of borrowers through a higher collateral 
                                                          
∗ © Tennessee State University College of Business Publishing, [2015].  The definitive, peer-reviewed and 
edited version of this article (Version of Scholarly Record) has been accepted for publication in [Journal 
of Developing Areas], [DOI: 10.1353/jda] or 
[http://www.muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_developing_areas/]. 
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requirement as a means of credit allocation increases the riskiness of the loans as 
borrowers cannot offer the required collateral (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). Collateral 
requirement is therefore not used as a rationing tool to eliminate excess demand if 
borrowers are risk averse and risk neutral, as this may also lead to adverse selection, 
therefore reducing lenders’ profit (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Wette 1983). These authors 
argue that amongst observationally identical borrowers in a single-contract equilibrium 
scenario given a level of (excess) demand, some receive loans, while others are denied 
loans due to randomized selection. Banks therefore choose an optimal interest rate for all 
borrowers with limited liability, which remains unchanged even in the presence of 
excess credit demand (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). The model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
has been criticized for considering interest rate and collateral a separate entity rather 
than a simultaneous incentive process from a sorting perspective (Su, 2012). An interest 
rate/collateral combination may lead to incentive-compatible contracts, which segments 
risk-making rationing insignificant as adverse selection is eliminated (Su, 2012). 
Random rationing also depends on the evaluation of the project in the borrowing pool; a 
positive elevation of a project by both bank and borrower does not lead to adverse 
selection, thus the validity of risk-sorting (Su, 2012). Therefore borrowers that may have 
been denied loans due to collateral constraints are no longer the result of random 
rationing, as described by Stiglitz and Weiss, (1981) (Su, 2012).  Collateral is accepted 
by a financial institution if it is valuable enough to mitigate the risk of the advanced 
loan, while banking policies may also reduce the number of high-risk borrowers 
(Besanko and Thakor 1987; Swinnen and Gow 1999). 
It is important to search for new approaches in dealing with information 
imperfection in agricultural credit risk in order to foster rural development, for instance 
considering new forms client evaluation, collateral and insurance policies (Boucher et 
al., 2008; Barry and Robison, 2001). Extension services with ecosystem services (EES) 
may help overcome the aforementioned information imperfection. The projects 
embarked on by the EES participants are mostly well documented due to monitoring, 
verification and reporting requirements. Thus comprehensive records are available on 
the business cycle, agricultural output, as well as all possible revenue sources of 
individual smallholders (Masiga et al. 2012). These schemes are often run by non-
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governmental organizations (NGOs) and provide training on ways to improve 
agricultural productivity through knowledge spillovers along with helping to generate 
additional income from payment for ecosystem services. For example, the International 
Small Group Tree Planting Programme (TIST) trains small and medium farmers on 
conservation techniques, including zero tillage, (organic) fertilizer application, 
mulching, terracing, climate change mitigation through tree planting, and rainwater 
harvesting. In addition, farmers receive assistance from TIST in accessing formal credit.  
This strategy not only improves farmers’ human capital, especially skills related 
to record-keeping and farm management, but also introduces carbon certification as an 
additional source of income (Tham-Agyekum et al. 2010; Evenson and Mwabu 1998; 
Pagiola et al. 2008). EES have led to improvements in and diversification of farm 
revenues among adopting farmers (Delgado 1999; Diagne and Zeller 2001; Kagwiria 
2013). Ecosystem and conservation farming by smallholders in developing countries 
contributes to the alleviation of poverty by helping farmers accumulate capital (Pretty 
1999;  Pagiola et al. 2005; Thierfelder et al. 2012; Havemann and Muccione 2011; 
Montagnini and Nair 2004). Moreover, carbon registration demonstrates that agriculture 
SMEs have already self-financed part of their project therefore sending a positive signal 
regarding their managerial abilities (Benjamin 2013b). 
This study investigates the impact of smallholder participation in EES on credit 
constraints and credit conditions in the case of Kenyan TIST participants. Participation 
may have beneficial effects since higher incomes, more diversified sources of income, 
and an extra source of collateral (future income from carbon sequestration) may lower 
risk premiums charged by financial institutions. In addition, skills provided through the 
TIST network may be perceived by financial institutions as an indicator of business 
viability and trustworthiness. We use the model of Han et al. (2009) to investigate 
whether farmers can be sorted into quality groups that are offered different contract 
types, using EES as a quality measure. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 6.2 introduces the 
theoretical framework of the sorting and screening model and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 6.3 elaborates on relevant data used in this study. Section 6.4 carries out an 
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econometric regression in order to verify the hypotheses. Section 6.5 discusses potential 
hurdles within the OLS analysis while section 6.6 then concludes. 
 
6.2 Theoretical Model 
 
The model described by Han et al. (2009) combines two previous theoretical 
models: Berger and Udell (1990) and Bester (1985). The former model argues that 
financial institutions may require collateral from and/or impose higher interest rates on 
observed risky borrowers (Sorting by observed risk), whereas the latter argues that the 
creditworthiness of borrowers is screened via the collateral put up by borrowers (Sorting 
by private information). As both are important possible mechanisms we use the 
combined model of Han et al. (2009). This model, contrary to the one of Stiglitz and 
Weiss’ (1981) single-contract equilibrium with optimal interest rate, depicts a screen and 
sorting mechanism resulting in optimal interest rate/collateral indifference curve and 
multiple-contract equilibrium. An alternative would be the model of Milde and Riley 
(1988), but they use loan size to screen participants, rather than observable 
characteristics.  
 As pointed out by Lambrecht (2009), Han et al. (2009) use the term signaling, 
which is an unfortunate choice, as they have in fact a sorting and screening model.4 
Borrowers are sorted according to observable characteristics and then screened through a 
menu of contracts. Thus we will refer to observable characteristics. To stay consistent 
with the notation of Han et al. (2009) we will denote the characteristics as s. 
In their article, Han et al. (2009) assume that financial institutions know the 
return on a project but are not familiar with the business ability of borrowers. Therefore, 
these formal institutions sort clients based on an observed characteristic. Examples of 
such characteristics are business records and involvement in EES both of which can be 
observed by the lender without significant cost. One issue with observable 
                                                          
4 Note that if borrowers consciously engage in EES to get better credit terms, and this engagement is 
costly then we would have a signaling model. However, we do not model this decision and as such we are 
not dealing with a signal model  
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characteristics is that they do not perfectly measure quality, thus borrowers who seem to 
have a high degree of creditworthiness may in fact not be very creditworthy.  
Following Han et al. (2009) we model farmers with and without EES who 
demand credit for a farming project. This farming project requires an exogenous 
investment (K) which is completely financed by formal institutions. The success of the 
farming project depends on the farming ability θ of the farmer with a probability p(θ).  
Highly-skilled farmers are denoted by θH and low-skilled farmers denoted as θL, {θH, 
θL}∈ (0,1). A farmer repays if the project is successful and defaults if it fails. The 
probability of project success is equal to farming ability of the farmer p (θ) = θ. Credit 
contract is made up of interest rate r and collateral C where repayment of credit = (1+ r) 
K. 
The Project (farming) return is:  
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 The utility function of the farmer at the end of the period for a successful project 
for a farmer with EES is ( EESSU | ) = (Initial wealth (W) + potential cash flow from carbon 
credit (B) + project return – credit repayment: 
EES|SU  = (W + B) + ((1+θ) K) – (1+ r) K = (W + B) + (θ – r) K  w.p.   θ.  (1) 
Similarly for a conventional farmer: 
alConventionSU |  = (W + ((1+θ) K) – (1+ r) K = W+ (θ – r) K   w.p.   θ . (2) 
In case the project fails we have ( FU ) Initial wealth – Collateral pledge (due to 
default): 
EES|FU  = (W + B) – C        w.p.  1 – θ. (3) 
alConventionFU |  = W – C        w.p.  1 – θ. (4) 
Thus the expected project utility (EU) is: 
EUEES = θ EES|SU + (1 – θ) EES|FU = (W + B) + θ2K – rθK – (1 – θ)   (5) 
EU Conventional = θ SU + (1 – θ) FU = W + θ2K – rθK– (1 – θ)    (6)
 Prior to the sorting process the bank estimates that the distribution of farmers 
over types is equal, i.e. P(θH) = P(θL) = 0.5. Moreover, the bank assumes that the 
probability of observing a high-quality characteristic of a highly-skilled farmer, s , is 
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equal to that of observing a low-quality characteristic of a low-skilled farmer, s , i.e., Pr 
( s |θH) = Pr ( s |θL) = 𝛼.  The conditional probabilities of observing the respective 
characteristic from the different types of farmers are: 
Pr (θ = θH | s = s ) = Pr (θ = θL | s = s ) = )1(5.05.0
5.0
αα
α
−+
=𝛼,   (7) 
and 
Pr (θ = θL | s = s ) = Pr (θ = θH | s = s ) = 1 – 𝛼      (8) 
The latter conditional probability represents the case of a low skilled farmer 
participating in a conservation program, i.e., the probability of a low-skilled farmer 
having a high-quality characteristic and vice versa. The conditional probability 𝛼 is 
assumed to be  ≥ 0.5. If 𝛼 is less than 0.5 then s is not a good measure of quality. With 
better information, formal institutions could design contracts for each type of farmer. 
Thus the bank offers two types of contracts: one for highly-skilled farmers Γ (rH, CH) 
and one for low-skilled farmers Γ (rL, CL). Assuming separate contracts, the expected 
profits of the bank are, in the case of 
a. High quality characteristics: 
[ ] [ ]KCKrKCKrE LLLLHHHH −−++−+−−++= )1()1()1()1()1( θθαθθαπ  (9) 
b. Low quality characteristics: 
 [ ] [ ]KCKrKCKrE LLLLHHHH −−+++−−++−= )1()1()1()1()1( θθαθθαπ   (10) 
 
6.2.1 Self-selection mechanism and screening  
 
Bank contracts can screen individuals and promote self-selection if two 
conditions are satisfied: individual rationality and incentive compatibility. For both 
lender and farmer, the individual rationality condition states that if the expected utility 
of undertaking the project is larger than the utility of not undertaking it then the project 
will be undertaken. Given W for conventional farmers and W + B for the sustainable 
farmer, it follows that the menu of contract for borrowers, given the expected utility of 
the project, under the individual rationality condition is:   
EUiEES (Γ i) = (W + B) + θ i 2K –  r θ iK – (1 – θ i)C  ≥  W + B 
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 θ i 2K – rθ i K– (1 – θ i)C ≥ 0,       (11) 
Similarly the expected utility of conventional farming project is: 
EUicv (Γ i) = W + θ i 2K  –  r θ iK – (1 – θ i)C  ≥  W  
EUicv (Γ i) = θ i 2K – rθ i K– (1 – θ i)C ≥ 0      (12) 
For the formal financial institution this condition implies:  
πE ≥ 0 if characteristic s = s  and πE  ≥ 0 if the characteristic s = s  
For farmers, the incentive compatibility ensures that it is optimal to choose 
contracts meant for them and not to opt for the other contract, i.e. for a high-(skilled) 
quality farmer )()( LHHH EUEU Γ>Γ  and low-quality farmers )()( HLLL EUEU Γ>Γ , for 
both of those sorted into the EES and conventional group. To further elaborate on the 
farmer’s participation condition, a high-skilled farmer who has a high-quality 
characteristics s  will maximize his expected utility by choosing a combination of low 
interest rate and high collateral such that )()( LEESHHHEES EUEU Γ>Γ , and a low skilled 
farmers high-quality characteristics s  such that )()( LLEESHLEES EUEU Γ>Γ . The same 
condition holds for conventional farmers. 
Under the individual rationality and incentive compatibility conditions contracts 
can be designed such that, given the characteristics, farmers are separated into high- and 
low-quality. In order to separate, the bank needs to offer for each type of characteristic 
two types of contracts such that 



<< LHHL
LHHL
C  C  then r r 
C > C  then r> r 
if
if
(proof: see appendix). 
The intuition is that each type of farmer will settle for the contract that matches their 
skills. Within the EES group the contracts separate the low skilled farmer from the high 
skilled ones, and the same occurs in the conventional group. However, high skilled 
farmers with EES probably face even better contract terms than high skilled without 
EES. 
The separation mechanism is illustrated in figure 17, which depicts the marginal 
(dis)utility of interest rate and collateral between low-skilled and high-skilled farmers. 
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Source: Authors modification of Han et al. 2009 
Note: subscripts denote farmer’s type 
Figure 17: Multiple contract equilibrium: Depicted are the indifference curves in r 
and C from a Bank´s perspective and for two types of farmers in a choice contract  
Depicted are the indifference curves in r – C for both the bank and the two types 
of farmers. On the y-axis of the graph are the interest rates r of the farmers, and on the x-
axis is the collateral requirement. For credit terms, low-skilled farmers maximize their 
utility at point “a” while highly-skilled farmers maximize utility at point “b”. From the 
above graph (Fig. 1) it is obvious from the indifference curve that a highly-skilled 
farmer would prefer collateral to interest rates, as this set of farmers is willing to pledge 
more collateral or assets for a substantially lower rate of interest. In contrast, a low 
skilled farmer has an opposite preference therefore pledging less collateral for a high 
interest rate.  
 
6.3 Data and Variables  
 
Agriculture accounts for approximately 75 percent of the Kenyan labor force, 
while 75 percent of total agricultural output is attributed to smallholder farmers (holding 
between 0.58 and 2.5ha farmland). Therefore, is an important sector for job creation and 
poverty alleviation (Salami et al. 2010; Orodho, 2006). An estimated three quarters of 
the population (32.3 million) are rural dwellers, of which 70 per cent are “poor” 
smallholder farmers located in the central and western regions (IFAD 2013). These areas 
are characterized by medium to high agriculture production potentials since other 
regions are either arid or semi-arid areas with frequent drought (IFAD 2013). 
 108 
 
Conversely, these arid and semi-arid constitute about 80 per cent of the land surface and 
are inhabited by 20 per cent of the total population (Orodho, 2006). The study area 
covered includes: Embu, Meru and Nanyuki, which are humid and semi-arid regions of 
Eastern and Rift valley provinces located in the central and western regions of Kenya. 
Maize, poultry, vegetables, beans, agroforestry and potatoes are some of the major 
agricultural produce produced in all three areas. We randomly sampled 210 farmers 
from these regions, whereby ca. half are members of the The International Small Group 
Tree Planting (TIST). No interviewee declined to be interviewed corresponding to a 100 
per cent rate of return of. Smallholders (farmsize ≤ 2.5 ha) were predominant 
throughout with ca. 55.7 per cent of them growing cash crops such as coffee or/and tea.  
TIST is undertaking projects in conjunction with the Clean Air Action 
Corporation’s (CAAC), a private carbon developer, to establish small-scale agroforestry 
in Kenya, India, Tanzania, Uganda, Honduras and Nicaragua. These projects not only 
help to rehabilitate ecosystems such that they are more  productive but also validate and 
verify carbon sequestration through the verified carbon standard (VCS) and the Climate, 
Community and Biodiversity standard (CCB) (Shames et al., 2012). TIST creates small 
groups of farmers to organize the tree planting and provides training in Kenya and have 
so far established tree cover on an estimated 4,597 ha, sequestrating 209, 613 tons of 
carbon (Masiga et al., 2012). In April 2013, a survey was carried out in the eastern, 
central, and rift valley provinces of Kenya where 130 smallholder farmers were 
randomly sampled. A structured questionnaire was developed and pilot-tests conducted 
before interviews were conducted amongst agricultural SMEs. 
 
6.4 Empirical analysis 
 
In Table 8 characteristics of the data used to assess the determinants of credit 
access in a set of regression analyses performed below are shown. Summary statistics 
show that 88 per cent of all interviewees report to have been able to obtain a loan, 
whereas for 12 per cent were not. However, we cannot be certain about the correct 
interpretation of “0” statements, since we cannot distinguish between “rejected 
application for credit”, “those that did not try to obtain credit” because they anticipated a 
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rejection and “those that are not in need of credit”. Approximately 42 per cent of 
smallholders stated that they keep written business records. Average number of cattle on 
farm is 1.52 in this sample and the average farm size is one hectare. 97 per cent of all 
farmers cultivate zero to five hectares, approximately 2 per cent of farms have a size of 
six to eight hectares, and the remaining farmer has a farm with a size of 16 hectares. 
Average total revenues among 130 smallholders is approximately 114,000 Kenyan 
shillings (Ksh); average distance to the nearest market is approximately 2.1 km. 
Education, measured in years of formal schooling, is 8.8 years. 66 per cent of all 
interviewees state to be member of TIST program and 82 per cent of all interviewees 
have a neighbor who is a TIST member. 
Table 8: Descriptive statistics (referring to models shown in Table 12) 
Variables N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Credit access (yes/no) 130 0.88 0.30 0.00 1.00 
Maintains business records (yes/no) 130 0.42 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Cattle (apiece) 130 1.52 1.61 0.00 15.00 
Farm size (hectares) 130 1.00 2.00 0.05 16.00 
Total revenues (in 000 Ksh) 130 114.74 113.11 8.20 730.00 
Education of farmer (in years) 130 8.75 3.68 0.00 16.00 
Distance to market (in km) 130 2.08 2.94 0.01 20.00 
TIST member (yes/ no) 130 0.66 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Neighbor is TIST member (yes/ no) 128 0.82 0.39 0.00 1.00 
 
A first approach to obtain information about differences between the successful 
and unsuccessful farmers in accessing formal credit markets is computing descriptive 
statistics for these groups separately. In Table 9, descriptive statistics of successful 
applicants are presented. A comparison of information with those who failed at 
accessing credit markets (Table 10) reveals that there are substantial differences between 
these groups’ socioeconomic indicators: successful applicants tend to have 
approximately 2.4 times more cattle, larger farms (factor 1.7), and substantially higher 
revenues (factor 2.7) compared to unsuccessful ones. They attend school longer (more 
than three years more), and are located closer to the nearest market (on average 1.8 km 
compared to 4.3 km). This indicates that some farmers might fail at accessing credit 
markets because they are less solvent, have less collateral and/or because they are less 
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skilled. Surprisingly, successful applicants keep written records less often (42 per cent 
versus 48 per cent) and are less likely to be a member of TIST, even though TIST offers 
advantages especially for smallholders’ with limited resources. Given the variety of 
potential reasons for credit market access, it is at this stage impossible to identify one 
particular reason. We will shed more light on this matter by assessing these factors 
simultaneously in a multiple regression framework. 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for those farmers with access to credit markets 
Variables N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min. Max. 
Credit access (yes/no) 115 1.00 0 1.00 1.00 
Maintains business records (yes/no) 115 0.42 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Cattle (apiece) 115 1.63 1.76 0.00 15.00 
Farm size (hectares) 115 1.04 1.90 0.05 16.00 
Total revenues (in 000 Ksh) 115 123.75 116.73 8.20 730.00 
Education of farmer (in years) 115 9.13 3.63 0.00 16.00 
Distance to market (in km) 115 1.78 2.23 0.01 15.00 
TIST member (yes/ no) 115 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Neighbor is TIST member (yes/ no) 114 0.84 0.37 0.00 1.00 
 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics for those farmers without access to credit markets 
Variables N Mean Standard Deviation Min. Max. 
Credit access (yes/no) 15 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 
Maintains business records (yes/no) 15 0.47 0.52 0.00 1.00 
Cattle (apiece) 15 0.67 1.05 0.00 3.00 
Farm size (hectares) 15 0.61 0.99 0.05 3.60 
Total revenues (in 000 Ksh) 15 45.62 33.71 10.00 120.00 
Education of farmer (in years) 15 5.87 2.75 0.00 8.00 
Distance to market (in km) 15 4.39 5.73 0.5 20.00 
TIST member (yes/ no) 15 0.53 0.52 0.00 1.00 
Neighbor is TIST member (yes/ no) 14 0.64 0.50 0.00 1.00 
 
In a first step, we investigate determinants of credit accessibility in a logistic 
regression framework. Correlation coefficients between variables used in the logistic 
regression models are shown in Table 11. Correlation between independent variables is 
generally low. We conclude it is safe to use them simultaneously in a regression 
framework since multicollinearity-related biases are unlikely to play a role. 
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Table 11: Correlation matrix, referring to models presented in Table 12 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Credit access (yes/ no) 1.00                 
2 Maintains business records (yes/ no) -0.06 1.00               
3 Cattle (apiece) 0.21 0.07 1.00             
4 Farm size (hectares) 0.09 0.06 0.49 1.00           
5 Total revenues (in 000 Ksh) 0.21 -0.06 0.11 0.09 1.00         
6 Education of farmer (in years) 0.24 -0.20 0.10 0.14 0.48 1.00       
7 Distance to market (in km)  -0.27 0.24 0.15 0.18 -0.09 -0.16 1.00     
8 TIST member (yes/ no) 0.08 0.26 0.11 0.23 -0.11 -0.16 0.25 1.00   
9 Neighbor is TIST member (yes/ no) 0.16 0.11 0.07 0.15 -0.05 -0.14 0.23 0.58 1.00 
 
Models 1 to 3 (Table 12) establish the baseline model, where essential 
socioeconomic characteristics of smallholders are controlled for. The results indicate 
that collateral, such as the number of cattle in possession of the farmer and size of farm, 
improve the chances to access formal credit markets. We also control for the farmer’s 
formal education, measured in years, which turned out to have a positive effect. 
Education is considered a crucial precondition for improved labor productivity and 
ability to adopt new technologies (Huffman, 2001; Huffman and Orazem 2007; Jamison 
and Lau 1982).  
Table 12: Determinants of access to formal credit markets among Kenyan 
smallholders  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Maintains business records 0.31 -0.11 0.01 -0.87 -0.88 
 (0.678) (0.694) (0.707) (0.824) (0.841) 
Cattle (apiece) 1.09** 0.97** 0.94** 1.06** 1.60*** 
 (0.447) (0.407) (0.416) (0.428) (0.608) 
Farm size (hectares) 0.93  1.07 1.10 2.18** 
 (0.723)  (0.742) (0.797) (0.988) 
Education of farmer (in years) 0.26*** 0.19* 0.19* 0.26** 0.15 
 (0.101) (0.099) (0.103) (0.122) (0.137) 
Distance to market (in km) -0.31*** -0.22** -0.29** -0.36*** -0.47*** 
 (0.111) (0.107) (0.115) (0.129) (0.159) 
Total revenues (in 000 Ksh)  0.01 0.02* 0.02** 0.02* 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Tist member (yes/ no)    2.39**  
    (0.950)  
Neighbor is TIST member  
(yes/ no) 
    2.76*** 
     (1.056) 
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Constant -0.79 -0.71 -1.21 -2.92** -3.19** 
 (0.918) (0.894) (0.974) (1.345) (1.571) 
      
Observations 130 130 130 130 128 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients represent odd-ratios of a logistic 
regression where the dependent variable equals 1 if smallholder is a borrower and 0 otherwise. 
 
Total revenues earned also seem to increase the probability to obtain credit at a 
formal credit institution, whereas distance to market has the opposite result. Banks are 
likely to search for these characteristic among applicants for credit to identify farmers 
with progressive production methods, higher and more stable incomes and therefore and 
a lower risk of default. Maintaining business records, according to the result, appears not 
to be an important factor at the early stage of loan application; rather collateral, 
collateral substitutes and human capital characteristics are of importance. In models 1 
and 2, the baseline model is varied in such a way, that potential collinearity between 
farm size and total revenues become visible. The results of model 3 confirm those 
derived in models 1 and 2, indicating robustness and that collinearity between total 
revenues and farm size is not an issue here.  
In a next step, the results of model 3 can be compared with those of models 4 and 
5. The latter two models confirm earlier results, and allow investigating the effect of 
TIST membership. Model 4 controls for TIST membership of an individual and the 
corresponding coefficient suggests that TIST membership positively affect the 
probability to obtain credit. TIST membership is associated with a 2.76 higher chance to 
access credit market compared with non-members. This may indicates that skills, 
information, and technologies provided through the TIST network, such as improving 
productivity, using natural and chemical fertilizer, mulching, avoiding erosion as well as 
the opportunity to market ecosystem services have a beneficial effect on credit access. 
Furthermore, TIST program facilitates loans from formal financial institutions on behalf 
of the smallholders for purchasing seed, farming implements for planting and educating 
their children (Shames et al. 2012). 
In model 5, the hypothesis is tested that it is not the membership per se that 
affects the ability to access credit, but is merely information, technology, etc. provided 
through the TIST network. Here, we do not control for TIST membership, but for the 
fact that an individual’s neighbor is a TIST member. By performing this test we are able 
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to separate the effect of formal membership and information transfer through the TIST 
network and subsequent spillover effect. The results indicate that the neighbor’s 
membership also has a positive impact on an individual’s ability to obtain credit, 
indicating that spillovers play a role in addition to returns to ecosystem services which 
are solely possible for formal TIST members. This phenomenon is not new to scientific 
literature as similar behavior has been observed for the U.S., India, Ghana, and 
Mozambique, but in this case the source for spillovers are not pioneering locals but an 
external institution (TIST), increasing skills by socializing knowledge (Bandiera and 
Rasul 2006; Conley and Udry 2010; Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Parman 2010, Ryan 
and Gross 1943). 
In a second step, we investigate those individuals who have successfully applied 
for credit. We are particularly interested in the interest rate these individuals pay. In 
Table 14 the correlation coefficients between relevant variables used in corresponding 
regression models are shown. Given the low correlations between explanatory variables 
capturing general farm and credit characteristics (see variables no. 2 - 8) we conclude 
that controlling for these variables does not bias our results. High correlations can be 
observed between different types of income, as some variables, such as off-farm 
revenues and non-agricultural revenues (see variables no. 8 - 10), measure similar 
activities. 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics (referring to models shown in Table 15) 
Variables  N Mean Standard 
Deviation  
Min. Max. 
Credit interest rate (%) 52 12.92 5.34 2 20 
Maintains business records (yes/no) 52 0.42 0.5 0 1 
Cattle (apiece) 52 1.63 1.33 0 7 
Farm size (hectares) 52 0.86 1.26 0.1 8 
Conventional credit institution 52 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Microcredit institution 52 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Co-operative bank 52 0.31 0.47 0 1 
Income share from cropping 52 57.03 37.08 0 100 
Income share from off-farm revenues 52 42.97 37.08 0 100 
Income share from non-agriculture 52 43.18 27.21 0 100 
Income share from ecosystem payments 52 1.00 2.53 0 13.33 
 
For the analysis of the determinants of credit interest rate, descriptive statistics 
are presented in Table 13. Unfortunately, we do not have all information necessary to 
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run regression on all 130 farmers; in fact, we lose those individuals without credit access 
and those with incomplete information, resulting in 52 individuals to be used in 
empirical tests. Descriptive statistics indicate that the mean interest rate among the 52 
smallholders who report credit access is 12.92 per cent per annum, with a reported 
minimum of two and a maximum of 20 per cent.5 Explanatory variables were collected 
to capture smallholders’ socioeconomic characteristics to assess their ability to check the 
risk of default as well as the credit institution’s banking practices. Approximately 42 per 
cent of all interviewees confirmed that they maintained written business records, an 
activity which is central for a bank’s client quality perception. As for collateral, average 
farm size totals 0.86 hectares, with a minimum of 0.1 and a maximum of eight hectares.6 
Other tangible assets that may be pledged as collateral by famers in the absence of real 
estate are cattle and cars, motorcycles, certain farm implements, home appliances, and 
cash deposits. Farmers kept on average 1.6 cattle on their farms while off-farm cash-
flow was on average 77,500 Kenyan shillings (Ksh) per annum. The most common 
credit source for loans is microcredit institutions (62 per cent). 31 per cent of 
interviewees reported practicing co-operative banking, while only 13 per cent are 
customers of conventional credit institutions. The contribution of on-farm revenue to 
total revenue averaged approximately 57 per cent which reaffirms the importance of 
(traditional) crop production in the income matrix of smallholders. Income shares from 
off-farm revenues and non-agricultural activities sum up to a total of 43 per cent each. 
The amount of off-farm revenues in the Kenyan case corresponds with the finding of 
Jayne et al. (2003) who estimate this value to be 40 per cent.  
The share of income from ecosystem services as a portion of total income, which 
should be an incentive for smallholders to engage in ecosystem conservation, is quite 
small. This may be due to the low price of carbon (see also Shames (2013)). On average, 
this source of income contributes only one per cent of total income, with 18 out of 52 
smallholders receiving no ecosystem payments at all. This finding is in line with that of 
                                                          
5 We excluded those individuals who reported to have been granted credit from other sources, such as 
family members, friends, or other informal channels. Because we cannot tell whether these individuals are 
(formally) credit constraint or whether they chose to lend money informally for other, unobservable 
reasons. 
6 51 out of 52 interviewees reported to own the land they cultivate. One out of 52 reported to have only 
leased the land. 
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Tschakert (2004) who found that the percentage for Senegal ranges between 1 and 4.5 
per cent. Two interviewees reported revenues from ecosystem conservation in the range 
of 12 to 14 per cent, indicating that among non-participants of ecosystem conservation 
practices there is still a large room for increases in income, collateral substitute (cash-
flow), and act as a positive observable characteristics. 
Table 14: Correlation matrix, referring to models presented in Table 15 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Credit interest rate (%) 1                     
2 Maintains business records (yes/ no) -0.35 1                   
3 Cattle (apiece) 0.16 0.21 1                 
4 Farm size (hectares) -0.11 0.05 0.55 1               
5 Conventional credit institution  
(yes/ no) 
0.15 0.23 0.07 -0.08 1             
6 Microcredit institution (yes/ no) -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.19 -0.5 1           
7 Co-operative bank (yes/ no) 0.06 -0.06 0.15 0.01 -0.14 -0.33 1         
8 Income share from cropping 0.18 -0.02 0.33 0.24 0.22 -0.02 -0.03 1       
9 Income share from off-farm revenues -0.18 0.02 -0.32 -0.24 -0.22 0.02 0.03 -0.99 1     
10 Income share from non-agriculture -0.18 0.02 -0.32 -0.24 -0.22 0.02 0.03 -0.99 -1 1   
11 Income share from ecosystem payments -0.01 0.07 0.25 0.14 0.21 -0.04 -0.16 0.32 -0.32 -0.32 1 
 
In Table 15 the results of a set of OLS regressions are presented. The low 
number of observations complicates standard tests on statistical significance here. 
However, the signs and size of coefficients allow an evaluation of the correlates of credit 
interest paid by Kenyan smallholders. Most importantly, farmers with the ability to 
maintain business records seem to experience a reduced interest burden compared to 
their peers who do not keep business records. The results indicate that banks are willing 
to provide credit at lower interest rates if the borrower is able to provide transparency 
about his business by providing insights into the farm’s financial situation. As for 
collateral, farm size is negatively correlated with lending rates, indicating that banks 
prefer real estate over other forms of collateral. The interest rate of credit granted 
decreases by approximately 1.2 to 1.3 per cent with every additional hectare of farm 
size, underlining the importance of collateral in the form of real estate. Conversely, the 
number of cattle owned by the borrower may be also accepted as collateral, even though 
borrowers have to pay a premium for this form of collateralization. The formal and 
informal interaction with a number of financial institutions operating in rural mount 
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Kenyan region reveal that cattle, to a certain extent, are  eligible as  collateral. The 
rationale behind the bank’s behavior may be explained by the fact that cattle may be 
sold, stolen or slaughtered.  There could also be certain variables driving the positive 
relationship between cattle ownership and interest rates charged, such as the availability 
or otherwise of insurance for cattle, or the prevalence of pestilence in livestock as well 
as measurement error. This positive correlation may be in line with the argument of 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) that higher interest rate rations high risk activities, such as 
cattle ownership.  
Table 15: Determinants (OLS) of credit interest rates among Kenyan smallholders  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Maintains business records -5.00*** -4.89*** -4.89*** -4.88*** -5.03*** 
 (1.273) (1.290) (1.290) (1.290) (1.262) 
Cattle (apiece)  1.62*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.54*** 1.71*** 
 (0.439) (0.436) (0.436) (0.436) (0.459) 
Farm size (hectares) -1.21** -1.24** -1.24** -1.24** -1.19** 
 (0.507) (0.523) (0.523) (0.522) (0.502) 
Conventional credit institution 3.30* 3.03 3.03 3.02 3.60* 
 (1.930) (2.030) (2.030) (2.031) (2.008) 
Alternative forms of credit reference reference reference reference reference 
Income from cropping (%)  0.01    
  (0.018)    
Off-farm revenues (%)   -0.01   
   (0.018)   
Income from non-agriculture (%)    -0.01  
    (0.018)  
Income from Ecosystem payments 
(%) 
    -0.21 
     (0.232) 
Constant 12.98*** 12.53*** 13.58*** 13.59*** 13.00*** 
 (1.201) (1.581) (1.396) (1.399) (1.213) 
Observations 52 52 52 52 52 
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
We also include controls for the type of credit, e.g. microcredit, co-operative or 
conventional. The results suggest that loans taken out at conventional credit institutions 
are substantially more expensive compared to alternative forms of credit. The advantage 
of having access to a microcredit institution or co-operative in terms of interest rate 
amounts to approximate reduction of 3 to 3.6 per cent. Commercial banks in Eastern 
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Africa appear to have strong preference for educated clients, collateral, liquidity and 
low-risk assets while advances to agriculture including smallholders are minimal. 
Average real interest rate from this region was estimated at 15.9 per cent (Čihák and 
Podpiera, 2005). Microfinance in contracts provides credit to lower-income clients 
including those otherwise unbanked (smallholders) while size of loan is typically small; 
however larger amounts are no longer a rare occurrence. Risk management is to a large 
extent joint liability with some cases of collateralization in recent years, while average 
interest rate was ca. 13 per cent (Robert et al. 2009). Co-operatives are more of an 
empowerment instrument which are mostly government support with average interest 
rate, in some case, of 5 per cent (Develtere et al. 2008).  A reason for the difference in 
interest rate may be attributed to the cost of capital which in the case of commercial 
banks is capital market based and in microfinance and Co-operatives is donor /aid and 
subsidy based, respectively. 
Most importantly for this study, we test for differences in terms of credit 
conditions depending on farmers’ income sources. We include variables capturing the 
effect of income share from traditional farming versus more innovative forms of 
farming. For example, in model 1, we estimate the effect of the share of income from 
traditional farming on interest burden. The result indicates that farmers with a large 
share of income from traditional cropping must pay more in interest. The corresponding 
coefficient indicates that jumping from one extreme (100 per cent of income from 
traditional agriculture) to the other (zero per cent) results in a reduction of the interest 
rate in the order of one per cent. Conversely, the share of income stemming from off-
farm revenues or non-agricultural activities – two metrics capturing very similar 
activities – corresponds with lower interest rates of the same magnitude. Interestingly, 
the share of income from ecosystem payments is correlated with significantly lower 
interest rates. Jumping from one extreme (0 per cent income from ecosystem services) to 
the observed maximum of 13.33 per cent results in a decrease in the interest rate of 2.1 
per cent. The orthodox interpretation of statistical significance of these coefficients 
would suggest accepting the hypothesis that this coefficient does NOT reflect a 
correlation between TIST membership and more favorable credit terms. However, 
McCloskey and Ziliak (1996) argue that the concept of statistical significance is 
 118 
 
unreliable if the underlying number of observations is small, as it is the case here.7 
Therefore, we may also consider the possibility that credit institutions reward innovative 
forms of economic activities, with a reduced interest rate for off-farm revenues and 
innovative practices of conservation agriculture, but prefer conforming this finding by 
adding more observations to the analysis in future research. 
In another set of regressions (not shown here) we additionally include control 
variables for loan size and physical height of an individual farmer. The rationale for the 
former is that interest rates on larger loans might be lower per unit borrowed, and hence 
constitute a potential explanatory factor of interest rate. The rational for including 
physical height is that we cannot rule out the possibility that there are characteristics 
reflecting a farmer´s quality, which we are unable to observe and therefore unable to 
incorporate in our regression framework. To minimize the risk of omitted variable bias, 
we use height as a proxy for “quality”, as this metric is strongly correlated with health, 
nutrition, and human capital (Schick and Steckel, 2010; Steckel, 1995). However, 
neither of these affects our results; in fact, the results remain virtually unchanged. 
Including this control, however, reduces our number of observations we therefore prefer 
to continue our analysis with our basic model as shown in table 15. 
 
6.5 Research shortfalls 
 
Some of the issues confronting this study are the limited number of observations 
and to a certain extent: endogeneity. While little can be done to address the former, the 
latter can be resolved using an instrumental variable (IV). Endogeneity in this study may 
arise as a result of omitted variables and possible reverse causality. As earlier 
mentioned, we used height as an instrument instrumental variable to control for an 
omitted variable, which did not change the outcome of our analysis. However, the 
possible existence of a reverse causality remains, that is to say that improved 
productivity and quality (possibly as a result of participating in EES) may lead to credit-
access, rather than the vice versa. Although this may be difficult to test in our case, we 
                                                          
7 Keep in mind that irrespective of a dataset’s data structure, large (small) numbers of observations lead to 
smaller (larger) standard errors. 
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use a relevant case study from another part of sub-Saharan Africa to make a case for 
unlikely reverse causality. The study by (Ali and Deininger, 2014) on credit rationing in 
rural Ethiopia argued that credit access to once constrained smallholder farmers in areas 
with high productive potential could improve productivity by an estimated 11 percent. 
Credit-constrained farmers in Peru and the Philippines could have increased production 
by 26 and 37 per cent, respectively, if they had had access to adequate credit (Godquin 
and Sharma, 2005; Guirkinger and Boucher, 2008).These results therefore align with the 
findings from other studies that accessibility to credit allows for the adoption of 
agricultural innovation, which may lead to higher productivity. 
  
6.6 Conclusion 
 
While the direct impacts of rural small and medium enterprises conservation, 
extension services with ecosystem services (EES) farming on living standards and 
ability to cope with climate change in sub-Saharan Africa is well understood, research 
on the possible secondary benefits e.g. access to credit by farmers who participate in 
these activities is slim (Masiga 2012; Shames et al. 2012; Shames, 2013). Farmers 
participating in ecosystem service may benefit from their observable characteristics — 
and thus creditworthiness — to financial institutions in order to obtain access to credit 
and better credit terms. This can substantial contribute to rural development as small 
farm households in sub-Saharan Africa may allocate a substantial percentage of formal 
credit to income (input purchase) and consumption smoothing. In the event of a 
temporary credit constraint, farmers in Malawi were observed to have preferred to hold 
credit reserves for future shocks at the expense of current income for investing in farm 
production and improve future consumption smoothing (Zeller, 2001). Improved credit 
market access may encourage the adoption of new technologies and strategies since 
increased monetary resources allow setbacks and shocks to be dealt with more flexibly 
(Khandker and Faruqee, 2003; Zeller, 2001).  
EES farmers may therefore improve their chances of obtaining loans amongst 
others by gaining valuable physical collateral through PES as an acceptable form of 
securitization within an extension and ecosystem services program. In the theory section 
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we utilize the model of Han et al. (2009) to show that EES can serve as a sorting 
mechanism for financial institutions to obtain information about a farmer’s business and 
creditworthiness. We have also shown that credit contract separation improves the loan 
terms for farmers. 
Moreover, empirical evidence for the existence of the game theory model implies 
that physical securitization and human capital may lead to separation equilibrium in 
credit contracts. In order to connect this hypothesis to a real-world scenario, unique data 
was collected from sustainable Kenyan smallholders participating in carbon agroforestry 
project. Our results indicate that financial institutions are willing provide credit at lower 
interest rates if smallholders are able to maintain business records, which allow financial 
institutions to gain insight into the farm’s financial situation. Banks adjust the credit 
conditions according to the quality of the borrower’s collateral; a low risk for default is 
observed if farm land can be offered as collateral, other forms of collateral result may 
also lead to lower interest rates. Most importantly for this study, the empirical evidence 
suggests that smallholders pay a premium for traditional farming, with no income from 
sectors other than agriculture. Conversely, farming that includes ecosystem conservation 
activities seems to offer advantages in terms of less interest paid, as this type of income 
can increase farmers’ incomes and reduce the risk of credit default. We also find 
evidence that members of TIST, a program encouraging and helping smallholders to 
diversify their income by participating in ecosystem services, are more likely to access 
formal credit markets.  
 
Appendix 
 
The maximum expected utility of a highly-skilled carbon farmer is:  
H
2 min-W )( YBKUE HHH ++=Γ θ ,  where, the absolute min
[ ]
α
θαθ KY L
2
H
) -(1 - -1  =  this is net transfer or repayment to the bank by high farmer, 
thus
[ ]
α
θαθ KY L
2
H
) -(1 - -1 ≥ . Since the high quality farmer has the possibility to 
negotiate, he/she will keep the value of HY  as low as possible.  
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For a highly-skilled farmer with a low-quality characteristics, choosing a low interest 
rate and pledging higher collateral will result in expected utility:  
H
2 Ymin  -W  )( +=Γ KUE HHH θ , where, min 
[ ]
α
αθθ
−
=
1
 -  -1 Y
2
H
KL  net transfer or 
repayment to the bank by high farmer with low quality characteristics is expected to be 
higher than that of a high skilled framer with high quality characteristics. 
In the case of a low-skilled farmer with a high-quality characteristics who chooses a 
high interest rate and pledges low collateral, maximum expected utility is: 
LLLL YKUE min  - BW )(
2 ++=Γ θ , where, the absolute min 
[ ]
α
αθθ
−
=
1
 - -1  
2 KY HL  . The 
low-skilled farmer with a low-quality characteristics who chooses a high interest rate 
and pledges low collateral will have maximum expected utility of: 
LLLL YKUE min  -W  )(
2 +=Γ θ ,where, the absolute min 
[ ]
α
θαθ KH
2
L
) -(1-  -1  Y =  
which is expected to be higher than that of a low-skilled farmer with a high-quality 
characteristics.  
Individual rationality:  
Starting with expected profit of Banks in the case of a good observable characteristics 
equation 9 
[ ] [ ]KCKrKCKrE LLLLHHHH −−++−+−−++= )1()1()1()1()1( θθαθθαπ  
This can be rewritten as under the assumption of a truly competitive capital market   
0)1( =−++−= LH YYKKE ααθπ  
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The Individual rationality constraints farmers both high and low skilled if the high 
quality Characteristics are observed: BYBKUE HHH +≥++=Γ W min-W )( H
2θ   
KY H2H θ≤ . Similarly, for low farmer BYBKUE LLL +≥++=Γ W min- W )( L
2θ   
KY L2L θ≤ .  
Substituting Input KY H2H θ≤ and KY L2L θ≤  into the bank ´s expected profit
0)1( =−++−= LH YYKKE ααθπ  and subsequently solve for HY and LY  gives: 
[ ]
α
θαθ KY L
2
H
) -(1 - -1 )min( = and,  
[ ]
α
αθθ
−
=
1
- -1 )min(
2 KY HL , farmers intend to keep  
expected net transfer to bank (Y) as low as possible. It then follows that the interval (Y) 
of high and low skilled farmers with high quality characteristics should lie between:   
[ ] KYK HL 2H
2) -(1 - -1 θ
α
θαθ
≤≤  and 
[ ] KYK LH 2
2
L1
- -1 θ
α
αθθ
≤≤
−
 
The expected profit of Banks in the case of a low quality characteristics is:  
[ ] [ ]KCKrKCKrE LLLLHHHH −−+++−−++−= )1()1()1()1()1( θθαθθαπ  
0)1( =+−++−= LH YYKKE ααθπ  
LH αθθαθ +−= )1(  
HHHHH CKrY )1( θθ −+=  
LLLLL CKrY )1( θθ −+=  
The utility function of farmers both (high and low skilled) if low quality characteristics 
are transmitted is:  W W )( H
2 ≥−+=Γ YKUE HHH θ   KY H
2
H θ≤  for high skilled 
farmers. Similarly for low skilled farmer WW )( L2 ≥−+=Γ YKUE LLL θ   
KY L2
L
θ≤  
Substituting KY H
2
H θ≤  and KY L 2
L
θ≤  into the bank´s expected profit 
0)1( =+−++−= LH YYKKE ααθπ  and subsequently solving for HY and LY  
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Incentive compatibility:  
Using the incentive compatibility in combination with the expected utility for carbon 
farmers with high and low skills we get for )()( EESEES HHLH EUEU Γ<Γ
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 From the equation above it is clear that a high quality farmer with EES pays a higher 
price for a wrong contract and would rather chose HΓ , and low farmer without EES will 
prefer contract LΓ  
Merging the two incentive compatibility conditions we ultimately end up with, 
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From the equation above it is intuitive that:  



<< LHHL
LHHL
C  C  then r r 
C > C  then r> r 
if
if
  
Given that banks are not aware of the private information of the sets of farmers (high 
and low) available, there has to be 2 types of contacts on the financial market. One 
contract would have high interest rate and low collateral while the other low interest rate 
and high collateral. It is essential to analyze the relationship between expected utility, 
interest rate and collateral in the presence of farmer’s ability.   
If expected utility of farmer is given as EUi (Γ i) = W + B + θ i 2K – r i θ i K– (1 – θ i) C i 
then the marginal utility of interest, collateral and carbon revenue are; 
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The marginal dissatisfaction of interest rate decreases as farmer’s talent θ decreases so 
also it can be concluded that marginal dissatisfaction of interest rate increases as 
farmer’s talent θ increases The marginal dissatisfaction of collateral decreases as 
farmer’s talent θ  decreases as these farmers already do not possess enough asset. The 
marginal satisfaction of carbon cash flow to farmer is 1. Farmers will thus choose the 
contracts which give them a better pay-off, thus high quality farmers with EES have a 
marginal rate of substitution (MRS-r,C) (interest and collateral) which is higher compared 
to low farmers given that; 
K
)1(-  EU| 
θ
θ−
=
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C
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Policy implication  
 
7.1 Summary of results  
 
An adequate level of sustainable smallholder agricultural financing by financial 
institutions may improve rural agriculture productivity and lead to rural development. 
Sustainable agriculture as described by Gold (1999) is an integrated system of plant and 
animal production practices having a site-specific application that will over the long 
term:  
- Satisfy human food and fiber needs; 
- Enhance environmental quality and the natural resource base upon which the 
agricultural economy depends; 
- Make the most efficient use of nonrenewable and on-farm resources and 
integrate, where appropriate, natural biological cycles and controls; 
- Sustain the economic viability of farm operations; and enhance the quality of life 
for farmers and society as a whole. 
Sustainability in a smallholder farmer context therefore encompasses a broad range of 
activities ranging from conservation agriculture and crop diversity (including 
agroforestry) to integrated pest management (IPM).  
Sustainable agriculture is also inevitable given the adverse effect of climate 
change in sub-Saharan African (SSA). For instance, most international agendas 
(millennium development goal / sustainable development goal) on sustainable 
development in SSA stipulate a dual objective of poverty reduction and global climate 
protection (Schipper and Pelling, 2006). Sustainable agriculture forestry and other land 
use (AFOLU) programs which ensure effective management of the limited resources 
available to smallholder farmers and preserve the environment can also support rural 
development through new market entry. Small scale carbon certified agroforestry, apart 
from providing certain direct benefits such as improved soil fertility and erosion control, 
also sequestrates carbon from biomass which can be tradable on emission markets. 
International programs which support agriculture emission trading through market 
mechanisms usually provide initial financial and technical support to project developers 
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and smallholder farmers, whereas investments by financial intuitions are limited or non-
existent. Formal financial institutions (micro-finance and commercial banks) in SSA 
have generally allocated limited capital to smallholder agriculture enterprise.  
The persistent low financing of agriculture by formal financial institutions which 
also affects potential “sustainable smallholders” may be detrimental to the long-term 
sustainable development of rural areas. The objective of national and international 
agencies to achieve sustainable development in rural areas may not materialize without 
the involvement of the private sector, especially formal financial institutions. The 
financial sector may complement national agencies in attaining sustainable development, 
as these agencies lack the adequate financial capital to sustain projects in the absence of 
international agencies (Eicher, 1989). A synergy between sustainable farming, 
ecosystem services and credit accessibility within an agroforestry carbon certified 
context may contribute to the aforementioned dual objective of poverty reduction and 
climate change mitigation if existing frameworks are adequately designed.  A structured 
framework which takes into consideration the base benefits of small-scale carbon 
certified agroforestry to smallholder farmers, formal financial institution and 
environment into is essential. Institutional innovation which harnesses emission trading 
and environmental conservation may therefore be an important driver of poverty 
reduction and sustainable rural development in SSA. 
One of the hurdles of engaging in sustainable agriculture in rural SSA—in this 
case participation in emission certified agroforestry programs and earning payment for 
ecosystem services (PES)—is the exclusion of certain types of smallholder farmers from 
such programs based on social status (wealth) and gender. The male-headed household, 
depending on factors such as tradition, religion, and social class, may be a member of a 
network or organization with limited female participation. In Kenya, it was observed 
that agriculture households headed by women did not to emulate farming systems of 
their male counterparts due to lack of information flow from male-headed to female-
headed households (Collier, 1998). Collier (1998) further argues that networks are made 
up of people with identical levels of knowledge, leading to a pooling of individuals, 
whereas a spin-off of such social grouping is the exclusion of the poor. This effect may 
also be observed amongst sustainable agricultural networks and programs in rural 
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Kenya, ultimately leading to the exclusion of smallholder farmers due to differences in 
socioeconomic status. However, the success of sustainable programs depends on the 
willingness of smallholder farmers to participate in program-designed projects (Nair et 
al., 2009). The role of information sharing in the adoption of innovation has being 
emphasized by innovation theory, while appropriate channels of communication have 
being found to increase the speed of uptake of innovation (Rogers, 2003).  
This study investigates whether voluntary smallholder emission certified 
agroforestry programs with PES result in a selection bias where only the wealthier, more 
educated farmers and younger farmers participate. Existing literature has suggested that 
aging smallholder farmers are less likely to adopt agricultural innovations which 
improve productivity since these farmers considerably reduce investments in their farms. 
This is due to the fact that strategic planning of older smallholder farmers tends to have 
a short-term orientation. A number of studies have also indicated that, depending on the 
opportunity cost of labor, a household with a substantially large number of family 
members may be more likely participate in agroforestry programs compared to a smaller 
household due to the availability of labor supply. 
The results suggest that a smallholder´s membership in a formal and informal 
network (e.g., neighbors and family)—and also to a certain extent the smallholder’s age, 
credit constraint and labor supply—positively influences participation in emission 
certified agroforestry programs with PES. Similar to the findings of Cole (2010) on the 
adoption of agroforestry with PES by smallholders in Costa Rica, this study also found 
that strong local networking facilitated the adoption of small-scale agroforestry on farms 
with PES. The results from the field study seem to weakly contradict a large body of 
literature, as the older the smallholder farmer in rural Kenya, the more likely it is that the 
farmer participates in the programs. The field study in rural Kenya, however, adheres to 
the general notion that availability of labor supply increases the chances of participation 
in emission certified agroforestry programs with PES. Although the results suggest a 
positive correlation between labor supply, age and program participation, caution needs 
to be applied to the interpretation of this relationship due to weak statistical significance. 
Schulz (2008), however, that argued that the correlation between labor supply and 
adoption of agroforestry by smallholders is mostly positive and that labor supply tends 
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to act as a catalyst for agroforestry adoption. Farmers who are credit constrained were 
more likely to participate in sustainable programs with PES as these programs usually 
provide loans and savings facilities to members. Socioeconomic variables such as farm 
size (a proxy for wealth) and television/mass media (a proxy for alternative means of 
information) were found to positively (the former) and negatively (the latter) influence 
adoption of emission certified agroforestry. However, both variables were statistically 
insignificant. This result shows that education negatively influences adoption of 
emission certified agroforestry in rural Kenya. The findings of this study imply that 
emission certified agroforestry programs with PES in rural Kenya do not exclude poor 
farmers from participating based on socioeconomic status. Schluz (2008) also found that 
smallholder emission certified agroforestry programs do not exclude the poorest of the 
poor because such programs tend not to lay emphasis on socioeconomic status.  
Access to agricultural financial services in rural sub-Saharan Africa is necessary 
for pro-poor growth (Poulton et al., 2006). To support pro-poor agriculture growth, 
financial institutions have to efficiently allocate funds and broaden their range of 
financial products. In the last couple of decades, the financing of smallholder 
entrepreneurs in the agriculture sector by financial institutions in rural sub-Saharan 
Africa has remained consistently low and in some case experienced sharp decline 
(Sacerdoti, 2005). Limited lending and investment in rural agriculture still occurs, 
despite the increase in the number of financial and non-financial institutions in SSA and 
their general above-average performance (Sacerdoti, 2005). Certain formal institutions 
such as micro-finance banks, despite flexible collateral requirements, are not improving 
rural agriculture financing due to lending that is typically short-term and a focus on 
modernized agriculture and urban non-agricultural economies (Poulton et al., 2006).  
This study reviews trends amongst sub-Saharan African financial institutions, 
based on secondary sources, in the last decade and the potential effect on rural 
agriculture financing. We found a substantial increase in the number of non-
conventional and for-profit institutions in the rural financial sector. While this may lead 
to an increase in outreach and to some extent improve efficiency, it does not necessarily 
correspond to an increase in the level of agriculture funding due in part to the likely 
investment in non-agriculture enterprise. Compared to loan advancement, financial 
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institutions require a reasonably high deposit. Farmers are more inclined to save money, 
rather than borrow, from financial institutions (Basu et al., 2004). Financial institutions 
across Africa would rather hold large deposits in order to access off-shore interest rates 
rather than advance loans to small and medium enterprise SMEs (Sacerdoti, 2005). This 
may be an indication of inefficient allocation of resources amongst some sub-Saharan 
African financial institutions. Protection of depositors and banking regulations in SSA 
are increasing, leading to the adoption of risk management strategies. International 
standards (equator principles) on environmental and social risk analyses for project 
financing are also being implemented by financial institutions. The equator principle 
(EP) is a risk management strategy meant to promote sustainable development (EP, 
2011). Small banks in SSA have stated that they are constrained by regulations enacted 
to reduce their risk, leading to limited lending (Honohan and Beck, 2007).  For instance, 
regulations which stipulate capital requirements as a buffer for credit risk based on a 
borrower’s creditworthiness and collateral may imply that financial institutions would 
opt for less risky projects or investments. Standard creditworthiness and borrower risk 
evaluation may (not) be applicable to rural financing.  The inability to measure and track 
rural agriculture risk may correspond to the presence of limited loan availability and 
extremely high interest rates (Honohan and Beck, 2007). There is an increase in the use 
of information and communication technology (ICT) for financial services in SSA. For 
instance, the provision of certain financial services through mobile phone companies 
(M-PESA) in Kenya and other parts of Africa has been widely taken advantage of and is 
perceived as a banking option for the poor. While this financial product is known for its 
simplicity in the process of transferring money, there is a need to incorporate this 
approach into credit accessibility. ICT innovations which are specifically tailored to the 
needs of rural businesses and clients should be further developed to foster stronger 
complementary (mobile phone payment) banking services. An automated credit 
approval system based on contract farming and warehouse receipts may be an option 
available to financial institutions when using ICT to improve credit assessment 
(Honohan and Beck, 2007).  
We propose two models based on the aforementioned trends observed amongst 
financial institution in SSA to improve sustainable agriculture financing within the 
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region. The existence of standards such as equator principle, although in its infancy, 
ensures that sustainable investments are being financed by financial institutions. The 
adoption of this standard by an increasing number of financial institutions in SSA may 
lead to an improvement in sustainable agricultural financing. In the face of stiff 
competition, financial institutions in rural areas may have to specialize in financing 
certain types of agricultural investments and offer a range of products. In the future, 
financial institutions may efficiently allocate resources to sustainable agriculture in rural 
areas and thus reducing greenhouse gases (GHGs) and promoting food security and 
poverty alleviation (e.g., small-scale carbon certified forestry with payment for 
ecosystem services (PES)). This investment may present a win-win situation for farmers 
and financial institutions by increasing smallholder incomes and providing financial 
institutions access to international capital. Other benefits that may accrue to 
smallholders due to investment in small-scale carbon certified forestry with payment for 
ecosystem services (PES) include acquisition of farm managerial skills, improved 
productivity and collateral substitutes. These benefits may increase smallholders’ access 
to formal credit due to reduced risk of default. The use of ICT in carbon certification to 
monitor, verify and produce reports may also be extended to the risk assessment of 
financial institutions evaluating potential borrowers involved in small-scale carbon 
certified forestry. 
Information asymmetries regarding borrowers, as well as proposed agricultural 
projects, may give rise to moral hazards and become hurdles for agriculture credit in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Simtowe et al., 2006). Financial systems in sub-Saharan African 
and other developing countries with limited non-bank financing and minimal product 
differentiation use inadequate risk pooling mechanisms in the credit evaluation process 
(Honohan and Beck, 2007). Risk-pooling using observable characteristics such as 
farmland, contract farming, credit registry, insurance, deposit, savings and payments 
remains one of the evaluation tools available to all financial institutions for individual 
risk assessment (Honohan and Beck, 2007). Efforts to minimize the dominance of 
commercial banks in the sub-Saharan African financial system and improve agricultural 
lending through the introduction of micro-finance and other institutions have been met 
with limited success. Information asymmetry and adverse selection also affect these 
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institutions and are likely to lead to risk management strategies in which individual 
lending is based on high-collateral contracts, with the ultimate result being credit 
rationing (Boucher et al. 2008). Honohan and Beck (2007) argued that when safe 
borrowers are crowded-out of the financial market due to high interest rates (i.e., risky 
business), banks generally become reluctant to lend, leading to credit rationing despite 
high liquidity. The generalization of rural agricultural business by financial institutions 
in sub-Saharan Africa may result in a common credit risk-pooling system which 
ultimately results in a single interest rate or premium, as describe in a study by Stigliz 
and Weiss (1981). This may imply that, in general, agricultural practices in rural areas 
all have the same level of risk and lack of information regarding business and borrower 
quality which may lead to high interest rates and high collateral requirements.  
This may not necessarily reflect the reality of rural agricultural systems, at least, 
in parts of sub-Saharan Africa with small-scale carbon certified agroforestry, where 
smallholders practice sustainable cultivation. These sustainable farmers keep some form 
of farm records due to participation in ecosystem services and also diversify farm 
revenues by earning payment for environmental services (PES). The agricultural system 
of these farmers is quite different from the conventional system in that it 
adapts/mitigates the adverse climatic and environmental conditions that confront these 
farmers and sustainably increases food production. This production system can, to a 
certain extent, reduce the covariant risk associated with agriculture. The certification of 
smallholder farmers based on emission reduction from a agriculture system resulting in 
PES serves as a proxy for sustainability.  
The pooling system in agricultural credit by financial institutions in sub-Saharan 
Africa may discriminate against sustainable farmers and limit the spread of sustainable 
rural development. We use existing game theory by Batabyal and Beladi (2010) to 
provide some theoretical evidence that inequality may exist due to single risk-pooling if 
the impacts of sustainability are ignored. The signaling of business quality through 
smallholder self-financing of a portion of small-scale carbon certified agroforestry 
should be considered in credit evaluations. This may lead to a separation, rather than a 
pooling, equilibrium in credit contracts. Charging sustainable farmers the same premium 
as conventional farmers may lead to the exit of these farmers from financial markets as 
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well as restrict participation in ecosystem services due to lack of incentives. Therefore, 
separation equilibrium is another way of encouraging and ensuring participation of 
creditworthy borrowers in financial markets and preventing financial institutions from 
operating at a loss. The use of separation equilibrium by financial institutions may also 
lead to the expansion of credit to the unbanked within the agricultural sector as well as 
limit credit rationing. 
   Africa´s financial system, dominated by financial and non-financial institutions with a 
large number of depositors and confronted with a weak judicial system (including land 
tenure), may tend to operate in a restrictive manner.  Honohan and Beck (2007) and 
Sacerdoti (2005) have also identified the poor infrastructure that characterizes the 
sub-Saharan African financial system as one of the reasons for the limited lending that 
has resulted in credit constraints. To protect depositors and core investors and ensure a 
healthy financial environment, financial institutions worldwide have, over the last 10 
years, standardized risk management under the aegis of the Bank of International 
Settlement (BIS). The BIS´s Basel committee on banking supervision (BCBS) issues 
regulatory guidelines on banking operations supervised by respective apex or central 
banks to ensure stability in the financial sector. Under the BCBS guidelines, exposure to 
credit risk by financial institutions must be 
identified,   measured,   monitored   and   controlled and capital must be set aside. 
Capital buffer requirements may affect bank lending by limiting the ability of 
institutions to advance loans while increasing interest rates if the banks are 
undercapitalized (Bridges et al., 2014). The spread of high interest rates could also be 
the result of a higher risk of borrower default (Honohan and Beck, 2007). Capital 
requirements and credit risk exposure certainly impact agricultural lending, especially in 
rural areas. Agricultural loans, similar to retail loans under international standards, are 
risk weighted based on collateral, capital leverage and volatility of earnings and assets. 
Therefore, the information asymmetry which prevails in rural SSA presents a major 
challenge to credit risk evaluation/exposure.  
This study assesses the impact of payment for ecosystem services (PES) on the 
credit risk indictors of financial institutions. Risk indicators comprise the probability of 
default (PD), loss given default (LGD), and expected and unexpected losses (EL/UL). 
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These variables influence the amount of working capital which financial institutions set 
aside as a buffer due to credit advances to (sustainable) borrowers. Available data on 
agriculture land prices and credits per hectare in South Africa from 1990 - 2003 and 
secondary literature on PES from agroforestry per hectare were used to estimate credit 
risk exposure for sustainable and conventional borrowers. During this period the price of 
farmland per hectare, a conventional form of collateral amongst financial institutions 
experienced a considerable drop while credits per hectare remained consistent.  
When a positive but minimal farm revenue per hectare is assumed, the distance 
to default and probability of default for the conventional farmer in the presence of 
falling farmland prices at the end of 2003 was (negative) -2.82 and 99.99 percent, 
respectively. The negative sign clearly indicates a high tendency of borrower default, 
and since the value is below the default threshold, financial institution may therefore ask 
for additional collateral.  This study applies a conservative estimate of US$5 tCO2e for 
one ton of carbon equivalent which reflects current low market prices. Sustainable 
borrowers with PES, despite the drop in farmland prices, were above the default 
threshold (0.176) while the probability of default was 43 percent. This result therefore 
provides some evidence on the benefits of sustainability in agriculture to credit risk 
exposure. 
Small-scale carbon certified agroforestry may lead to a win-win situation where 
smallholder farmers escape poverty through climate resilience and sustainability while 
earning PES (Cole, 2010).  Nair et al. (2009) and Syampungani et al. (2010) argued that 
intercropping farmland with trees increases carbon stock and thus soil fertility which 
may improve farmers’ livelihoods and benefit society, as well as grant access to 
emission markets. Emission trading, despite the immense imbalances between north and 
south, may help smallholder farmers in developing countries accumulate capital 
(Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). This accumulated capital, as well as PES, may also 
present an additional benefit for smallholder farmers in terms of accessibility to formal 
credit. A number of studies have stated that smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa 
generally lack the collateral necessary to access formal credit, resulting in credit 
constraints (Salami et al., 2010; Honohan and Beck, 2007; Poulton et al., 2006). Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) and Wett (1983) argue that banks perceive all borrowers as engaging 
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in the same kind of (risky) investment thereby charging an optimal interest rate and 
collateral requirement and randomly denying loan requests. This is a case of a single 
contract choice where increasing interest rates or collateral requirements may crowd out 
safe borrowers from the financial market leading to a portfolio of loans with high levels 
of risk. On the contrary, the combination of collateral and interest has being argued by 
Su (2012) to lead to a multiple contract choice. PES may not only provide physical 
collateral, i.e., cash flow, but may also signal quality of smallholder livelihood. This 
study hypothesized that sustainable smallholders with PES are less credit constrained 
and have better credit terms compared to conventional smallholders.  
Theoretical evidence based on modification of the sorting and screen model of 
Han et al. (2009) was used to verify the hypothesis. The introduction of a sustainability 
indictor into the model resulted in the multiple contract choice.  Financial institutions 
may end up charging two interest rates based on collateral availability which is in line 
with the reasoning of Su (2012) who argues that “the occurrence of rationing is sensitive 
to the ranking of projects in the borrowing pool.” 
Our results suggest that sustainable smallholder farmers and their immediate 
neighbors in rural Kenya were approximately 2.39 percent more likely to have access to 
formal credit (micro-finance and commercial banks) compared to conventional farmers. 
In the long-term, those sustainable farmers who do have access to credit and keep 
business records are also likely to have interest rates approximately 5 percent lower 
compared to conventional borrowers. However, participation in ecosystem services 
programs does NOT necessarily lead to favorable interest rates for farmers with formal 
credit due to the statistical insignificance of our results. Since the analysis is constrained 
by the limited number of observations and the likely endogeniety issues, caution should 
be exercised in interpretation. Nevertheless, participation in rural sustainable programs 
with PES may be a way to reduce the information asymmetry and moral hazard from a 
banking perspective. Participants not only benefit from farm management training but 
also gain access to formal credit through these programs; additionally, PES helps 
diversify on-farm income which, from a banking perspective, may reduce co-variant risk 
and probability of default. The survey of financial institutions on agricultural credit risk 
evaluation in rural Kenya indicates that these institutions may be more willing to 
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advance loans to farmers with PES compared to conventional farmers, if—and only if— 
the ecosystem service was implemented with the their involvement.  
7.2 Policy recommendation  
The purpose of extension services in agriculture is essentially to provide access 
to information and technology in order to improve rural smallholder livelihoods and 
promote rural development (Davis, 2008). The decline in public extension services, 
despite certain levels of success, is due to high budget costs, unstainable models, and 
inefficiency, as well as lack of specificity to suit local needs (Davis, 2008). Extension 
services in rural areas in SSA have a major role to play in mitigating the effects of 
climate change by prompting practices such as small-scale agroforestry with PES 
amongst smallholder farmers. Kenya´s national agricultural sector extension policy 
(NASEP), which came into effect in 2005, emphasizes the use of agroforestry in climate 
adaptation/mitigation and natural resource management (Speranza et al., 2009). Despite 
formulation of environmental policies, public extension services in Kenya lack 
implementation capacity due to limited funds and know-how (Speranza et al., 2009). A 
number of innovative and efficient extension models which takes into account country 
and farm specific conditions while implementing sustainability programs can be 
replicated by policy-makers (Davis, 2008). 
This study proposes a concrete strategy that extends beyond mere policy 
formulation, suggesting formulation of a national action plan for mitigation/adaptation 
that includes active collaboration with and between research institutions and private 
extension services specializing in carbon-certification. This novel approach prescribes a 
pro-active role for sub-Saharan African public agricultural extension services in 
adaptation and mitigation in the presence of climate change. Although public agriculture 
extension services which primarily focus on sustainable farming with forestry ecosystem 
services (as described in gov.mb (2008)) have been observed in developed countries, 
these services are rather limited in developing countries. Reforestation of farmland and 
training in micro-forestry by public agriculture extension services in the Manitoba 
province in Canada generated carbon revenues and economic incentives of between 
US$5 and $25 per acre (gov.mb, 2008). The Manitoba provincial government in Canada 
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also put together a carbon credit registry and trained carbon verifiers (gov.mb, 2008).  
The involvement of agricultural extension services in the establishmentg of emission 
projects has a positive effect on participating farmers and bridges the knowledge gap in 
terms of carbon sequestration and financing (Seeberg-Elverfeld, 2010). Therefore, 
successful projects in developing countries which link emission research and 
smallholder farmers through specialized, mostly private extension services in 
agroforestry may complement public extension services. This may further promote 
agricultural activities, especially small-scale agroforestry, on the carbon market for 
sustainable farmers. Furthermore, monitoring, verification and reporting (MVR) of 
agroforestry carbon certification improves transparency which is often the hurdle 
confronting agricultural emission reduction that leads to its exclusion from certain 
emission markets. The restriction of sequestrated forest emissions on the European 
Union emission trading scheme (EU ETS) is recognized as one of the barriers to 
generating carbon revenues in sub-Saharan African (Gondo, 2012).  
A national (agriculture) emission trading system which adheres to global 
standards and complements existing carbon markets – clean development mechanism 
and voluntary carbon market – could form the backbone of a market-driven mechanism 
for rural sustainable development. The Chinese government has completed plans to set 
up a unified emission trading system (ETS) to reduce CO2 emissions (current local ETS 
is administered in two provinces and five cities with the carbon price of €9 per ton of 
carbon equivalent tCO2e) (Li et al., 2014). The policy which brought about the 
aforementioned ETS and corresponding prices is argued to effectively reduce future CO2 
emission (Li et al., 2014). The path to an emission trading scheme for sub-Saharan 
Africa should consider following a local, regional, national and international pyramid to 
achieve economic of scope. Local emissions trading system which considers the 
opportunities and challenges existing in sub-Saharan Africa serves as a flexible and 
more affordable emission reduction tool (Niemack, and Chevallier 2010). The African 
carbon exchange (ACX) http://www.acxafrica.com in Kenya and African carbon credit 
exchange http://www.africacce.com in Zambia, a platform for carbon credits traded on 
the clean development mechanism and voluntary carbon markets, can enhance ETS 
creation. With a domestic ETS under development in South Africa, the country´s stock 
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exchange involvement, which already trades carbon credit on its security index, could 
further develop the ETS, increasing local investment in African projects and promoting 
sustainable development (Niemack, and Chevallier, 2010; Waterford, 2008; DEA, 
2011).   
Financing of forestry in sub-Saharan Africa is based on government expenditure 
which may be limited/restricted due to the underestimation of the overall contribution of 
forestry to the economy. Gondo (2012) argues that the current domestic financing of 
forestry in Eastern and Southern Africa is plagued by low government allocation, 
although forestry also generates revenues through licensing, taxes, and fees, despite 
inefficiency. To increase domestic financing of forestry, it is argued that there is a need 
to increase revenues by formalizing activities involving forest operations (Gondo, 2012). 
Establishing an institutional agency which provides financial support to carbon certified 
agroforestry is another way national agencies can generate revenue through a low-
carbon economy. 
The participation of financial institutions in the financing of small-scale carbon 
certified agroforestry projects in sub-Saharan Africa has been rather limited. For 
instance, a limited number of small-scale carbon-certified agroforestry projects in sub-
Saharan Africa have a high level of both non-financial and micro-finance institutional 
financing (Shames et al., 2012; Shames and Scherr, 2010). Local funding of small-scale 
carbon projects in sub-Saharan Africa is limited, leaving host countries to source 
funding from external investors (Pfeifer and Stiles, 2008). The limited financing of 
small-scale carbon certified agroforestry by financial institution may be due to lack of 
technical knowledge and lack of project benefits accruable to these institutions. The 
situation in rural Kenya, where a substantial number of financial institutions are not 
aware of smallholder payment for ecosystem service (PES) in agroforestry, is an 
example of the lack of awareness of sustainability by local financial institutions. 
Fletschner and Kenney (2011) argue that the low level of financing of rural business was 
due to the inability of financial institutions to appraise their clients’ businesses, as well 
as limited specific product lines and high collateral requirements. Financial institutions 
need to invest in local capability building by training their staff on sustainable financing 
and risk management, while emphasis should be placed on diversifying agricultural 
 138 
 
portfolios. Financial institutions’ lack of awareness and recognition of ecosystem 
services may lead to forgone revenue and/or improved agricultural lending. Investing in 
carbon certification may also serve as a long-term strategy for financial institutions in 
rural sub-Saharan Africa. 
Financial institutions must broaden their definition of eligible collateral by 
including physical collateral that poor rural smallholder farmers, particularly women, 
possess (Fletschner and Kenney, 2011). In line with the results of this study, Shames et al. 
(2012) also argue that financial institutions are increasingly acknowledging membership 
(contract) in carbon projects with PES as a form of security; this may be perceived as an 
indirect benefit of sustainable farming. Gondo (2012) describes eco-securitization (cash-
flow from ecosystem services) as an alternative to usual creditworthiness in evaluating 
collateral for forestry project financing. There is need for formal financial institution in 
sub-Saharan Africa to also shift attention to eco-securitization as an appropriate means 
of sustainable farming collateralization. This may not only increase loan advancement to 
farmers participating in carbon projects but also bank those farmers who were initially 
unbanked by providing them with bank accounts. The non-governmental organization 
(NGO) Environmental Conservation Trust (ECOTRUST) in Uganda intends to establish 
a financial institution which advances loans to farmers with PES from carbon-certified 
agroforestry (Shames et al., 2012). A proposed ECOTRUST bank with a local financial 
institution with adequate infrastructure and banking know-how may not only reduce 
transaction costs but also provide an opportunity for financial institution involvement in 
sustainable financing. Such collaboration may promote the spread of sustainable credit 
risk management amongst financial institutions in rural areas in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
financing of sustainable projects may further strengthen rural financial institutions´ 
equator principles as well as environmental, social and governance (ESG) procedure. In 
a number of sub-Saharan banks, ESG is not incorporated into standards evaluation due 
to the lack of guidelines on implementation, despite the continent´s environmental 
degradation (UNEP, 2007). The use of ESG in credit risk management and investment 
decision-making through sustainability credit risk assessment (SCRA) policies is argued 
to re-direct funds to projects that mitigate adverse social and environmental effects in 
sub-Saharan (UNEP, 2007). 
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Regional and international financial organizations, such as the African 
development bank (AfDB) and the international finance corporation (IFC), provide 
incentives that may increase the participation of African financial institutions in carbon 
financing, if adequately implemented. The AfDB´s African Carbon Support Programme 
(ACSP) on climate change and clean development mechanism (CDM) is expected to 
generate carbon revenues in excess of US$150 million at a carbon price of US$3 per ton 
(tCO2 e) over the next 10 years (AfDB, 2013). ACSP´s capacity building and awareness 
tool for carbon trading mechanism is argued to target AfDB staff, project owners and 
government agencies (AfDB, 2013)  Local financial institutions seem to not be 
integrated into the ACSP, even though they are likely financiers of such projects; this 
situation may not lead to substantial increase in the financing of carbon projects by local 
banks. However, commercial bank loans as a possible financing instrument for carbon 
projects in West Africa are proposed by the African investment fund (Pfeifer and Stiles, 
2008). The lack of integration of rural banks into ACSP may be one of the reasons why 
local funding of small-scale carbon projects in sub-Saharan Africa is limited. The 
financing of investment which improves environmental standards in sub-Saharan Africa 
can be made through subsidized credits for local banks offered by international 
organizations or the establishment of a guaranteed fund to improve lending conditions 
for local banks (Paulais and Pigey, 2009).   
Local banks often do not consider carbon revenues when evaluating project 
funding proposals as they perceive it to be an intangible asset with high price volatility 
and high risk (Pfeifer and Stiles, 2008). However, revenues from carbon projects could 
cover between 5 and more than 100 percent of total costs, depending on the type of 
project undertaken (Pfeifer and Stiles, 2008). Banks consider the financing of investment 
in sustainable agriculture as a high-risk venture primarily due to disruption of operation 
and legal issues, with credit risk also being a major issue (IFC, 2007). IFC can sensitize 
financial institutions to the importance of sustainability as an instrument of economic 
growth and help local banks design bank-area-borrower-specific financial products 
which address social and environmental imbalances. Local banks must, however, 
develop specific strategies for sustainable banking which align with their objectives and 
sustainability trends within their location (IFC, 2007). There are strong indications that 
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the financing of sustainable projects and businesses by financial institutions amounts to 
higher returns, reduced risk and improved access to international capital for the financial 
institution involved (IFC, 2007). The IFC standard on social and environmental risk 
management in private-sector investment, the backbone of the equator principle, is 
applied by 43 financial institutions which finance 80 percent of global sustainable 
projects (IFC, 2007).  
A social and environmental standard developed with IFC for micro-finance 
institutions purposely for the evaluation of agriculture carbon emission projects in 
developing countries could further increase IFC standards amongst other institutions 
aside from commercial banks. This provides an additional opportunity for micro-finance 
banks to access international capital for carbon projects that often require high up-front 
costs. Special loans from international financing institutions mitigate the risk for private 
sector institutions of participation in carbon projects by reducing overall exposure 
(Pfeifer and Stiles, 2008). Banks adopting this standard may not only contribute to the 
macroeconomic development of rural areas but also gain  a first mover advantage in best 
sustainability practices (IFC, 2007). The access of micro-finance institutions to a new 
market may result in increased environmental, social and economic benefits to poor 
smallholder farmers and improve their livelihoods. 
Incentives such as the BioCarbon fund offered by the World Bank provide 
financial and technical support to forestry projects that sequestrate carbon and that are 
likely to increase land-use emission reduction activities in developing countries on the 
carbon market (World Bank, 2014). While diversifying the incomes of farmers through 
payment for ecosystem service (PES) is important, co-benefits such as biodiversity 
conservation and institutional innovation in rural areas are also important aspectsof 
BioCarbon Funded projects (World Bank, 2014). The World Bank´s forest carbon 
partnership facility (FCPF) fosters partnership on forest related emission reduction 
(World Bank, 2010). FCPF focuses on reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation – plus (REDD+) from a small-scale perspective. The objectives of the FCPF 
are to enhance capacity building within REDD+ as well as evaluate payment based on 
project performance through a readiness and the carbon finance mechanism to limit 
deforestation and alleviate poverty (World Bank, 2010). There is need for central, 
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regional and local governments to work with rural communities and organizations to 
create awareness about forestry carbon financing as well as efficient implementation 
strategies. The BioCarbon fund and FCPF, which are accessible to host country 
authorities, may improve carbon-certified agroforestry under certain price conditions. 
For instance, the low price of carbon is a source of concern amongst experts when it 
comes to the ability and effectiveness of a market-driven mechanism to adequately price 
carbon and ensure a low carbon economy. In the case of serious action to control climate 
change given a global carbon market, a harmonized price of between US$28 and $200 
tCO2e is appropriate (Australian Government, 2011). The global financial crisis and 
higher forecasted energy prices (less emission) in developed countries is suggested to 
have decreased world carbon prices while the estimated increase in future emissions 
from developing countries is helping stabilize world carbon prices (Australian 
Government, 2011). Winchester and Reill (2014) estimate a price between US$55 and 
$217 for each ton of carbon from 2015 to 2050 as a precondition for a favorable market 
for biomass energy with less land-use change, similar to the estimations of the 
Australian Government (2011).   
7.3 Recommendation for future research  
The analysis carried out in this study investigates potential synergies between 
small-scale carbon certified agroforestry (climate smart agriculture - sustainability) and 
agricultural financing. One of objectives of this analysis is to evaluate how smallholder 
carbon certification from agroforestry influences the credit risk evaluation of formal 
financial institutions (micro-finance and commercial banks) and smallholder credit 
accessibility. Another objective is to access the factors that determine the participation 
of smallholder farmers in small-scale carbon certified agroforestry with payment for 
ecosystem services. 
 Chapter 2 shows the ability of utility theory and the probit/logit model to serve 
as instruments for practical scenario analysis of ecosystem service adoption amongst 
smallholder farmers. This methodology shows how latent variables such as networking 
may influence observable factors, unlike a model strictly based on pure observable 
variables. Schulz (2008) suggests incorporating social capital into future research 
 142 
 
because a common approach used in studies on agricultural adoption often neglects this 
variable, one which may strongly influence adoption decision. This study takes the 
effect of social capital into account and proposes a platform on which stakeholders can 
communicate with and promote adoption of agroforestry carbon certification amongst 
smallholder farmers. The application of such a model to determine the factors that 
influence adoption of carbon certification in agroforestry in a rural setting, however, 
requires further research. A number of research studies on factors that affect the 
adoption of agricultural innovation with payment for ecosystem services by farmers 
have been conducted (Garbach et al., 2012; van der Horst, 2011; Schulz, 2008). 
However, adoption amongst smallholder farmers in sub-Saharan Africa is not adequately 
covered. While utility theory and latent variable categories have been used to analyze 
risk in agroforestry decision making by Senkondo (2000), they have found limited 
application in adoption of carbon certification in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The game theoretic model applied in chapter 4 and chapter 6 indicates that 
carbon certification in agroforestry or sustainable farming may provide certain benefits 
to smallholder farmers and banks in terms of credit risk evaluation and collateral 
substitution. There is need to apply caution to the results of this analysis which is based 
on a cross-sectional data “one point-in-time” and a limited household survey. This type 
of one point-in-time analysis may not capture the true price of carbon which is highly 
volatile over time, and reporting done by farmers may lack a high degree of accuracy. 
To gain a long-term overview of the effect of small-scale carbon certified agroforestry 
on credit risk evaluation of, credit accessibility for and interest rates offered to 
smallholder farmers, it is important to use a time series. Time series data collected from 
a field study would provide a more comprehensive analysis on the possible long-term 
effect of sustainability on agricultural financing. 
   The credit risk modelling of formal financial institutions in chapter 5 suggests a 
lower probability of default for sustainable farmers. Aligning benefits from sustainable 
farming such as payment of ecosystem services (PES) to the risk management strategy 
of rural micro-finance may be an interesting extension for future research. Future 
research should therefore include a comprehensive cost and benefit analysis of 
ecosystem services for smallholder farmers and banks alike. In so doing the feasibility of 
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financial institutions extending investment to ecosystem services while taking the 
opportunity cost of financing into account may provide new perspectives on agricultural 
financing. 
 Finally, while some of the direct effects of carbon certified agroforestry such as 
soil fertility and conservation and renewable sources of energy are well documented, not 
everything is known about the possible long-term indirect benefits, especially with 
regards to agricultural financing. There is an urgent need for such research to analyze in 
more depth the win-win situation associated with ecosystem services.  
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Questionnaire 1 
Macroeconomics (Europäisches Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
-EIIW) 
Bergish University of Wuppertal (BUW) 
Analysis of agriculture conservation and rural formal lending in sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Questionnaire (smallholder respondents) 
If you have any queries contact: 910614@uni-wuppertal.de or Welfens@uni-
wuppertal.de 
 
 
Preamble: Dear respondents, please be informed that this study is purely for academic 
work. We therefore solicit for your support and cooperation by providing the necessary 
information. As we are aware of the sensitivity of the financial data sought and the need 
to assure privacy, we promise to treat the information provided as confidential.    
Criteria:  
a. Decision-maker on farm activity: [ ] 
b. Above 18 years of age: [ ] 
c. Height [ ] 
 
Enumerator………………………............ 
 Respondent………………………………  
 
Section B: Socio-economic detail 
1. Number of household members working on farm …………………………………. 
2. Do you have a cell phone a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]   
Farm Labor  
Member of household Hours per day  Day per week 
Farmer   
Spouse   
Children   
6 – 10 +   
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11 – 15 +   
16 – 17 +   
18 – 29 +   
30 – 59 +   
External laborers   
   
 
3. Number of hectare of farmland………………………………….  
4. Location of farmland: a. on a slope [  ]  b. on a plain [  ]  c. on a plateau [  ] d. in a 
valley [  ] 
5. Dwelling structure: a. Plastered house [  ]   b. Non-plastered house [  ]   b. Hut [  ] 
6. Is farmland assessable by road:  a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
7. Is there a school present in the community a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
8. Which type of institution is present: a. elementary school [ ]  b. secondary school [ ] 
c. college [ ] d. Others [ ] specify..…………. 
9. What is the distance of farm to next major tarred road………………km 
10. What is the distance of your home to the nearest market? ……………………km 
11. Are you the owner of your farmland: a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
If No, how much is the rent charge ……………………… 
Does the owner influences your farming a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
12. How long have you being cultivating your farmland: ……………………………… 
13. What kind of farm implements is used on farmland: a. mechanized [  ]   b. manual [  
] 
14. Ownership of the following farm asset: 
 
Type Quantity 
Tractor  
Harrow (breaking up and smoothing soil)  
Plow (drawn by animals)  
Hoes  
Work cattle  
Cutlass  
Rake   
Cattles   
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Cart  
Pigs  
Poultry  
Donkey/ horses   
Goats/mutton  
Others animals (specify………………….)  
 
15. Type of cultivated Cash crop  
Name Cultivated  Percentage of own 
consumption 
Green beans Annually [ ] Biannually [ ] Others (…..) [ ]  
Sweet potato Annually [ ] Biannually [ ] Others (…..) [ ]  
Tomatoes Annually [ ] Biannually [ ] Others (…..) [ ]  
Cabbage Annually [ ] Biannually [ ] Others (…..) [ ]  
Baby corn Annually [ ] Biannually [ ] Others (…..) [ ]  
Flowers Annually [ ] Biannually [ ] Others (…..) [ ]  
Tobacco Annually [ ] Biannually [ ] Others (…..) [ ]  
Maize Annually [ ] Biannually [ ] Others (…..) [ ]  
Others (specify 
……………) 
Annually [ ] Biannually [ ] Others (…..) [ ]  
 
16. Do you purchase seeds: a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
17. Amount paid for seedlings a. (in 2011)…………………… b. (in 
2012)……………… 
18. Type of seed of seeds: a. Hybrid [  ]   b. Genetically Modified  [  ] c. Conventional [  
] 
19. Do you use own harvested seeds: a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
20. Use of fertilizer a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
If yes:  
Chemical 
fertilizer 
used:  
amount 
used 
amount 
paid 
subsidized Organic 
fertilizer 
Used: 
amount 
used 
amount 
paid 
subsidized  
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21. Use of Plant protection a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
If yes:  
Pesticide  
(Chemical) 
used:  
amount 
used 
amount 
paid 
subsidized Biological 
Method 
used: 
amount 
used 
amount 
paid 
subsidized  
        
        
        
        
        
 
22. Are you a member of a (farming) cooperative: a. Yes [ ]   b. No [ ] 
If yes, please specify: 
……………………………………………………………………. 
23. How long have you being a member: ……………………..(years)  
24. Which one of these services doers your cooperative provide  
a. Training and extension services [ ] b. information exchange [ ] c. marketing of 
farm produce [ ] d. credit [ ] e. saving [ ] 
25. Are there non-governmental organizations (NGO) and governmental organization 
promoting sustainable / conservation farming and ecosystem management in the 
region: 
 a. Yes [ ]   b. No [ ] 
If yes how did you get to know of such organization: a. word of mouth [ ] b. mass 
media [ ] c. social organization (cooperative) [ ] 
26. Are you a member of such organization: a. Yes [ ]   b. No [ ] 
27. Do you participate in conversation farming / ecosystem program as a group within 
such organization: a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
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28. If yes,  
Type of conservation farming Type of ecosystem provided 
  
  
  
 
29. What is your reason for participating in the ecosystem services/conservation 
program? 
………………………………………………………………………………………
……. 
30. Why do you think you were admitted into the program  
………………………………………………………………………………………
……. 
31. Are your neighbors also involved in ecosystem services/conservation program a. 
Yes [ ]   b. No [ ] 
If yes, distance to next neighbor participating in program……………… 
32. What percentage of land is delegated to Payment of ecosystem services? 
……………%  
33. Are there any extension / ecosystem agent assigned by the organization to your 
group 
: a. Yes [ ]   b. No [ ] 
34. How often do these agents visit your group in a year: 
a. Weekly [ ] b. Fortnightly [ ] c. Monthly [ ] d. Every three months [ ] 5 Others [ ] 
specify …………… 
35. Have you always had trees planted on your farmland: a. Yes [ ]   b. No [ ]  
If yes, reason and year of planting ………………………………………………… 
How many trees do you have on your farmland…………………………………. 
36. What is the business of the group? 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
37. What year did you join the group? ..........................................................................  
38. Did you pay membership fee in year 2012: a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
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If yes how much is the membership fee………….. 
39. How often does your group meet? ……………………………… times 
(week/month) 
40. Which of the following represents the percentage of the time you attend such 
meeting last year? a. 1 – 20% [  ] b. 21 – 40% [  ] c. 41 – 60% [  ] d. 61 – 80% [  ] d. 
81 – 100% [  ] 
41. Is there penalty for lateness / non-attendance of meeting a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
If yes,  
Lateness is: …………………………… 
Nonattendance is: …………………….. 
42. How many members are there in the group: …………………………….. 
43. Which of the following facilities/benefits does you group provide: 
a. Training [ ] b. Investment [ ]   c. Monitoring [ ] d. credit [ ] e. others [ ]  
(specify…………………..) 
44. Did you receive payment for ecosystem services (PES) in 2012 a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
If yes, what was the amount………………………………………. 
45. Which of the following direct cost are associated with conservation agricultural/ 
ecosystem program: a. travel expense  [  ]   b. information gathering [  ] c. external 
monitoring [  ] d. protection cost [  ] e. technical support [  ] f. Consultancy [  ] 
What is the aggregated direct cost of conservation agricultural / ecosystem program 
per year ……………………………………… KES 
46. Estimated agriculture production in 2011:  
Cash crops [  ] a. Bags …………….or  b. value (kg/KES)………………….. 
Others [  ] a. Bags …………….or  b. value (kg/KES)…………………… 
Sold at: ………………………………………………………………………….. 
47. Estimated agriculture production in 2012:  
Cash crops [  ] a. Bags …………….or  b. value (kg/KES)………………….. 
Others [  ] a. Bags …………….or b. value (kg/KES)…………………… 
Sold at: ………………………………………………………………………….. 
48. How do you transport your farm produce to sales point: 
……………………………….. 
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49. What is the distance to market or sales point: 
…………………………………………… 
50. Do you use your cell phone to obtain market information a. Yes[ ]    b. No [ ] 
51. Estimated agriculture production before joining conservation / ecosystem services 
program:  
a. Bags ………………………  or value b.  (kg/KES)………………….. 
52. Has participation in conservation agricultural / ecosystem program improved yields:  
a. Yes [ ]    b. No [ ] 
53. Did/do you source business relevant information a. Yes [ ]    b. No [ ] 
54. What was your monthly/yearly farm income in 20….: [ ] 
55. Which of the following are yours source of income  
Primary business Percentage contribution 
to income  
Farm [ ] Off- farm [ ]  
a. Spouse: 
……………….. 
b. Other family 
members: 
………………. 
c. Gift  
d. Remittance 
e.  Ecosystem 
revenue…………
… 
f. Others 
(specify)………
…………………
…… 
a. Spouse: 
……………….. 
b. Other family 
members: 
………………. 
c. Gift  
d. Remittance 
e. Ecosystem 
revenue………
… 
f. Others 
(specify)………
………………
…… 
 
 
Section C: Banking and Finance detail 
56. Client of a formal banking institution: a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]   
If yes which: 
[   ] Micro-finance (small loans)…………………………………………………….  
[   ] Conventional Bank...……………………………………………… 
[   ] Co-operative Bank ...……………………………………………………..]   
57. Year of registration with institution...……………………………………………… 
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58. Are you or your neighbor having short term credit constraints i.e. you cannot get 
credit a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
59. Do you have crop damage insurance a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]   
60. Which of the following services does your bank provide: 
a. Saving [   ] b. Credit [   ] c. Investment [   ]   d. Others [   ] (specify 
………………)  
61. Did you take credit from the formal banking institution: a. 2011 [   ] b. 
2012 [ ] c. earlier [   ] (specify …………) 
If yes please specify the amount 
……………………………………………………….. 
62. Did you take credit from other source in: a. 2011 [   ] b. 2012 [   ] c. 
earlier [ ] (specify …………) 
If yes please specify source……………………………………………………….. 
If yes please specify the amount 
……………………………………………………….. 
63. Do you have access to cell phone banking a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]   
64. Have you use phone banking in the past 12 month a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ] 
65. What was the reason for obtaining credit (formal /informal): 
a. [   ] Farming business  
b. [   ] Non-farming business 
c. [   ] Daily Need / food 
d. [   ] Child education 
c. [   ] Health care 
e. [   ] Others (Specify ……………………………………………………..) 
66. What was the interest rate charge on credit: ………………………..% 
67. Type of Guarantee/ Security on loan:  
a. [ ] group Guarantee 
b. [ ] Government Guarantee 
c. [ ] Physical Collateral 
d. Others (specify……………………………………………….)  
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68. What was the duration (days/weeks/months) between loan application and loan 
collection……………… 
69. When was the loan due: ………………………………….. 
70. What was the amount (loan + interest) yet to be repaid as at this due date  
……………………………………….. 
71. Did/would you pay part of an outstanding loan with ecosystem payments or farm 
profit:  
a. Yes [   ]   b. No [   ]   
72. Did you save part of your income in:  
a. 2011 [  ] b. 2012 [  ] c. earlier [  ] (specify date ……………) 
If yes please specify the amount 
……………………………………………………….. 
73. What was the reason for saving  
a. [   ] Access to saving  
b. [   ] Access to credit 
c. [   ] Interest rate on saving 
d. [   ] survival strategy  
74. What was the interest rate on savings: ………………………..% 
75. Visitation frequency of loan officer to (your/group) business in 20….. 
a. Weekly [  ] b. fortnightly [  ] c. monthly [  ]  d. quarterly [  ]
 e. others [  ] (specify……………) 
 
Section A: Demographics and personal details  
 
76. Name …………………………………………………… 
77. Community …………………………………………………………………………. 
78. Province/County …………………………………………………. 
79. Age ………………… 
80. Religion ……………………………………………. 
81. Gender: a. Male [  ]  b. female [  ]  
82. Marital status: a. single[  ]   b. Married [  ]   c. Widow [  ]   e. Divorced [  ]  
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83. Number of spouse if married ……………….. Age of spouse……………………… 
84. Occupation: a. Farming [ ]   b Farming and ……………… c. others specify 
………………..   
85. Years of formal education………..Spouse Years of formal education………………. 
86. School certificate: a. elementary school [ ]  b. secondary school [ ] c. college [ ] d. 
Others  
[ ] specify ..…………. 
87. Tribal / ethnic group ………………………………………………….. 
88. Number of individual in household……………………… 
89. Household composition  
Age (years) No. of males  No. of females 
0 – 5 +   
6 – 10 +   
11 – 15 +   
16 – 17 +   
18 – 29 +   
30 – 59 +   
60 +   
 
90. Please indicate which of the following items you own (household Asset)? 
a. Chair [ ]  
b. Table [ ]  
c. Lamp/ Lantern [ ]  
d. Watch / Clock [ ]  
e. Bed [ ]  
f. Motor cycle [ ] 
g. Bicycle [ ] 
h. Radio , Cassettes, CD [ ] 
i.  TV / VCR [ ] 
j. Concrete slab for dying [ ] 
k. Rainwater reservoir [ ]  
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l. Others (specify) [ ]………………………… 
91. In the past one year has your household purchased or spend money on any of the 
following  
product  Value of 
product 
Fabric  a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Male cloths  a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Female cloths a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Child cloths (< 15) a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Shoes, hats, umbrella a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Kitchen utensils a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Bedding a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
House improvement  a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
School tuition a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Loan payment a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Books  a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Medicine, Pharmacy a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Hospital Clinic a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Social celebration a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Trips / transportation a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Energy (stove, electricity) a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
savings a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Farm implements a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Food  (including processed) a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Alcohol a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
Cigarettes a. Yes [  ]   b. No [  ]    
 
Thank You!!! 
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Questionnaire 2 
 
Private and Confidential  
 
 
This questionnaire is provided in connection with a study by Emmanuel Benjamin to 
assess the credit risk management in SME agricultural loan [Kenya] The study is being 
conducted in collaboration with the [European Institute for International Economic 
Relations] under a PhD program . Responses to this questionnaire will be used to 
develop general findings and conclusions without specific reference to institutions, 
clients or credits, except where information may be independently available in the public 
domain or where permission has been granted approval.  
Responses to the questionnaire should be completed in as much detail as possible, and 
supported by relevant statistics and data where available.  
 
1. Types of Lending.  
a. Describe the types of lending provided by your institution and the total volume 
and percentages of lending in each category and the interest rates charged on 
each of the above types of lending 
Type of lending  Total volume  Percentage  Interest rate 
charged  
Primary sector    
Agriculture    
Mining    
forestry    
Fishery     
Secondary sector    
Manufacturing    
Processing    
Construction    
Others (Specify)    
Personal    
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Mortgage    
Auto     
Educational     
 
b. What types of risk management techniques does the Bank utilizes and what is the 
preferred (or most common) form used: A. collateralization B. Guarantor C. 
Insurance D. Securitization  
Type of lending  Collateral required  Collateral preferred  
Primary sector   
Agriculture   
Mining   
forestry   
Fishery    
Secondary sector   
Manufacturing   
Processing   
Construction   
Others (Specify)   
Personal   
Mortgage   
Auto    
Educational    
c. Which of the following credit criteria is used to determine borrower’s 
creditworthiness in the primary sector esp. SME agriculture? 
Factors  Reponses  Importance (rating) 
Income, past earnings and 
projected cash flow 
Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Number of account at other 
institutions 
Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Character and reputation  Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
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Experience and depth of 
business  
Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Strength of business Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Ability to repay the loan with 
earnings from the business  
Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Sufficient invested equity to 
operate on a sound financial 
basis 
Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Potential for long term success Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
The effect any business 
affiliate may have on the 
ultimate repayment ability of 
the applicant  
Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
 
d. Do you also rate credit worthiness of the primary sector using the following factors? 
Factor  Reponses  Importance (rating) 
New application  Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Late payment  Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Delinquency Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Bankruptcy  Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Credit history Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Outstanding debt  Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Type of credit in used Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
 
e. Describe 5 key problems that exist in the loans procedure to SME agriculture?  
1. ……………………………………………………….. 
2. ……………………………………………………….. 
3. ……………………………………………………….. 
4. ……………………………………………………….. 
5. ……………………………………………………….. 
f. Do you group SME agriculture into method of farming i.e. conventional and 
conservation?  
a. Yes [ ]      b. No [ ] 
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g. Do you pool or segment SME farm operation in credit contract term? 
a. pooling [  ]      b. segmenting [  ] 
If segmenting, please state criteria ………………………………………………. 
 
2. Security/Collateral.  
a. What proportion of lending is secured by category? 
Type of lending  Percentage secured  
Primary sector  
Agriculture  
Mining  
forestry  
Fishery   
Secondary sector  
Manufacturing  
Processing  
Construction  
Others (Specify)  
  
  
 
b. What portion of your total loan in the last five years is allocated to commercial and 
small medium enterprise agriculture SME?   
Year Commercial farms  SME 
2012   
2011   
2010   
2009   
 159 
 
2008   
 
c. Are you aware of Payment for ecosystem services amongst SME conservation 
agriculturalist?  
a. Yes [ ]      b. No [ ] 
 
d. Would you consider this an eligible collateral substitute in loan procedure? 
a. Yes [ ]      b. No [ ] 
 
3. Credit Recovery and Credit Risk Management.  
A. what type of securities does the Bank prefer from primary sector esp. esp. SME 
agriculture 
Assets Reponses Importance  
Land Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Cash deposit Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Jewelry Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Bicycle Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Motorcycle Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Car Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Farm animals Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
Farm implements Yes [ ]      No [ ]  
 
b. Describe 5 key problems that exist in the creation, recording (registration) and 
enforcement of security and collateral in SME agriculture?  
1. ……………………………………………………….. 
2. ……………………………………………………….. 
3. ……………………………………………………….. 
4. ……………………………………………………….. 
5. ……………………………………………………….. 
……………………………………………………….. 
c. Does your institution have a credit recovery department that handles collection of 
credits in default? a. Yes [ ]    b.  No [ ] 
If yes, describe the following:  
i. The organizational structure of the department, number of staff bank-
wide, and the process for decision-making.  
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…………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……. 
 
ii. The qualification requirements and training process for staff in this 
department. 
 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……. 
  
iii. Any standardized procedures for handling credit recovery and whether 
a general operations manual or guide exists.  
…………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…… 
…………………………………………………………………………………
……. 
 
 
d. At what point is a credit transferred to the credit recovery department for action?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………
……….. 
 
- 1 - Private and Confidential  
 
a. Provide data on the level of agriculture non-performing loans (NPLs) in your 
institution on an annual basis for the past 5 years by amounts and percentages with 
reference to (i) aggregate amounts.  
 
Year Amount % of total NPLs 
 161 
 
2012   
2011   
2010   
2009   
2008   
 
 
4. Credit Recovery Methodologies.  
a. For SME agricultural loan  indicate the following information to the extent possible 
on an annual basis for the past 4-5 years: (i) average recovery rates (as a 
percentage of the total credit due, including interest components) (ii) average 
recovery rates (as a percent of nominal value of the credit); (iii) the average duration 
for recovery; and (iv) the average costs incurred in trying to collect the loans (e.g., 
costs of litigation, costs for external lawyers, valuation reports, auction or execution 
costs, experts.). The following table may be helpful for assembling the information 
in sections a. and b of this question.  
Credit Recovery 
Method 
Total Credits  Ave. 
Recovery  
(% Total 
Due) 
Ave. 
Recovery 
(% 
Nominal) 
Ave. 
Duration 
Ave. Costs 
Incurred 
No. Amount  
Sale of credit to third 
party 
      
Debt Rescheduling        
 Informal workout       
 Non-judicial 
foreclosure/Exec. 
      
Judicial Foreclosure 
(immoveable) 
      
Judicial execution 
(moveable) 
      
Liquidation       
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Formal Rehabilitation 
(e.g., concordat, 
administration, etc.) 
      
Debt Equity Swap       
Other       
Private and Confidential  
5. Information. (This question deals with the quality of information available for credits)  
a. Describe the type of information routinely requested by your institution from SME 
agriculture borrower: 
I. in the case of a workout: a. financial statements [ ] b. cash flow projections [ ] c. pro 
forma statements [ ] d. Others specify ……………………………….. 
II. Seeking a new credit  
……………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
III During the course of the course of a credit relationship in which the credit is 
performing 
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………  
How would you describe the quality of the information provided by the SME 
agricultural debtors in each of the above instances? a. Good [ ]    b. Fair [ ]   c. Poor 
[ ] d. Not relevant [ ] 
b. What steps does your institution follow to verify the integrity and accuracy of 
information provided by borrower (and borrowers in default)?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………
…………  
 
7. Workouts. In a debt rescheduling or a more extensive workout arrangement of SME 
agricultural loans, which one of the changes in the business does your institution require as a 
condition to rescheduling or workout?  
a. change in agricultural management [ ] 
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b.  cost cutting measures [ ] 
c.  sale of assets [ ] 
d.  provision of new collateral/security [ ] 
How frequently are these changes implemented?  
……………………………………………………………………………………………….. 
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